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Essay 1 
A New Approach to Evaluating  
Active Labour Market Programs 
 
 
Joint with Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper calculates the impact of Active Labour Market Programmes through the use of 
three new indicators measuring the application performance of the unemployed. These 
indicators can be measured repeatedly and therefore allow the usage of Panel Regression 
methods, cancelling out any unobserved individual heterogeneity. To implement the new 
approach, data on 30,000 applications has been collected. Using this data, a large positive 
effect for unemployed with a long term unemployment forecast was estimated. For 
unemployed without such a forecast, the effect is much smaller. The paper also shows that 
the new evaluation approach fulfils the requirements of a good controlling instrument: It is 
accurate, detailed, non-intrusive, inexpensive and therefore easy to keep up to date, easy to 
understand and communicate.  
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1. Introduction 
Many national labour agencies use a large proportion of their resources for Active Labour 
Market Programmes (ALMPs), with the intention to make the reintegration of unemployed 
persons quicker and longer lasting. In 2007, the average OECD member country spent 0.56 
of its GDP on ALMPs. In order to improve the quality of these expensive programs, a good 
controlling instrument is needed. This controlling instrument should estimate the ALMP 
effects in an unbiased way. It should be easy to understand and communicate and therefore 
being trusted. It should be detailed so that its findings can be used to identify which ALMP is 
successful for which group of unemployed. Ideally, the instrument would indicate why an 
ALMP is successful or unsuccessful, so existing programs can be adapted. It should be 
relatively cheap so it can be applied on a regular basis, to keep the results updated and 
relevant for the current labour market.  
   
Unfortunately, such an instrument doesn’t exist yet. In some ways this is not surprising, as 
the challenges are nontrivial: A direct comparison between participants and non-participants 
of a certain ALMP is not possible, as it is very likely that characteristics which influence the 
decision of participation (by the unemployed or case worker) also influence the outcome on 
the labour market. Comparing only very similar participants and non-participants as done 
through the intensively used matching approach has limits because it can only rely on the 
characteristics recorded in databases. Often, many important features and skills of the 
unemployed are missing in these records. 
 
This study tries another attempt at the old research question; how can one measure the 
effect of an ALMP accurately? It doesn’t do this by applying more sophisticated statistical 
tools, but instead through a different approach and different data. As part of this study, a nine 
months data collection period was carried out at an agency of the Swiss unemployment 
insurance in the city of Zurich. During this time, all applications written by the unemployed at 
this agency, their characteristics and outcome were documented. A sample of 30,000 
applications was then coded and recorded electronically. Further data on the unemployed 
and the ALMP was collected through surveys among the case workers and the persons 
responsible for the ALMP. Through this, a very rich dataset was assembled.  
 
Based on the idea of Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller (2005), this paper measures changes in the 
application process of the same person rather than comparing different individuals. It does 
this by measuring the probability of a job interview and the frequencies of applications and 
interviews per week, indicators which can be repeatedly observed. While Falk et al. applied 
an experimental design (by adding ALMP diplomas to randomly chosen applications, 
comparing the impact of the diploma on the success rate) this new approach measures the 
impact on a purely observational base, comparing applications before, during and after 
ALMPs.  
 
The method of comparing the success of applications has been frequently used in the 
discrimination literature (under the name of correspondence-testing), but is new for the 
ALMP evaluation literature. The approach has great advantages over traditional evaluation 
methods: It allows cancelling out all time-invariant characteristics of an individual by using 
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quite simple statistical tools. It permits the calculation of individual treatment effects. It is non-
intrusive and since it does not need the consent of the persons involved, doesn’t result in a 
selection bias. Because the whole spell from beginning to end can be observed, all the 
different effects proposed by theory can be identified. Further, it fulfils the controlling criteria 
mentioned above (unbiased, easy to understand and communicate and therefore trusted, 
detailed, inexpensive and easy to update). This makes it a very powerful controlling tool.  
 
Using the data collected at the trial agency, the following results were calculated through 
panel regression estimation with fixed effects: Overall, the ALMPs had a large positive effect 
on the participants. Participation resulted in more interviews per week (the number is 
increased by 0.0308, which, at the time the average ALMP is announced, is equivalent to an 
11.1 % increase), a higher probability of a job interview (plus 0.0107, which is equivalent to a 
9.4 % increase) and a higher number of applications per week (plus 0.0972 or 3.9 %). 
 
The effects are particularly large for unemployed with a long term unemployment forecast 
while they are quite small for unemployed with a forecast below twelve months. This 
difference seems to hold important information on who should be sent to participate in 
ALMPs: It is mainly the unemployed with low chances of a quick reintegration into the labour 
market who gain from the programs.  
 
The results show further that the different subtypes of ALMPs fare very differently: On 
average, basic courses, the category “other courses” (a mix of IT and vocational training) and 
basic qualifications do well. Employment programmes and personality oriented courses on 
the other hand have a negative effect. Programs with negative effects don’t have to be 
abolished altogether; but either the programs or the mix of unemployed participating have to 
be adapted in order to reap the benefits.  
 
The paper is structured in the following way: In section 2, the four effects proposed by theory 
are illustrated and a short overview on the literature is given. The advantages of the new 
approach are elaborated in further details in section 3, and the data used is described in 
section 4. Section 5 describes the three application indicators and their development over the 
duration of the unemployment spell. In section 6 the ALMP effect is measured through Panel 
Regression analysis. The main models are presented and several sensitivity tests conducted. 
Section 7 looks at the distribution of the effect, to find out under what circumstances the 
ALMP result in a positive effect. Section 9 explains why the method is a good controlling 
method despite its inability to track the application process to its ultimate goal, the job, and 
Section 10 concludes. 
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2. Theory and related literature 
The success of ALMPs has created great interest over the past two decades and as it is 
connected to the wider topic of evaluating welfare programs in general, the related literature 
is vast. A good overview over the literature, methods and challenges involved can be 
gathered from Heckman et al. 1999, Smith and Todd 2005 and a recent study by van den 
Berg et al. 2009.  
 
There are four main effects proposed by the evaluation literature: the threat effect, the lock-in 
effect, the skill enhancement effect and the signal effect. These effects occur at different 
times during the unemployment spell, as illustrated by Figure 1, and have different effects on 
the three application indicators used in this study. The first one of these three indicators is 
“interviews per week”. This is the indicator which policy makers are most interested in, 
because it captures both quality and quantity of the application process and is closely 
connected to the final outcome, a new job (for how close exactly, see section 9). It is a vector 
of the two other indicators: “interview probability” and “applications per week”. Interview 
probability captures the chances of the application resulting in a job interview. It could be 
interpreted as the qualitative side of the application process. It is to a large extent determined 
by the employer who chooses the requirements and the number of applicants to the job 
opening (through his or her use of advertising). Application frequency, measured in 
applications per week, on the other hand can be interpreted as the search intensity, or the 
quantitative side. It is directly influenced by the unemployed person his or herself (and the 
unemployment agency, which sets a minimum requirement). 
  
The first effect, the threat effect, starts right after the unemployed has been informed about 
her or his participation in an ALMP (for an overview on the threat effect, see Rosholm and 
Svarer 2008). This effect caught a lot of attention in research, especially after the paper of 
Black et al. 2003 which concluded that the threat effect is the driving forces behind the 
evaluated welfare program in Kentucky. It predicts that the search intensity rises after the 
announcement, as the unemployed is not keen on joining the ALMP. What happens to the 
interview probability is unclear and depends on how dry the pool of suitable jobs is. If suitable 
jobs are abundant, the probability should stay the same (maybe even rise because of better 
applications being written), if not, the probability falls as each further application is a worse 
job match than the one before. Because the probability of these additional applications is 
unlikely to be zero, one would expect the effect on interviews per week to be positive. 
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Figure 1: The four ALMP effects proposed by theory  
 
  
After the ALMP has started, theory predicts the occurrence of a second effect, the lock-in-
effect. This effect happens if the ALMP is demanding and doesn’t leave the unemployed 
enough time to write as many applications as they did before the ALMP started. This will 
decrease the number of applications a person writes per week. Because unemployed 
persons are probably inclined to stop writing the applications for jobs they think they have a 
low chance to get, the average application probability should increase. Overall however the 
effect results in a lower number of invitations to job interviews. A different explanation of the 
lock-in effect is that an unemployed person reduces the search efforts if the program is 
attractive and positive treatment effects are anticipated (Carling and Richardson 2004). 
Finally, the lock-in effect could result if the case worker of the unemployed person reduces 
counselling efforts while the unemployed is participating in an ALMP (Ragni 2007). All three 
explanations point to lower search intensity during the ALMP. 
 
Increasingly with the advancement of the ALMP, and especially once the ALMP has finished, 
the desired effects should set in, i.e. the skill enhancement and/or the signal effect. The two 
differ in as far the skill enhancement is an effect on the know-how of the unemployed, like 
better application techniques and improved language skills. The signal effect on the other 
hand unfolds when the unemployed is in a better position to reveal information (a signal) to a 
potential employer about her or his productivity (Carling and Richardson 2004). One would 
expect an increase of chances on the labour market through this signal, but the diploma can 
backfire if it actually signals a lack of knowledge (Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller 2005). 
  
Table 1 summarizes the different effects. It also shows the overall trends in the three 
application indicators as predicted by theory. The overall trend for the probability of a job 
interview is downward: employers get more suspicious as they interpret a long duration of 
unemployment as a signal for low employability, low productivity or low work moral (Rosholm 
and Svarer 2004). As for applications per week, one would expect this indicator to rise over 
time as unemployed become more desperate with the end of the entitlement period nearing, 
Duration 
  
 (1) Threat Effect 
 (2) Lock-in Effect 
 (3) Skill enhancement Effect 
     (1) (4) Signal Effect 
          (3) (4) 
 
 
    
                            (2) 
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opening up their search field and writing more applications. The trend for interviews per week 
is driven through the other two indicators, and given that the interview probability presumably 
falls steeply at the beginning and then flattens out, and the number of applications per week 
increases gradually at the beginning, but then gains momentum later in the unemployment 
spell, one would expect interviews per week to fall quite quickly at the beginning, flattening 
out and then increasing towards the end. 
 
 
 
 
Overall Trend 
 
Threat effect (after 
announcement) 
Lock-in Effect 
(during ALMP) 
Skill enhancement 
Effect (after ALMP) 
Signal Effect 
(after ALMP) 
Interviews per 
week 
- 
 (steep fall at beginning, 
flattening and increase 
towards the end) 
+ - + + / - 
Probability of a 
job interview 
-  
(steep fall at beginning, 
later flattening) 
- + 
+  
(dominant  
indicator) 
+ / - 
(dominant  
indicator) 
Applications 
per week 
+ 
(slow increase at 
beginning, later gaining 
momentum 
+  
(dominant indicator) 
- 
(dominant 
indicator) 
0 0 
Table 1: The influence of the four effects on the application indicators, as proposed by 
theory 
Note: “+” indicates an increase, “-“ a decrease and “0” no changes in the indicator through the effect 
 
 
It is important to note at this point that these are all effects measured on a short term basis 
(rather than long term effects on salary, job satisfaction etc.) and on the individual level. A 
possible substitution effect (another worker is displaced because the unemployed finds a job, 
so the net gain in employment is zero) can only be measured on the macro level. There are 
also effects on the non-participants (threat effect through the pure existence of ALMPs) and 
even on employed workers (higher tax burden as ALMPs have to be paid for). There are 
limits to the microeconomic analysis. In terms of learning which ALMPs work and why, and to 
develop a controlling instrument, the micro approach seems to be the way forward however 
as macroeconomic analysis can estimate the effect only on a very aggregate level.  
 
There have been several studies on Swiss ALMPs since they’ve been introduced in the late 
nineties. Lalive et al. (2000), accounting for participation selectivity using a multivariate 
duration model, estimate that during an ALMP, participants have a lower exit rate through the 
lock-in effect. Once the ALMP is finished, the authors find a strong positive effect for women, 
but none for men. Gerfin and Lechner (2002), using the matching approach, found that wage 
subsidies work well, but conclude that vocational training programmes show disappointing 
performance. A study of Lechner and Smith (2007) concludes that the current allocation of 
unemployed to ALMP by case workers is inefficient and that efficiency is as low as if a 
random rule would be used. In a recent study, Lalive et al. (2008) used both “timing-of-
events” and matching estimation. While the estimation based on “timing-of-events” showed 
that none of the Swiss ALMPs shortened unemployment duration, the matching results were 
similar to those of Gerfin and Lechner, concluding that wage subsidies show good results 
while training and employment programmes do not. In a macroeconomic study, Zweimüller et 
al. (2006) estimated that the positive effect of wage subsidies has a darker side: a very small 
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negative effect on all non-participants actually results in a negative overall effect for the 
whole economy. Employment programmes on the other hand have a negative impact on the 
participants. Through their deterring effect however, they have a small positive impact on all 
non-participants, which results in an overall positive effect. For many of the ALMPs used in 
Switzerland therefore, the calculated results are mixed at best. They seem to work well for 
certain groups, but in average fare quite poorly. This weak performance doesn’t seem due to 
an especially bad provision of ALMPs in Switzerland, but rather reflects what researchers 
have found all over the world.  
 
 
 
 
3. The new approach and its methodological advantages 
While many statistical approaches have been used over the years, they all had to come to 
terms with the fact that, with the existing data, very sophisticated methods had to be applied, 
many of those relying on strong assumptions. Heckman et al. (1999) pointed out that “the 
best solution to the evaluation problem lies in improving the quality of the data on which 
evaluations are conducted and not in the development of formal econometric methods to 
circumvent inadequate data.” The innovation of the new approach being applied in this study 
is indeed not the statistical method but new indicators, possible through a unique data set 
especially collected for this study.  
 
The idea of the new approach is based on the work of Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller (2005). 
These authors introduced a new indicator into the ALMP evaluation literature; the probability 
of a job interview. Falk et al. (2005) recruited ten unemployed persons and got them to write 
20 applications each. While the quality of the applications was held constant, a diploma of an 
IT training course attended by the applicant was attached to 10 randomly chosen 
applications of each unemployed. The outcome of the application (did the application lead to 
a job interview?) was then reported back by the unemployed to the authors. The focus of the 
paper was on the signal effect of the IT courses: how well is a course received by potential 
employers? The study produced interesting results: while on average adding the diploma had 
a negative (not significant) effect, the individual effects spread from positive to negative. 
Adding the IT-diploma was clearly disadvantageous when applying for jobs which required 
good IT skills. The fact that someone had to attend an IT course organized by the 
unemployment insurance was taken as a signal for low IT knowledge. 
 
The approach used by Falk et al. is related to the “correspondence testing” method which is 
commonly applied in discrimination research: Two fictional applications are sent out which 
differ only in the gender or nationality of the applicant, and the researcher compares the 
success of both applications. A good overview over correspondence testing is given by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004 who used the approach using African-American and white 
American-sounding names to test for discrimination. The method has been used by 
Oberholzer-Gee 2008 using applications from unemployed and employed to test for an 
unemployment stigma. In recent papers, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) measured the effect of 
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different ethnic backgrounds and Drydakis (2009) the effect of the gender of the applicant on 
the application success.  
 
While common in the discrimination literature, the approach has not been used in the ALMP 
research. However, the ALMP effect can be analysed by using the probability of a job 
interview as indicator, measuring how employers “discriminate” between ALMP participant 
and non-participants. This new indicator has a tremendous advantage over other indicators 
used so far in studies, e.g. duration, number of months unemployed in the next year and 
salary in the new job, which lies within the fact that it can be measured several times over the 
duration of unemployment instead of only once. This makes it possible to calculate an effect 
not just by comparing two persons, but by comparing the same person over time. Thus 
unobserved heterogeneity between persons which is time-invariant can be completely 
eliminated.  
 
Furthermore, the new indicator allows the calculation of individual treatment effects instead 
of average treatment effects over all participants or groups of participants. This enables the 
researcher to observe the distribution of the effects among individuals participating, and 
simplifies identifying groups of individuals who benefit from the ALMPs (Falk, Lalive and 
Zweimüller 2005). Because the new approach conducts its estimation without a control group, 
another issue can be avoided: Sianesi 2004 argues that, depending on the program, all 
unemployed persons will join an ALMP, if only the duration of the spell is long enough. If the 
reason that the person doesn’t participate in an ALMP is that she or he found a job before 
the ALMP could have been announced, this could lead to a distortion of the estimation not in 
favour of the ALMPs.  
 
The idea of Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller (2005) is used for this study again, but modified in 
two main aspects. In addition to the indicator “probability of a job interview”, two additional 
indicators are used: the number of applications per week and interviews per week. A second 
difference is that instead of the experimental design, a purely observational design is 
implemented. While such an observational approach allows less control over the application 
process (the quality of the application cannot be held constant, for example), it has several 
advantages: It is not as time consuming and allows therefore collecting data on a much 
higher number of observations. It is non-intrusive because it doesn’t change the application 
process; the data represent the “normal” behaviour outside the monitoring period. The 
consent of the unemployed isn’t necessary to collect the data as in Switzerland; it is already 
standard that some data on applications is collected by the case workers. This is an 
advantage because no special incentives to participate in the data collection have to be 
created and therefore potential distortions can be avoided. In contrast to the way 
correspondence testing is usually used, no fictional applications have to be created; this has 
the advantage that applications are as real as possible. Forging applications can be difficult 
for researchers if applications from a whole range of educational and occupational 
backgrounds have to be mimicked. And because the whole unemployment spell from 
beginning to end can be observed, all effects proposed by theory can be identified and 
measured, not just the signal effect. All those characteristics make it possible to create a 
powerful controlling instrument which fulfils all the criteria mentioned in the introduction 
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(unbiased, easy to understand and communicate and therefore trusted, detailed, inexpensive 
and easy to update).  
 
 
 
 
4. Data 
Data on the application process is systematically gathered in all Swiss unemployment 
insurance agencies, using a self-reporting sheet filled out by the unemployed person. The 
unemployed track all their applications over the course of a month and hand the sheet over 
to the case worker at the end of the month. Most of these forms are filled out by hand, and 
while they are archived for quality checks and lawsuits, the information isn’t stored 
electronically. The data has not been used for research so far.  
 
In order to make this data source accessible and by this enabling the new form of evaluation, 
the data on the application sheets has to be stored electronically. This has been done as a 
trial run in a single agency of the Swiss unemployment insurance, the Zurich-Staffelstrasse 
agency. Being a medium sized agency with both clients from city and rural areas and with a 
wide variety of occupations, this agency seemed well suited. Data on 30,000 applications 
was gathered between 1st of July 2007 and 31st of March 2008. 
 
For efficiency reason, a stratified sample of the persons registered during the observational 
period was taken: The sample contains all unemployment spells with at least one ALMP 
participation (a quarter of all unemployed registered at Zurich-Staffelstrasse) and a random 
selection of a third of the spells in which the unemployed did not attend an ALMP. This 
sample led to a database containing data of 806 unemployment spells. Applications within 
the lay-off period and applications during the last month of unemployment were dropped, as 
these periods are subject to different rules by the unemployment insurance. Including them 
would distort the analysis. Spells which consisted solely of applications of the above 
mentioned kind were dropped with them. 
 
This leaves 738 observed spells, 338 of which are treated spells (unemployed participated at 
some stage of the unemployment spell in one or several ALMPs), containing a total of 17,910 
applications. The 400 untreated spells (unemployed didn’t participate in an ALMP at any time 
of the spell) include 12,081 applications. The number of observations decreases steeply as 
the duration of the spell increases; more and more unemployed leave as they find a job. As 
shown in Figure 2, over the first few weeks of unemployment the majority of applications 
stem from unemployed who will not participate in an ALMP during their spell. As time passes 
on, an increasing amount of the data comes from persons with ALMP. The case number can 
be low when looking at the later stages of the unemployment spell (that explains some of the 
high fluctuation in Figure 3 to 5). 
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Figure 2: Number of observations recorded in the dataset, per week of the spell  
Note: The graph shows the number of applications recorded in each of the weeks of the spell. The duration is plotted until the 
104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 unemployment spells are observed, 338 of 
which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with an ALMP”). 
 
 
Two objections to the data quality could be raised, both in connection to the self-reporting 
nature of the application sheets. The first possible objection could be that not all records are 
truthful and that some unemployed record applications they have never written. While 
wrongly recorded data (on purpose or by mistake) cannot be ruled out, the amount of 
purposeful cheating should be rather small, as case workers regularly check back with 
employers if the unemployed have indeed applied to the job indicated on their self-reporting 
sheet. Even if a small amount of cheating remains, this could only distort the calculation if 
more or less cheating is going on after the ALMP has started. There is nothing pointing to 
such an effect. The second objection could be that because of the requirement to write at 
least 8 to 12 applications, many unemployed don’t bother writing all their applications down 
and instead stop once the minimum has been reached, therefore depriving the dataset of all 
their other applications. Again, this doesn’t seem to be the case, neither according to 
statements by the case workers, nor showing up in the data. The applications are more or 
less evenly distributed over the stretch of a month, especially when looking at unemployed 
with ALMP (see Annex 1). If only the first 10 or so applications would be recorded, you’d 
expect an accumulation at the beginning of the month.  
 
There is one more issue which has to be addressed in connection to the reporting sheet: 
Among other entries, the unemployed record the outcome of the application, whether they 
had an interview, a job offer or a rejection. The case workers at the trial agency reported that 
there was some confusion about the meaning of “job interview” when unemployed were 
carrying out personal applications (showing up at a company’s door step and asking for a 
job). Some unemployed recorded such a personal application as an interview, others didn’t. 
A sensitivity test in section 6 checks if the results change if applications from unemployed 
who reported almost all of their personal applications to be successful are left away. If not 
otherwise mentioned, all applications are used. 
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Apart from the self-reporting application sheets, data sources used include the electronically 
registered data of the unemployment insurance on the unemployed persons, a survey 
conducted among the case workers at Zurich Staffelstrasse (gathering additional data on the 
unemployed, e.g. a forecast regarding the unemployment duration of each person and the 
motivation to participate in the ALMP) and a survey among the employees responsible for 
the organization of ALMPs at the Office for Economy and Labour of the canton of Zurich 
(gathering diverse data on the ALMPs).  
 
 
 
 
5. Changes in the three application indicators over time 
To get an overview, the three application indicators are plotted over the duration of the 
unemployment spell. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement 
time frame in Switzerland expires. Most unemployed use their benefits up beforehand, 
usually in the 18th month. There are several deviations from this pattern for persons who 
haven’t paid into the unemployment insurance (shorter benefit period), elderly (longer period) 
and persons who participate in a work subsidy scheme (longer period). 
 
The changes in the number of interviews per week over time are shown in Figure 3. The 
similarity between the two groups is striking: For the first 10 weeks the number of interviews 
per week is exactly the same. For the remainder of the spell the development seems similar 
for both groups, with the unemployed without an ALMP showing higher volatility and a 
slightly higher level. This indicator can be considered a result of both other indicators. Its 
downward trend however, as the next two graphs show, clearly stems from the decreasing 
probability of a job interview over time, while the gently raising number of applications per 
week does little to offset this downward trend. 
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Figure 3: Frequency of interviews 
Note: The graph shows the average number of interviews per week, giving equal weight to each unemployed registered in a 
certain week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 
unemployment spells are observed, 338 of which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with 
an ALMP”). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used. 
 
 
Looking at the development of the second indicator, probability of a job interview (Figure 
4), one notices that both groups start off with similar chances: one in ten applications are 
successful. The similarity of that starting level, and in fact the whole development over time, 
is again surprising. One would expect quite stark differences between the two groups: Case 
workers send the persons with bad chances to an ALMP, and let the others search without 
training. 
 
 
0
.
02
5
.
05
.
07
5
.
1
.
12
5
Pr
o
ba
bi
lity
 
Jo
b 
In
te
rv
ie
w
0 20 40 60 80 100
Duration of the unemployment spell in weeks
Unemployed with an ALMP
Unemployed without an ALMP
 
Figure 4: Probability of a job interview 
Note: The graph shows the average probability of a job interview, giving equal weight to each unemployed registered in a 
certain week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 
unemployment spells are observed, 338 of which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with 
an ALMP”). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used.  
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Chances drop for both groups quickly over time. This is what theory predicts: Employers get 
more wary as time progresses, taking the long unemployment duration as a signal for low 
employability. Unemployed themselves might broaden their search field which could entail a 
fall in the proportion of successful hits. Just as important though are the changes in the group 
composition: the successful unemployed leave early and the remaining ones have a lower 
average chance. 
 
For unemployed with ALMP there seems to be a stabilization of the interview probability after 
the first six month of unemployment, before the indicator drops again after the twelfth month 
to almost zero over the remaining duration of the entitlement frame. The development is very 
similar for the unemployed without ALMP, but because of the lower number of observations, 
the indicator is more volatile. 
 
The number of applications per week represents the quantitative side of applications 
(Figure 5). Again, both the treated and control group start off in a very similar way, with the 
member of the treated group starting just above the control group. The number of 
applications per week gently drops till the 6th month and then picks up again. Apart from a 
remarkable increase at the very end of the entitlement period, the indicator is relatively stable.  
 
According to theory, one would probably expect more of an upward trend over time, 
especially as the end of the entitlement period comes nearer. The application number seems 
to take the minimum requirement of the unemployment insurance (8 to 12 applications a 
month) as orientation. Case workers of the regional placement centre don’t seem to pressure 
the unemployed into writing more applications as time passes by. 
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Figure 5: Search intensity 
Note: The graph shows the average number of applications per week, giving equal weight to each unemployed registered in a 
certain week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 
unemployment spells are observed, 338 of which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with 
an ALMP”). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used. 
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Summarizing, one can conclude that the differences between the two groups in all three 
indicators are very small. This is surprising as one would think behaviour and chances on the 
labour market as captured by the three indicators would be a main influence on the decision 
of ALMP participation. The closeness of the level and the development of the three indicators 
over the entire duration indicates that either a) the two groups are in fact very similar (i.e. that 
participation is random, at least in terms of labour market chances as captured by three 
indicators) and that the ALMPs have no influence at all, or b) that the ALMP participants 
actually do fare worse over time but that this is offset by the ALMPs.  
 
 
 
 
6. Measuring the effect through Panel Regression 
Unlike most studies on ALMP, which compare different persons with each other, the rich 
panel data at hand allows to compare applications of the same person over time. This 
eliminates a tremendous amount of unobserved heterogeneity. Because heterogeneity can 
be controlled for, widely understood statistical instruments like the regression method can be 
used, and there is no need to rely on strong assumptions. 
 
Frame of Analysis 
Whatever the estimation strategy or sample used, there are always three sets of regressions 
conducted in the following, one each for the three application indicators. For job interview 
probability the observational unit is the individual application and the dependent variable 
measures if the application resulted in a job interview (taking on the value 1 if successful, 
and 0 if unsuccessful). For the other two indicators, weekly number of interviews and 
applications, the panel is transformed so that the observational unit is one week of the 
unemployment spell. The unit shows the number of interviews or applications in that 
particular week.  
 
The effect of the ALMP is captured by the regression coefficient of a dummy variable which 
indicates if the application was sent off before (0) or after the ALMP announcement (1). The 
announcement is chosen as the focal point as it divides the spell into a period before the 
application behaviour of the unemployed was influenced by a participation, and a period 
where it is influenced, therefore capturing all possible effects of the ALMP. 
 
To calculate the coefficient of the effect dummy accurately, control variables are added to the 
model. The first set of control variables is a set of 13 duration dummies which indicate in 
which months the application was sent off (the dummies are: 1st month, 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 
11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months). For the number of applications per 
week, this is simply the month in the unemployment spell that particular week is part of. For 
interview probability and the number of interviews per week, the month in which the 
applications are sent off is relevant, and not the month in which the interviews occur; the 
dataset does not contain information about the date of the job interview (the indicator 
“interviews per week” is therefore the number of interviews achieved by the applications sent 
off in a certain week). These dummies capture the influence of time in a very flexible way. It 
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is a very important set of control variables, as two of three application indicators fall steeply 
over time. Without the duration dummies, the results are heavily distorted. As applications 
after announcement are later in the spell than applications before announcement, the 
estimation wouldn’t correctly distinguish between the effect and the influence of time.  
 
An additional variable is added which indicates how many weeks before or after the ALMP 
announcement the application was sent off. If the application was sent off before the 
announcement, the value is negative. The variable thereby controls for any correlation 
between the ALMP effect and duration relative to the announcement (a cumulative effect for 
example). This model belongs to the family of event study models, which study the impact of 
an event on a variable of interest, often the stock price of a company (for a recent overview 
of this methodology, see Khotari and Warner 2006). It is common to document graphically 
the development of the indicators of interest around the “event”, thereby identifying the short 
term effect. This is done in Figure 6. Because of high fluctuations, moving averages are used. 
These moving averages are calculated separately for the weeks before and the weeks after 
the announcement. The value for the week of the announcement is calculated with both the 
data from before and after the announcement. The graph shows that there is a positive gap 
between the two values, for both probability of a job interview and interviews per week (i.e. 
the value is higher when using the moving average based on data after the event). This 
simple descriptive analysis indicates that ALMPs have a positive effect. The number of 
applications in the week of the event on the other hand is a bit smaller when calculated as a 
moving average of the weeks after the announcement, indicating a negative effect of the 
ALMP on the search intensity. 
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Figure 6: Development of the application indicators before and after the ALMP 
announcement 
Note: The graph shows the average development in the three indicators ten weeks before to ten weeks after the ALMP 
announcement (the announcement is marked with a vertical line). Because of low observational numbers and high volatility in 
the indicators, a nine week moving average is used. The moving average is applied separately to the weeks before and the 
weeks after the announcement. The value for the week of the announcement (week 0) is calculated once through a moving 
average with data before the announcement and once with data after the announcement. Data from 203 unemployed was used 
(the effect can only be calculated for ALMP participants with at least one observed application before and one application after 
the announcement). 
 
 
One more variable is added to the model, the unemployment rate in the occupation of the 
unemployed person who writes the application. This variable is measured on a monthly 
interval (e.g. for an application in September the unemployment rate of the occupation in 
September is used), and is calculated as the deviation from the median value. This variable 
is an important control variable as the state of the labour market might have both a large 
influence on the success of the application and on the performance of the ALMP. To prevent 
any bias, the control variable is added to the model. Finally, fixed effects are included, and 
thereby all time invariant differences between the unemployed are controlled for. 
 
Note that the sets of control variables overall are parsimonious, only adding variables which 
would distort the calculations of the effect. The data is rich enough to add many other 
variables to the model, which would explain the outcome (for example the characteristics of 
the application). However, by adding more variables they are effectively held constant when 
estimating the effect. If the unemployed writes different types of applications after the ALMP, 
this should not be hold constant as it is part of the effect.  
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The estimation is done through Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported. If not mentioned differently, data from all ALMP participants are 
used (there is no exclusion of outliers). All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month are included. As described in the data section, these applications 
have to be dropped as both the lay-off period and the last month are subject to different rules 
by the unemployment insurance which would potentially distort the analysis. 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the average effect of the ALMPs used at the Zurich-Staffelstrasse agency. 
The effect is large: An increase of 0.0308 in the number of interviews per week is the 
equivalent of 7.3 % when measured against the value of the constant, 0.4214. The constant 
can be interpreted as the number of interviews in the first month of unemployment. At the 
time the average ALMP is announced (104 days after the unemployment spell has started 
(median)) that baseline interview frequency has decreased to 0.2774 (measured as the sum 
of the constant and the coefficient for the dummy of the fourth month of unemployment). The 
relative effect is then the equivalent to a rise of 11.1 %.  
 
The interview probability is increased by 0.0107, which is the equivalent of 7.0 % measured 
in the first month of unemployment, and 9.4 % after 104 days. The effect on applications per 
week is relatively small: The unemployed write 0.0972 applications per week more after the 
announcement. That is an increase of 3.6 % in the first month, or 3.9 % measured after 104 
days. Both effects, the effect on interview probability and the one on search intensity, feed 
into the effect of the first indicator, interviews per week. However, changes in the number of 
interviews per week stem mainly from changes in the interview probability, while the search 
intensity increases just a little through the ALMP and has only a small influence on the 
increase in interviews per week.  
 
Only the coefficient for the effect on interview probability is statistically significant (on the 10 
%-level), despite the large size of the effect on interviews per week. The standard errors are 
large, indicating that there is considerable heterogeneity hidden behind the average effects. 
This heterogeneity will be further investigated below. 
 
The control sets behave as assumed: The coefficients of the duration dummies are highly 
negative and increasing over time, at least when regressing on interviews per week and 
interview probability. This shows that these indicators are falling over the duration of the spell. 
The variable “application date relative to announcement” has a negative influence. This 
indicates that there might be a small interaction between the effect and the duration i.e. that 
the effect is decreasing over time. However, the coefficient is not significant and the effect 
relatively small. The unemployment rate in the profession of the unemployed person has a 
large negative influence on both interviews per week and the interview probability, but a 
small positive effect on the search intensity. 
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Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
    Mean 0.1355 0.0493 2.7478 
    Std. Dev. 0.4752 0.2165 1.6552 
      
Overall ALMP Effect 0.0308 0.0107+ 0.0972 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0215) (0.0061) (0.0732) 
       
Duration (omitted dummy: Month 1) 
      
    Month 2 -0.1394** -0.0344** -0.1900 
 (0.0394) (0.0094) (0.1273) 
    Month 3 -0.1596** -0.0465** -0.2278+ 
 (0.0426) (0.0110) (0.1350) 
    Month 4 -0.1440** -0.0391** -0.2239 
 (0.0502) (0.0134) (0.1530) 
    Months 5 to 6 -0.1443* -0.0420** -0.2205 
 (0.0560) (0.0152) (0.1783) 
    Months 7 to 8 -0.1674* -0.0454* -0.1811 
 (0.0700) (0.0194) (0.2214) 
    Months 9 to 10 -0.1780* -0.0516* -0.0699 
 (0.0838) (0.0242) (0.2687) 
    Months 11 to 12 -0.1691+ -0.0416 -0.1933 
 (0.0974) (0.0285) (0.3166) 
    Months 13 to 15 -0.1903 -0.0506 -0.0773 
 (0.1161) (0.0338) (0.3752) 
    Months 16 to 18 -0.2072 -0.0611 0.0045 
 (0.1356) (0.0400) (0.4618) 
    Months 19 to 21 -0.2182 -0.0606 -0.0170 
 (0.1557) (0.0465) (0.5393) 
    Months 22 to 24 -0.1699 -0.0370 -0.0751 
 (0.1808) (0.0541) (0.6130) 
    Month 25 and more -0.2820 -0.0722 0.1109 
 (0.2040) (0.0641) (0.7272) 
      
Application date relative to announcement (in weeks) -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0044 
 (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0066) 
      
Unemployment rate in occupation -0.0135** -0.0056** 0.0103 
(in percentage point deviation from the median rate) (0.0052) (0.0017) (0.0174) 
      
Fixed effects yes yes yes 
      
Constant 0.4214** 0.1532** 2.7351** 
 (0.0879) (0.0270) (0.2695) 
      
Sample 
     
All unemployed / only ALMP participants ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of applications or weeks 6518 17910 6518 
Number of unemployed 338 338 338 
       
Estimation 
      
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.1178 0.1454 0.1864 
F-value 4.8861 3.8608 3.2209 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
Table 2: The ALMP effect on the three indicators 
 
 
Although not all overall effects are statistically significant when measured as the average 
over all participants, there are some groups which gain heavily from the ALMP. The most 
important of these groups in terms of size and the gain through the ALMP is the group of the 
unemployed with a long term unemployment (LTU, i.e. a duration of more than 12 months) 
forecast. The forecast is an individual duration prediction recorded by the case worker at the 
start of the unemployment spell. Among ALMP participants, both groups of unemployed with 
a LTU forecast and unemployed ones are roughly of the same size. Annex 2 shows the 
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characteristics of groups split according to the duration forecast. In average, the unemployed 
with a LTU forecast are older and worked more often in the hospitality industry and public 
administration. This group has an above average proportion of unemployed with no further 
education. In terms of ALMP, they participate more often in employment programmes and 
personality oriented courses, less often in Basic courses and language courses. 
 
Because the two groups differ largely regarding the ALMP effect, the results are shown again 
in Table 3, this time with the sample split into two: One regression is conducted for the group 
with a forecast of more than 12 months (LTU); the other regression only uses data from the 
group with a forecast of less than 12 months (Non-LTU). The results show that the effect is 
very strong for unemployed with an LTU forecast while quite weak for the other group, no 
matter what indicator is examined. The group with a LTU forecast experiences an increase of 
0.0386 interviews per week. Measured against their baseline number in month one (as 
measured by the constant), this effect is equivalent to 19.4 %. After 104 days, the effect is 
equivalent to an even larger increase of 27.6 %. Interview probability increases by 0.0132 
(an increase of 23.5 % in the first month and 32.3 % after 104 days), once the ALMP has 
been announced. And the third indicator, applications per week, increases by 0.2071 (8.2 % 
in the first month, 8.7 % after 104 days). The effect of ALMP on the application indicators of 
participants with an LTU forecast is positive, very large and statistically significant. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = LTU Non-LTU LTU Non-LTU LTU Non-LTU 
    Mean 0.1033 0.1782 0.0382 0.0648 2.7034 2.7482 
    Std. Dev. 0.4073 0.5479 0.1917 0.2463 1.5657 1.6716 
          
Overall ALMP Effect 0.0386+ 0.0150 0.0132+ 0.0043 0.2071* 0.0280 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0216) (0.0371) (0.0069) (0.0102) (0.1012) (0.1083) 
          
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Application date relative to announcement yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment rate in occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Constant 0.1991* 0.6253** 0.0562+ 0.2425** 2.5145** 3.0000** 
 (0.0901) (0.1513) (0.0289) (0.0438) (0.3662) (0.4404) 
          
Sample 
         
All unemployed / only ALMP participants ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of applications or weeks 3496 2851 9451 7835 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 166 162 166 162 166 162 
          
Estimation 
         
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.2748 0.1825 0.1864 0.1178 0.2244 0.1806 
F-value 2.3576 3.1401 3.2209 4.8861 1.0121 0.7125 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
Table 3: The ALMP effect for unemployed with (without) a Long Term Unemployment 
forecast 
 
 
Unemployed with a forecast of less than 12 months on the other hand only show an increase 
of 0.0150 interviews per week (which is equivalent to 2.4 % after the first month, 3.0 % after 
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104 days), an increase in the interview probability of 0.0043 (1.8 %, 2.1 %) and an increase 
of 0.0280 applications per week (0.9 %, 1.0 %). The ALMP have also a positive effect on this 
group. Compared with the group with a LTU forecast, the effect pales though.  
 
The next table (Table 4) shows the decomposition of the overall effect into its partial effects. 
The simple dummy measuring the overall effect is substituted by three dummies which 
switch to 1 when the application is written after the announcement and before the start of the 
ALMP (threat effect), or between start and end of the ALMP (lock-in effect) or after the ALMP 
has finished (skill enhancement and signal effect). Because they both happen at the same 
time, their combined impact is measured. The coefficients compare the effect relative to the 
situation before announcement. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU 
    Mean 0.1355 0.1033 0.1782 0.0493 0.0382 0.0648 2.7478 2.7034 2.7482 
    Std. Dev. 0.4752 0.4073 0.5479 0.2165 0.1917 0.2463 1.6552 1.5657 1.6716 
             
Partial Effects 
            
1. Threat Effect  0.0339 0.0159 0.0252 0.0097 0.0006 0.0071 0.1075 0.2495* -0.0085 
    (Dummy is 1 between announcement  (0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0435) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0116) (0.0855) (0.1244) (0.1217) 
    and start ALMP)          
          
2. Lock-in Effect  0.0279 0.0508* -0.0020 0.0118+ 0.0203* -0.0006 0.0865 0.1842+ 0.0735 
    (Dummy is 1 between start and end ALMP) (0.0233) (0.0248) (0.0430) (0.0068) (0.0079) (0.0119) (0.0839) (0.1100) (0.1288) 
          
3. Skill enhancement and 4. signal effect  0.0269 0.0710* -0.0168 0.0126 0.0308** -0.0060 0.0678 0.1778 0.0300 
    (Dummy is 1 after the ALMP ended) (0.0302) (0.0331) (0.0542) (0.0088) (0.0101) (0.0154) (0.1054) (0.1406) (0.1630) 
             
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Application date relative to announcement yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment rate in occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Constant 0.4213** 0.2038* 0.6344** 0.1531** 0.0579* 0.2456** 2.7368** 2.5078** 3.0038** 
 (0.0880) (0.0903) (0.1542) (0.0270) (0.0288) (0.0442) (0.2696) (0.3669) (0.4427) 
             
Sample 
            
All unemployed vs. ALMP unemployed ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of applications 6518 3496 2851 17910 9451 7835 6518 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 338 166 162 338 166 162 338 166 162 
             
Estimation 
            
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.2172 0.2754 0.1827 0.1454 0.1872 0.1179 0.2233 0.2245 0.1807 
F-value 2.1041 2.1213 2.7494 3.4545 3.0716 4.2914 0.6704 0.9337 0.6584 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
Table 4: The ALMP effect split into its partial effects 
 
 
All partial effects result in sizeable changes on at least one indicator, but not all of them in 
the direction proposed by theory. Regarding the threat effect, there is indeed evidence of 
changes showing up on the indicator “applications per week” once the ALMP has been 
announced. The effect only exists for the group with a LTU forecast where it is strong (+ 9.9 
% more applications per week, when measured against the constant). The group without a 
LTU forecast shows no sign of the threat effect. 
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The lock-in effect doesn’t seem to exist at all. The unemployed don’t seem to decrease their 
search intensity once the ALMP has started; on the contrary. The LTU group increases 
search efforts by 7.3 %. At the same time, the LTU group experiences a steep increase in 
the interview probability which overall results in a similarly steep increase on interviews per 
week. The group without a LTU forecast doesn’t show any changes worth mentioning. The 
lack of a lock-in effect during the ALMP is not so much surprising from a practical point of 
view as many of the ALMPs include application training. If the lock-in effect exists at all, it is 
overlaid by the skill enhancement effect which might start even before the ALMP has finished. 
 
Once the ALMP has finished, the positive effect is very large for the group with a LTU 
forecast. The leading indicator is interview probability, but there is also an increase in search 
intensity, compared with the situation before the announcement. For interviews per week and 
interview probability, the measured effect is at its strongest here, indicating the strong 
sustainability of the positive ALMP effect for this group.  
 
The non-LTU group on the other hand shows negative effects for probability and interviews 
per week after the ALMP has finished. These effects are relatively small and don’t differ 
significantly from zero. The negative effects could therefore be purely random. If a negative 
effect would remain in a larger sample, its most likely explanation would be that it stems from 
a negative signal sent out to potential employers.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
A possible criticism questioning the validity of the results could be that the results are 
distorted because the composition of the observed group of unemployed changes over time. 
This criticism will be addressed in test 1. Further, while there are good reasons why the main 
estimation (Table 2 and 3) has been conducted with the specification chosen (those reasons 
will be stated below), it is interesting to see how robust the estimates are when the 
estimation strategy is changed. In order to test this, the main model is changed in six aspects. 
Test 2 observes how the estimates change when the panel structure is changed. The other 
tests incorporate changes regarding the duration variables (test 3), the observations used 
(dropping outliers in test 4 and personal applications with an unusual high success rate in 
test 5) and check the non-anticipation assumption (test 6). 
  
A potential issue regarding the balance of the sample (test 1) is that the panel might become 
less balanced as unemployed with low chances remain in the pool and unemployed with 
above average chances leave because they find a job. If the ALMP has a better effect on 
unemployed with low chances (as shown in Table 3), the calculated average effect might 
overestimate the true effect of the ALMP. Figure 7 shows that the chances of the remaining 
pool of unemployed don’t deteriorate as much as one might expect. For each person, the 
average of the three indicators before the announcement is calculated (pre-announcement 
value). At the moment of the announcement, the sample is complete; the average pre-
announcement values over the whole sample of ALMP participants are an interview 
probability of 0.0632, 0.1857 interviews per week and 2.9264 applications per week. Each 
week after the announcement, the sample looses members. The sample average of the pre-
announcement values falls because of the changes in the group composition; members with 
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high pre-announcement values leave the group. As a benchmark, a second line in the graph 
represents what would happen if no members would have left the group (i.e. the attrition is 
corrected): the line is horizontal as the average value would stay constant. Figure 7 shows 
that there is some deviation of the uncorrected sample mean of pre-announcement values 
from that constant, but the difference is relatively small. With other words, the estimation of 
the ALMP effect should not be biased by an imbalance in the sample. 
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Figure 7: Assessment of sample attrition (development of pre-announcement values in 
sample) 
Note: The duration is plotted until the 38th week after the announcement (the maximum for any person in the sample). A total 
number of 322 ALMP participants are observed (only ALMP participants with at least one observed application before the 
announcement can be assessed). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used.  
 
 
In terms of the balance between unemployed with a LTU forecast and unemployed without 
such a forecast, a similar conclusion can be made. As time progresses, an increasing 
number of applications might stem from unemployed with a LTU forecast. Again, changes in 
the balance of the sample over time might have an impact on the results: the calculated 
effect might be larger for unemployed with a LTU forecast because there are more 
applications after the announcement. The graph in Annex 3 shows how many applications 
stem from unemployed with a LTU forecast and how many applications from unemployed 
without such a forecast, and plots the development of these numbers over the duration of the 
unemployment spell. The balance does not change as quickly as one might have anticipated 
– the sample only changes its balance slowly. Finally, as part of this first test, the main model 
is recalculated (Annex 4). Instead of one dummy switching to 1 once the ALMP has been 
not corrected for attrition in sample
corrected for attri tion in sample
Average pre-announcement value 
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announced, this model entails three dummies: One switches to 1 between 0 and 10 weeks 
after the ALMP announcement and is zero before and after this period. The second dummy 
switches to 1 between 11 and 20 weeks after the ALMP announcement and the third dummy 
in week 21 and later. The results show clearly that the large difference between the effect on 
unemployed with LTU forecast and on unemployed without such a forecast is not just due to 
the fact that unemployed with LTU forecast tend to remain longer in the sample. The results 
show that in all three assessed periods after the announcement, the LTU forecast 
unemployed fare better than the Non-LTU ones. 
   
Test 2 (Annex 5) shows what happens when all unemployed are added to the estimation, 
even the ones who haven’t participated in an ALMP. The effects of the ALMP are smaller. 
The reason for this is that the model now assumes that the effect of duration is exactly the 
same for the ALMP-participants as for the rest of the unemployed. That is not necessarily 
true: Indeed, when using separate duration dummies for the treated and control groups, the 
coefficients of the separate duration dummies are quite different (not shown in the table). 
Using different duration sets for both groups, the size of the effect coefficients increase. 
There is no gain in adding the control group members to the regression, as they don’t add 
any information on the size of the effect.  
 
The third column shows the results when dropping the fixed effects and pooling all the 
applications. The same duration dummies are used for both groups here, but a new dummy 
variable is introduced, which switches to one if the unemployed writing the application is an 
ALMP participants at some stage of his or her spell (in the following referred to as the 
treated-dummy). The coefficient of this dummy is interesting, as it shows that there is large 
negative selection into the programs: The participants have a lower performance than non-
participants in terms of interviews per week and interview probability, as shown by the 
negative coefficient of the treated-dummy. In the regression on the number of applications 
per week, the treated-dummy has a positive coefficient, indicating that ALMP participants 
write more applications than non-participants all other variables in the model kept constant.  
 
In a last step of this test, many characteristics are added to the regression, which level out 
the differences in the application indicators between participants and non-participants which 
can be explained by these characteristics. The added variables are gender (dummy), 
Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former 
industry (11 dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The separate duration 
dummies are kept in the regression. Indeed, through this the treated dummy is now almost 
zero for interview probability. It is even positive for applications per week and interviews per 
week, although the coefficient for the latter is small and not statistically significant. Together 
with the different sets of duration dummies, these variables seem to explain the differences 
in performance in the 3 application indicators rather well. 
  
What happens to the coefficient of the effect dummy? The effects get stronger when moving 
from the regression with fixed effects to pooled regressions (apart from the regression on 
applications per week). Once the set of characteristics of the unemployed are added, the 
coefficient get smaller again, in fact to about the size they have in the standard specification, 
using fixed effects and only the data from ALMP participants (again, apart from applications 
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per week). This shows that the core results are robust in terms of the estimation of the 
counterfactual development of the three application indicators, even when comparing 
applications of persons who participated in an ALMP with applications of unemployed who 
didn’t participate. 
 
The results of test 3 are shown in Annex 6. The standard model contains 13 dummies. This 
seems to be the best way to model the effect of time in a flexible way, allowing for non-linear 
influences. The results in Annex 6 show that if no time variables were used at all, the ALMP 
effects are smaller, in some regressions even negative. This downward shift of the effect 
coefficients is to be expected; as the effect dummy now partly includes the negative effect of 
time on the indicators (it does that since the applications after the announcement are by 
definition later in the spell than the applications before the announcement). The model is 
then tested by adding a more simple set of time dummies (only 5 instead of 13), and by 
adding two continuous variables (duration in weeks, duration in weeks squared). The effects 
tend to be weaker for the whole sample and even negative for the group without a LTU 
forecast. The effect for the group with LTU forecast on the other hand is quite robust. The 
test shows considerable robustness for the main finding; that ALMP should be used mainly 
for unemployed with low chances on the labour market.  
  
Test 4 (Annex 7) looks at the influence of outliers. Outliers were not excluded in the main 
estimation as there was no reason to suspect that the ALMP effect would be different for 
them. To conduct test 3, the main results are recalculated, this time without unemployed who 
show at any stage of their unemployment spell more than 15 applications a week or 5 
interviews per week. Unemployed with an overall interview probability above 0.75 are not 
covered. If the unemployment spell is longer than 2 years, it is cut off after this point. Overall, 
314 applications are dropped (1.8 % of the observations), 19 of them from unemployed with 
a LTU forecast. Accordingly, the results for the participants with a LTU forecast changes very 
little (the effect becomes a bit stronger). For the group without the LTU forecast on the other 
hand, the effect gets weaker on two of the indicators. Again, the main conclusion, that ALMP 
should be mainly used for unemployed with a LTU forecast, remains valid. 
 
Test 5 (Annex 8) recalculates the estimates, this time dropping all applications of 
unemployed who reported a success rate of 0.9 and higher for their personal applications. 
Such a high success rate is extremely unlikely and shows that the unemployed person has 
probably understood the term “interview” differently from the research team (as described in 
section 4). Through this, 130 applications of 7 unemployed are dropped. Leaving these 
applications away, the effect becomes larger for interview probability and interview per week 
when looking at the overall results and the results for group without a LTU forecast. The 
effect on interview per week almost doubles in size for unemployed without a LTU forecast. 
However, the effect remains considerably larger for unemployed with a LTU forecast. 
 
The next test, test 6 (Annex 9), checks if the participants anticipated the ALMP. If that were 
the case, the threat effect would start to exert pressure well before the course was 
announced. In order to check for that a new dummy variable is introduced into the model. 
This dummy variable switches from 0 to 1 if the application was written during the month just 
before the announcement. If the participants don’t anticipate the participation, the coefficient 
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should be zero or close to it. The results show that the coefficients of this ‘placebo’ dummy 
are insignificant (even on the 10 %-level) in all nine estimations. Some of the coefficients are 
relatively large, but this could be either due to anticipation of the ALMP or due to random 
fluctuations. By introducing a dummy for the month before the announcement, the effect 
dummy now measures the difference between applications written until a month before the 
announcement and applications written after the announcement. The performance of the 
applications until a month before the announcement is slightly weaker than the average 
application before the announcement (as indicated by the positive placebo coefficients). 
Therefore, the estimated effect of the ALMP becomes larger in the placebo estimation. The 
average effect over all participants is now significant for the indicators interviews per week as 
well. The differences between the group with a LTU forecast and the group without one 
remain large.  
 
Concluding over the six tests conducted, the results show that the coefficients are robust. 
The coefficients are particularly stable for the group of the LTU-unemployed. The coefficients 
for the non-LTU group vary and even change signs, but generally stay small. The main result, 
that the effect is much larger for the LTU group, holds throughout all changes.  
 
 
 
 
7. Who gains? 
The regressions in the last section show the average effect over all participants, the effect 
over the unemployed with a LTU forecast and the effect over unemployed without such a 
forecast. Because of its panel structure, the data set allows venturing beyond these average 
results by calculating individual treatment effects for each participant. This is useful because 
it gives further insights into which groups gain most from ALMP.  
 
Technically, the individual effects are calculated using the residuals after estimating the main 
models (Table 2). The residuals capture everything which cannot be explained through the 
average treatment effects, the duration dummies, the application date relative to 
announcement, the unemployment rate in the occupation and the fixed effect. Latter makes 
sure that any time-invariant personal characteristics are not part of the residual. The only 
systematic component in the residuals should therefore be the personal treatment effect, 
measured as the deviation from the average effect. It is captured by calculating the 
difference between the mean of all the residuals before the announcement and the mean of 
all the residuals after the announcement. In order to calculate the absolute individual 
treatment effect, the difference is simply added to the average ALMP effect. Note that the 
effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application before the 
ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement. Altogether, the 
individual effects can be calculated for 203 unemployed. 
 
Figure 8 shows the average ALMP effect on the three application indicators. It illustrates that 
there are many winners, but also some losers among the participants.  
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Figure 8: Distribution of the individual effects 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of the ALMP effect on the three indicators (as calculated from the estimation in Table 2). 
Data from 203 unemployed was used (the effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application 
before the ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement). Extreme outliers are not shown in the 
graphs (interview probability: four persons below 0.5 and one above 0.5; applications per week: one below -5 and two above 5; 
interviews per week: seven below -1 and three above 1). 
 
 
Regressions can now be run, explaining the individual effects through different independent 
variables to see under what circumstances the ALMP effect is increased or diminished. The 
first set of independent variables used is a set of ALMP type dummies (Table 5). In order not 
to overstretch the number of observations, each category of ALMP entails at least 16 
unemployed persons. This is admittedly a very low number still, so the results are only 
preliminary. The categories used are “basic course” (which focuses on situation analysis, 
general information about unemployment and application training), “personality oriented 
course” (assessing and developing soft skills), “basic qualification course” (alphabetization 
and very basic German), “language course” (German courses), “other courses” (IT courses 
and vocational training for different industries) and “employment programmes” (workplaces 
for the unemployed with a training component). The observational number is indicated in 
parentheses in Table 5). 
 
The different ALMP types have very different effects. The results show that the omitted 
category, basic course, has strong positive effects on all three indicators (its coefficient are 
shown by the constant). Interviews per week rises by 0.0791 (the overall ALMP effect for the 
assessed group of the 203 unemployed is 0.0281), interview probability by 0.0277 (overall 
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0.0114) and applications per week by 0.1242 (0.0940). Against the strong performance of 
this ALMP type which is also the most commonly used one, all other types fare worse, at 
least in terms of interview probability and interviews per week (the ALMP type coefficients 
show the relative performance compared to the omitted category, the basic course).  
 
Apart from the basic course, basic qualifications courses and “other course” also do well. The 
effect of the language courses is around zero as can be seen by adding the coefficients of 
the constant and the coefficient of the language course. Employment programmes and 
personality oriented courses do even worse, resulting in a negative effect on the application 
performance of its participants.1 It might surprise that the effect of these two ALMP types is 
not just zero but negative (many previous evaluations actually identify negative impacts of 
programs, see Sianesi 2008). This negative effect can stem from a decrease in motivation 
through the announcement (as part of the threat effect), a lower number of applications while 
on an ALMP (lock-in effect) and/or a bad signal sent to potential employers when adding the 
course diploma to the application (see Falk et al. 2005). The observational number is too low 
in order to measure the partial effects on a program type base. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Individual ALMP effect on Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
    Mean 0.0281 0.0114 0.0940 
    Std. Dev. 0.5520 0.1532 1.3052 
     
ALMP Type (omitted: Basic course (90 participants)) 
    
Personality oriented course (30 participants) -0.1363 -0.0569 0.0311 
 (0.1152) (0.0393) (0.2389) 
Basic qualifications course (16 participants) -0.0346 -0.0040 -0.0397 
 (0.0722) (0.0154) (0.2298) 
Language course (17 participants) -0.0815 -0.0216 -0.3994 
 (0.1179) (0.0286) (0.3735) 
Other course (18 participants) -0.0699 -0.0021 0.0442 
 (0.1584) (0.0471) (0.2865) 
Employment programme (32 participants) -0.0959 -0.0355 -0.0135 
 (0.1050) (0.0338) (0.2192) 
     
Constant 0.0791 0.0277+ 0.1242 
 (0.0702) (0.0151) (0.1795) 
Sample 
    
All unemployed vs. ALMP unemployed ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of unemployed 203 203 203 
     
Estimation  
      
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.0088 0.0193 0.0076 
F-value 0.4576 0.7455 0.3126 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Data from 203 unemployed used (the effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application before the 
ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement). 
Table 5: The effect of different types of ALMP   
 
 
Note that all coefficients but one (the effect of the basic course on interview probability) are 
insignificant, despite their large size. This means that not all participants have the same gain 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, those two ALMP types are also the longest ones. This raises the questions if the lock-in effect is responsible for 
the weak performance. This doesn’t seem to be the case, as the search intensity as measured by the number of applications 
per week is not reduced during these two types. Rather, it is the interview probability which is decreased during and after the 
ALMP. 
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from the ALMP types and there is a lot of variation in these individual effects, even when split 
up according to the ALMP type. Since the observational number is quite small, one would 
probably obtain significant differences with a larger sample. 
 
In order to find out under what circumstances the ALMP work best, characteristics can be 
added to the regression. The dataset is very rich and allows for a multitude of factors to be 
tested (both characteristics of the unemployed person and the ALMP). However, the 
influence of many of those factors is not large enough to be significant on basis of the small 
observational set.  
 
Table 6 shows how different characteristics of the unemployed person influence the ALMP 
effect. In the first block entered are three age group dummies. The results show that ALMP 
work best for the unemployed below the age of 30 (the omitted category). The coefficients 
are not statistically significant however, despite the considerable size of the coefficients. The 
next variables entered indicate the highest education the unemployed has attained. The 
results show that the higher the education of the unemployed, the better the results. The 
worst results show unemployed with no further education at all and unemployed with an 
apprenticeship, the best result unemployed with a university degree. This is surprising, 
because there is a broad choice of ALMP for unskilled persons. 
 
Foreigners and women experience a larger effect on the number of interviews per week than 
Swiss and men: Foreigners gain more than Swiss because the ALMP results in a larger 
change in the search intensity, while women have a higher increase on interview probability 
than men. If the unemployed searches for a job in the same occupation as previously held 
(overall 73 % of all ALMP participants), he or she shows a much better ALMP effect. A 
search for a job in the same occupation increases the ALMP effect on interviews per week by 
0.1484, the effect on interview probability by 0.0666 (significant on the 10 %-level) and the 
effect on applications per week by 0.1389 compared to searching a job in another occupation. 
This sheds a critical light on retraining and participants learning new skills because they 
cannot or do not want to go back to their old occupation. One could argue that this is merely 
an indication for motivation, but this effect is measured separately through the next variable. 
Motivation to participate in the ALMP has a strong positive effect, but the difference between 
motivated and unmotivated unemployed is not statistically significant. After controlling for 
motivation, the coefficient for the dummy which indicates if the person has been sanctioned 
once or several times during the unemployment spell is almost zero. 
  
As a last characteristic, the forecast of the case worker on duration is added to the 
regression. Three groups are used here, and the gains for persons with a longer duration 
forecast seem to hold even if comparing persons with 0 to 5 months forecasts with the ones 
of 7 to 11. Comparing the two extreme ends, unemployed with 0 to 5 months forecasts and 
those with a LTU forecast, the following differences are statistically significant: The ALMP 
effect on interviews per week is 0.2069 higher. This is an enormous difference, considering 
the average effect is 0.0281. 
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Dependent variable: Individual ALMP effect on: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per 
week 
    Mean 0.0281 0.0114 0.0940 
    Std. Dev. 0.5520 0.1532 1.3052 
      
Age (omitted: below 30) 
     
Age 30 - 39 -0.0144 -0.0169 0.2621 
 (0.0857) (0.0254) (0.3988) 
Age 40 to 49 -0.1660 -0.0457 0.0391 
 (0.1183) (0.0310) (0.3229) 
Age 50 and older -0.1164 -0.0544 0.0575 
 (0.0985) (0.0340) (0.3089) 
      
Education (omitted: no further education) 
     
Apprenticeship -0.0171 0.0080 -0.0030 
 (0.1483) (0.0337) (0.2184) 
Gymnasium 0.1566 0.0425 0.1491 
 (0.1096) (0.0347) (0.3116) 
Technical college 0.2393* 0.0677+ 0.4153 
 (0.1036) (0.0346) (0.3600) 
University 0.2644* 0.0459+ 0.6861 
 (0.1208) (0.0275) (0.9044) 
Education not known 0.1171 0.0237 0.1596 
 (0.1242) (0.0388) (0.4079) 
      
Of foreign origin 0.0444 -0.0118 0.2508 
 (0.1146) (0.0281) (0.2537) 
      
Woman 0.0474 0.0237 -0.2798 
 (0.0800) (0.0207) (0.2115) 
      
Former industry (12 dummies) yes yes yes 
      
Participant is searching for a job in the same 
profession than previously held 
0.1484 
(0.1147) 
0.0666+ 
(0.0385) 
0.1389 
(0.2460) 
 
   
      
Not motivated to participate in ALMP -0.0846 -0.0225 -0.2271 
 (0.0805) (0.0204) (0.4329) 
      
Sanctioned at least once during spell -0.0003 -0.0102 -0.1267 
 (0.0920) (0.0264) (0.2612) 
      
Unemployment duration forecast (omitted: Forecast 12  
months and more & forecast unknown)    
Forecast 0 to 5 months -0.2069+ -0.0590 -0.3772 
 (0.1171) (0.0367) (0.2708) 
Forecast 6 to 11 months -0.1585 -0.0384 -0.1540 
 (0.0997) (0.0298) (0.1972) 
      
Constant -0.0872 0.0042 -0.1843 
 (0.2077) (0.0583) (0.5449) 
      
Sample 
     
All unemployed vs. ALMP unemployed ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of unemployed 203 203 203 
      
Estimation  
     
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.1185 0.1278 0.0873 
F-value 1.2388 1.3751 0.7564 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Data from 203 unemployed used (the effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application before the 
ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement). 
Table 6: The influence of different characteristics on the ALMP effect 
 
 
One has to keep in mind that Table 5 shows the effect the way the ALMP types are currently 
used on the unemployed of the Zurich-Staffelstrasse agency. These estimates do not just tell 
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a story about the ALMP itself, but also about its participants and how well they are adapted 
to the course itinerary. To improve performance of the ALMP types, one can adapt the ALMP 
to the existing participants, or select the participants differently for an existing ALMP, or one 
can do both. 
 
 
 
 
8. Getting a job 
A possible criticism to the new approach could be the fact that job interviews only provide a 
stepping stone on the way to find a new job and end unemployment. While this is true by 
definition, a job interview takes a job seeker a far way, as the data shows. The following 
numbers are based on the data of all unemployed who left unemployment with a job and who 
started the spell after 1st of July 2007 and ended it before 31st of March 2008. Only for this 
group the entire application history from start till end of the unemployment spell is known. 
This group only entails 76 unemployed; because of the low number of observations, the 
following results cannot be further assessed for subgroups (e.g. ALMP participants vs. non-
participants, unemployed with LTU forecast vs. Non-LTU forecast etc.). 
  
The average person who left unemployment with the opportunity to start a new job wrote 36 
applications (median value). Please note that this is a group with above average chances, 
because they found a job during the nine months of unemployment monitored. The 
probability of getting the job when writing an application is therefore 5.2 %. Within that 
process, the biggest hurdle is getting a job interview. In average, it took the unemployed 7.1 
applications for each job interview (median), resulting in a probability of 14.1 %. It then took 
them in average 2 interviews (median) to actually get a job. The chances of a job, given an 
interview, are 50.0 %. 
 
 
 
Median Mean 
Probability job interview given an application  0.1409 0.2038 
Probability job offer given a job interview  0.5000 0.5372 
Probability job offer given an application  0.0520 0.1065 
    
Number of unemployed 76 76 
Number of applications 2,053 2,053 
Notes: The table only captures unemployed who i) left unemployment with a job and ii) started unemployment 
on 1 July 2007 or later and finished their spell on 30 March 2008 or earlier. Thereby, all applications of a 
person could be recorded in the database. Because of these selection criteria, the reduced sample is not 
representative for the overall sample. 
Table 7: Probability of getting a job (reduced sample) 
 
 
The relative impact of the ALMPs on the overall probability of a job remains exactly as 
measured by the different regressions in this study, as long the ALMP doesn’t change the 
probability of a job interview. This is unlikely of course, as most acquired know-how would 
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work both when writing the application and in the job interview environment (e.g. language 
skills, self assurance, showing newly acquired job skills). It is therefore plausible that the 
ALMP effect on the probability of a job interview is are going have an effect on the probability 
of the job, given an interview, as well. 
 
It is difficult to envisage a characteristic which has a positive impact on getting to an interview, 
but then a negative one on getting the job (or the other way round). The calculated effects on 
the probability of a job interview can therefore be taken as a lower boundary of the overall 
effect on getting a job.  
 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
While many previous studies applied methods which had to rely on strong assumptions in 
order to calculate accurate and unbiased estimates of the ALMP effect, the new approach 
used in this study doesn’t. This is possible through the use of new indicators and data, which 
allows measuring the outcome several times before, during, and after the ALMP. This allows 
excluding time-invariant characteristics and to solve the selection bias.  
 
The new instrument can be relatively easily applied to measure the effect of ALMPs by 
labour market institutions, as it combines several good controlling characteristics: It is a 
detailed, accurate and unbiased instrument utilizing relatively simple statistical tools. It can 
be easily understood by the persons responsible for the controlling process and 
communicated to involved partners. This makes it a trustworthy controlling instrument. It is 
inexpensive; the biggest cost involved is that the case worker has to update the application 
sheets (that is not just a cost though as it shows to the unemployed that these sheets are 
taken seriously). It can be easily updated on a regular base. This is an important 
characteristic as the ALMP might have different effects depending on the condition of the 
labour market (McVicar and Podivinsky 2008). 
 
The method was applied as a trial run in one agency in Switzerland, the Zurich-Staffelstrasse 
agency. 30,000 applications were collected, along with much information on the unemployed 
and the ALMP used. Through this, a very rich dataset could be assembled. Estimates based 
on this data show that on average, the ALMPs have a strong positive effect on the chances 
of a job interview, the weekly number of applications and the weekly number of interviews 
when applied to unemployed with a long term unemployment forecast. Applied to 
unemployed without such a forecast, the ALMP show relatively little impact. There are stark 
differences between the ALMP types as well. While most types do well, personality oriented 
courses and employment programmes have a negative impact on the application 
performance of the unemployed. These are preliminary results of course since they stem 
from the unemployed of a single agency.  
 
In order to gain more insight into the ALMPs and to start using the proposed method as a 
controlling tool, more data now needs to be collected. It is worth the effort: ALMPs are an 
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expensive tool in financial terms. If they don’t work, they are costly in human terms too, 
because both the participants and the case worker hope that these programs will shorten 
unemployment. It is time to start controlling this instrument thoroughly and on the basis of 
quantitative data, and thereby improve its quality and reputation. 
Essay 1: A New Approach to Evaluating Active Labour Market Programs 44 
 
Bibliography 
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan (2004), Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, American 
Economic Review, 94(4), 991 - 1013. 
 
Black, D. A., Smith, J. A., Berger, M. C. and B. J. Noel (2003), Is the Threat of 
Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves? Evidence from 
Random Assignment in the UI System, American Economic Review 93, 1313 - 1327. 
 
Carling, K., and K. Richardson (2004), The Relative Efficiency of Labor Market Programs: 
Swedish Experience from the 1990s, Labour Economics 11, 335 - 354. 
 
Carlsson, M., Rooth, D.-O., 2007. Evidence of Ethnic Discrimination in the Swedish Labor 
Market Using Experimental Data. Labor Economics 14, 716 - 729. 
 
Drydakis, N. (2009), Sexual orientation discrimination in the labour market, Labour 
Economics 16, 364 – 372. 
 
Falk, A., Lalive, R. and J. Zweimüller (2005), The Success of Job Applications: A New 
Approach to Program Evaluation, Labour Economics 12(6), 739 - 748. 
 
Gerfin, M. and M. Lechner (2002), A Microeconometric Evaluation of the Active Labour 
Market Policy in Switzerland, Economic Journal 112(482), 854 - 893.   
 
Heckman, J. J., LaLonde, R. J. and J. A. Smith (1999), The Economics and Econometrics of 
Active Labor Market Programs, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. III, ed. by O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card, Elsevier. 
 
Khotari, S. P. and J. B. Warner (2006), Econometrics of Event Studies, in Eckbo, B. E. (ed.), 
Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Volume A, Handbooks 
in Finance Series, Elsevier/North-Holland, Ch. 1 
 
Lalive, R., van Ours, J. C. and J. Zweimüller (2008), The impact of Active Labor Market 
Programs on the Duration of Unemployment in Switzerland, Economic Journal 
118(525), 235 - 257. 
 
Lalive, R., van Ours, J. C. and J. Zweimüller (2000), The Impact of Active Labor Market 
Policies and Benefit Entitlement Rules on the Duration of Unemployment, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 149.  
 
Lalive, R., Zehnder, T. and J. Zweimüller (2006), Makroökonomische Evaluation der aktiven 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik der Schweiz, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). 
 
Essay 1: A New Approach to Evaluating Active Labour Market Programs 45 
 
Lechner, M. and J. Smith (2007), What is the Value Added by Caseworkers? Labour 
Economics 14(2), 135 - 151.    
 
McVicar, D. and J. M. Podivinsky (2008), Does the Impact of Active Labor Market Programs 
Depend on the State of the Labour Market? The Case of the UK New Deal for Young 
People. Discussion Paper.  
 
Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2008), Nonemployment Stigma as Rational Herding: A Field Experiment, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 65(1), 30 - 40. 
 
OECD (2009): Public expenditure and participant stocks on LMP. OECD Stat Extracts. Data 
extracted August 2009. 
 
Ragni, T. (2007), Die Wirksamkeit der öffentlichen Arbeitsvermittlung in der Schweiz, 
Direktion für Wirtschaftspolitik Diskussionspapier, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (SECO). 
 
Rosholm, M. and M. Svarer (2008), The Threat Effect of Active Labour Market Programs, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110(2), 385 - 401. 
 
Rosholm, M. and M. Svarer (2004): Estimating the Threat Effect of Active Labour Market 
Programmes, IZA Discussion Papers 1300, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).  
 
Sianesi, B. (2008), Differential Effects of Active Labour Market Programs for the Unemployed, 
Labour Economics 15, 370 - 399. 
 
Sianesi, B. (2004), An Evaluation of the Swedish system of Active Labour Market 
Programmes in the 1990s, Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1), 133 - 155.  
 
Smith and Todd (2005): Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s Critique of Nonexperimental 
Estimators?, Journal of Econometrics 125, 305 - 353. 
 
Van den Berg, G. J., Bergemann, A. H.,, M. Caliendo (2009): The Effect of Active Labor 
Market Programs on Not-Yet Treated Unemployed Individuals, Journal of the European 
Economic Association 7(2-3), 606 - 616.   
 
  
Essay 1: A New Approach to Evaluating Active Labour Market Programs 46 
 
Annex 
 
Annex 1: Applications recorded in a typical month at the Zurich-Staffelstrasse agency 
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Note: Averages over the nine month of data collection are shown. Day 30 and day 31 were reweighed because their lower number of appearance. 
December was not taken into account. 
 
 
Annex 2: Characteristics of ALMP participants 
 
Unemployment duration forecast: 0-6 months 7-12 months 13 and more months no forecast 
         
Age 35.20 39.58 42.54 44.70 
Women 0.57 0.44 0.48 0.20 
Swiss 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.60 
 
    
Industry 
        
No answer, first sector or “private household 0.35 0.18 0.14 0.00 
Industry 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.30 
Building and Constructing 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.00 
Trade and Commerce 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.10 
Hospitality industry 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 
Transport and Communication 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 
Financial services 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.30 
Business services (incl. IT) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Public administration 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.10 
Health and social services 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.00 
Other services 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.00 
 
    
 
Essay 1: A New Approach to Evaluating Active Labour Market Programs 47 
 
Annex 2: Characteristics of ALMP participants (continued) 
 
Unemployment duration forecast: 0-6 months 7-12 months 13 and more months no forecast 
 
        
Highest attained educational 
        
no further education 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.40 
Apprenticeship  0.22 0.19 0.19 0.30 
Gymnasium 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.10 
Technical college 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.00 
University 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.20 
Education not known 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.00 
 
    
ALMP 
        
Basic course 0.63 0.54 0.31 0.30 
Personality oriented course 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.30 
Basic qualifications course 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.00 
Language course 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.10 
Other course 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.00 
Employment programme 0.09 0.13 0.33 0.30 
 
    
N 54 108 166 10 
Note: Only unemployed with an ALMP at some stage of their spell are covered. Apart from age, baseline probability, ALMP treatment effect and 
the number of observations, all numbers are proportions 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Sensitivity test 1 - development of the number of applications after the 
announcement 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the total number of applications per week sent out by any of the 338 ALMP participants. The duration is 
plotted until the 62nd week after the ALMP announcement (this is the maximum duration for any person in the sample). 
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Annex 4: Sensitivity test 1 - model including “time since announcement”  
interaction terms 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU 
    Mean 0.1355 0.1033 0.1782 0.0493 0.0382 0.0648 2.7478 2.7034 2.7482 
    Std. Dev. 0.4752 0.4073 0.5479 0.2165 0.1917 0.2463 1.6552 1.5657 1.6716 
             
Effects split according to time since 
announcement 
           
1.  Effect between week 0 and 10 after  0.0067 0.0223** -0.0110 0.0476 0.0750 0.0622 0.0189 0.0559** -0.0224 
    announcement (Dummy is 1 from  (0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0098) (0.0726) (0.0947) (0.1094) (0.0204) (0.0212) (0.0357) 
    week 0 to week 10)          
          
2.  Effect between week 11 and 20 after  0.0005 0.0290** -0.0282* 0.0680 0.1147 0.0707 -0.0065 0.0719* -0.0907+ 
    announcement (Dummy is 1 from (0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0144) (0.1038) (0.1302) (0.1677) (0.0272) (0.0302) (0.0492) 
    week 11 to week 20)          
          
1.  Effect after week 20 (Dummy is 1  -0.0148 0.0221 -0.0526* 0.1268 0.2649 -0.0068 -0.0319 0.0737+ -0.1517* 
    from week 20 to end of spell) (0.0113) (0.0138) (0.0212) (0.1368) (0.1688) (0.2325) (0.0372) (0.0416) (0.0703) 
          
Control variables (duration;  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
    unemployment rate in occupation)          
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
           
Number of applications 17910 9451 7835 6518 3496 2851 6518 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 338 166 162 338 166 162 338 166 162 
            
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
          
R-squared 0.1457 0.1873 0.1183 0.2231 0.2240 0.1808 0.2175 0.2755 0.1834 
F-value 4.1454 3.4978 4.8996 0.5850 0.8926 0.7119 2.2975 2.3413 3.2033 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
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Annex 5: Sensitivity test 2 – on selectivity 
Annex 5a) All unemployed 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0282 0.0334 0.0397* 0.0266 0.0087 0.0113+ 0.0147** 0.0092* 0.0949 0.1100 0.0534 0.0342 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0219) (0.0215) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0722) (0.0732) (0.0565) (0.0570) 
                
Duration 
               
    Specification 1: 13 dummies (same for treated and control) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
    Specification 2: 13 dummies (different for treated and control) no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
               
Panel or pooled estimation 
              
Fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy) no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy and characteristics) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Treatment dummy (ALMP at some stage of the spell) 
  -0.0094 0.0112   -0.0106 -0.0019    0.1984+ 0.2173* 
 
  (0.0312) (0.0310)   (0.0078) (0.0078)    (0.1032) (0.1033) 
                
Control variables (application date relative to announcement; 
unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
Sample (all unemployed incl. unemployed without ALMP) 
              
Number of applications 10805 10805 10805 10805 29991 29991 29991 29991 10805 10805 10805 10805 
Number of unemployed 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
               
R-squared 0.2684 0.2687 0.0161 0.0421 0.1659 0.1663 0.0086 0.0246 0.2433 0.2440 0.0090 0.0195 
F-value 3.2042 1.9958 6.7740 9.4412 4.4365 3.1683 9.9932 15.1264 0.8662 0.8245 3.7452 4.2857 
 Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The pooled specification 1 lacks the individual fixed effects from the standard model but contains an extra dummy describing if the unemployed participates in an ALMP at any time during his or her spell (treated 
dummy). The pooled specification 2 is like specification 1, but contains further variables: gender (dummy), Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former industry (11 
dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Unemployment rate in 
occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used.  
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Annex 5b) All unemployed with a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0374+ 0.0435* 0.0496* 0.0544* 0.0125+ 0.0151* 0.0179** 0.0183** 0.2033* 0.2106* 0.1203 0.1255 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0967) (0.1009) (0.0783) (0.0794) 
                
Duration 
               
    Specification 1: 13 dummies (same for treated and control) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
    Specification 2: 13 dummies (different for treated and control) no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
               
Panel or pooled estimation 
              
Fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy) no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy and characteristics) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Treatment dummy (ALMP at some stage of the spell) 
  0.0448 0.0534   0.0091 0.0138    0.2593 0.2159 
 
  (0.0522) (0.0512)   (0.0134) (0.0133)    (0.1876) (0.1866) 
                
Control variables (application date relative to announcement; 
unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
Sample (all unemployed incl. unemployed without ALMP) 
              
Number of applications 5497 5497 5497 5497 14938 14938 14938 14938 5497 5497 5497 5497 
Number of unemployed 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
               
R-squared 0.2728 0.2751 0.0121 0.0629 0.1982 0.1998 0.0085 0.0434 0.2380 0.2403 0.0128 0.0380 
F-value 1.4806 1.5549 2.5685 7.3164 2.3966 2.3529 4.9068 13.5115 0.5799 0.9089 2.7294 4.3053 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The pooled specification 1 lacks the individual fixed effects from the standard model but contains an extra dummy describing if the unemployed participates in an ALMP at any time during his or her spell (treated 
dummy). The pooled specification 2 is like specification 1, but contains further variables: gender (dummy), Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former industry (11 
dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Unemployment rate in 
occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used.  
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Annex 5c) All unemployed without a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0109 0.0166 0.0373 0.0113 0.0004 0.0038 0.0152* 0.0052 0.0446 0.0531 -0.0339 -0.0609 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0097) (0.0103) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.1089) (0.1090) (0.0830) (0.0846) 
                
Duration 
               
    Specification 1: 13 dummies (same for treated and control) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
    Specification 2: 13 dummies (different for treated and control) no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
               
Panel or pooled estimation 
              
Fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy) no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy and characteristics) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Treatment dummy (ALMP at some stage of the spell) 
  0.0022 0.0293   -0.0048 0.0028    0.0991 0.1442 
 
  (0.0432) (0.0435)   (0.0108) (0.0109)    (0.1315) (0.1328) 
                
Control variables (application date relative to announcement; 
unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
Sample (all unemployed incl. unemployed without ALMP) 
              
Number of applications 4935 4935 4935 4935 13923 13923 13923 13923 4935 4935 4935 4935 
Number of unemployed 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
               
R-squared 0.2620 0.2619 0.0193 0.0396 0.1432 0.1437 0.0098 0.0221 0.2257 0.2268 0.0098 0.0239 
F-value 3.6299 2.1427 3.8630 4.1065 4.9027 3.2091 5.5097 6.3848 0.8542 0.7017 1.9471 2.4457 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The pooled specification 1 lacks the individual fixed effects from the standard model but contains an extra dummy describing if the unemployed participates in an ALMP at any time during his or her spell (treated 
dummy). The pooled specification 2 is like specification 1, but contains further variables: gender (dummy), Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former industry (11 
dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Unemployment rate in 
occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used.  
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Annex 6: Sensitivity test 3 – changing the duration modelling 
Annex 6a) All ALMP participants 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0308 -0.0014 0.0117 0.0127 0.0107+ 0.0011 0.0067 0.0062 0.0972 0.0305 0.0640 0.0330 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0219) (0.0224) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0732) (0.0730) (0.0731) (0.0741) 
                
Duration 
               
Specification 1: 13 Dummies (standard) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
Specification 2: No time dummies no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no 
Specification 3: 5 dummies no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Specification 4: 2 variables (duration, duration squared) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Control variables (application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
              
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
               
Number of applications 6518 6518 6518 6518 17910 17910 17910 17910 6518 6518 6518 6518 
Number of unemployed 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
              
R-squared 0.2172 0.2132 0.2139 0.2141 0.1454 0.1437 0.1441 0.1441 0.2232 0.2219 0.2224 0.2219 
F-value 2.3693 5.6057 3.1096 4.4200 3.8608 9.8710 5.2518 9.9042 0.7262 0.4424 0.7333 0.2746 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Specification 1 contains the following 13 duration dummies: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Specification 3 contains the 
following 5 duration dummies: 1-2 months (omitted), 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13 and more months. Specification 4 contains two continuous variables: duration in weeks and duration in weeks 
squared. Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
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Annex 6b) All ALMP participants with a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0386+ 0.0305 0.0400+ 0.0427+ 0.0132+ 0.0109+ 0.0152* 0.0160* 0.2071* 0.1936* 0.1716+ 0.1707+ 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0216) (0.0222) (0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.1012) (0.0962) (0.0993) (0.0997) 
                
Duration                
Specification 1: 13 Dummies (standard) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
Specification 2: No time dummies no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no 
Specification 3: 5 dummies no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Specification 4: 2 variables (duration, duration squared) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Control variables (application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
              
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
               
Number of applications 3496 3496 3496 3496 9451 9451 9451 9451 3496 3496 3496 3496 
Number of unemployed 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
              
R-squared 0.2748 0.2688 0.2714 0.2696 0.1864 0.1830 0.1851 0.1836 0.2244 0.2220 0.2230 0.2222 
F-value 2.3576 1.5168 2.4851 1.4901 3.2209 2.9052 4.6508 3.7047 1.0121 1.5490 1.3668 1.0695 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Specification 1 contains the following 13 duration dummies: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Specification 3 contains the 
following 5 duration dummies: 1-2 months (omitted), 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13 and more months. Specification 4 contains two continuous variables: duration in weeks and duration in weeks 
squared. Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
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Annex 6c) All ALMP participants without a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0150 -0.0371 -0.0150 -0.0201 0.0043 -0.0118 -0.0025 -0.0061 0.0280 -0.0516 -0.0238 -0.0050 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0371) (0.0384) (0.0378) (0.0387) (0.0102) (0.0094) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.1083) (0.1102) (0.1090) (0.1081) 
                
Duration                
Specification 1: 13 Dummies (standard) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
Specification 2: No time dummies no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no 
Specification 3: 5 dummies no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Specification 4: 2 variables (duration, duration squared) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Control variables (application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
              
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
               
Number of applications 2851 2851 2851 2851 7835 7835 7835 7835 2851 2851 2851 2851 
Number of unemployed 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
              
R-squared 0.1825 0.1717 0.1755 0.1732 0.1178 0.1116 0.1142 0.1122 0.1806 0.1780 0.1788 0.1793 
F-value 3.1401 5.7401 4.0171 4.0862 4.8861 9.2781 6.5348 8.9038 0.7125 0.3131 0.5672 0.9727 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Specification 1 contains the following 13 duration dummies: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Specification 3 contains the 
following 5 duration dummies: 1-2 months (omitted), 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13 and more months. Specification 4 contains two continuous variables: duration in weeks and duration in weeks 
squared. Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
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Annex 7: Sensitivity test 4 – dropping outliers 
Estimation without unemployed who show at any stage of their unemployment spells more than 15 applications a week or 5 
interviews per week. Unemployed with an overall interview probability above 0.75 are not covered. If the unemployment spell is 
longer than 2 years, it is cut off after this point. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU  Non-LTU  All LTU  
Non-
LTU  All LTU  Non-LTU  
             
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0245 0.0430* 0.0003 0.0056 0.0132+ -0.0054 0.1372+ 0.2120* 0.0732 
    (Dummy is 1 after the announcement of the ALMP) (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0342) (0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0721) (0.1018) (0.1071) 
             
Control variables (duration; application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
            
Number of applications 6428 3487 2785 17596 9432 7651 6428 3487 2785 
Number of unemployed 331 165 157 331 165 157 331 165 157 
             
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
           
R-squared 0.1866 0.2278 0.1595 0.1102 0.1429 0.0879 0.2160 0.2243 0.1867 
F-value 2.1789 2.2664 2.8293 3.3079 3.2212 4.1352 0.7453 1.0210 0.6505 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
 
 
Annex 8: Sensitivity test 5 – dropping personal applications with an unusual high 
success rate 
Unemployed who report an overall interview probability above 0.9 for their personal applications are not covered. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU All LTU Non-LTU 
            
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0360+ 0.0376+ 0.0268 0.0118+ 0.0121+ 0.0068 0.0732 0.1691 0.0224 
    (Dummy is 1 after the announcement of the ALMP) (0.0211) (0.0218) (0.0357) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0749) (0.1044) (0.1099) 
            
Control variables (duration; application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
           
Number of applications 6263 3365 2734 17176 9060 7503 6263 3365 2734 
Number of unemployed 319 158 152 319 158 152 319 158 152 
            
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
          
R-squared 0.1834 0.2332 0.1510 0.1150 0.1500 0.0918 0.2263 0.2299 0.1807 
F-value 2.3374 2.2277 3.1856 3.9109 3.1027 4.6701 0.7137 0.9894 0.7103 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
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Annex 9: Sensitivity test 6 – testing the no anticipation assumption 
A dummy variable is added which switches to one in the period from one month before the ALMP announcement to the 
announcement. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU All LTU Non-LTU 
             
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0496+ 0.0414 0.0293 0.0194* 0.0164+ 0.0123 0.1611+ 0.2349+ 0.0192 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0275) (0.0299) (0.0482) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0141) (0.0972) (0.1309) (0.1527) 
             
Placebo test  0.0283 0.0047 0.0196 0.0124 0.0050 0.0106 0.0962 0.0456 -0.0120 
    (Effect one month before announcement) (0.0287) (0.0299) (0.0494) (0.0075) (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0990) (0.1264) (0.1511) 
             
Control variables (duration; application date 
relative to announcement; unemployment rate 
in occupation) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
            
Number of applications 6518 3496 2851 17910 9451 7835 6518 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 338 166 162 338 166 162 338 166 162 
             
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
           
R-squared 0.2173 0.2748 0.1825 0.1455 0.1864 0.1179 0.2234 0.2245 0.1806 
F-value 2.3828 2.2276 3.0741 3.8311 3.0266 4.6669 0.7905 0.9499 0.6713 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
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Essay 2 
The Effect of Unemployment Duration on Happiness and 
the Perceived Chances to Find a Job 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
To gain new insights into the dynamics of unemployment, over three thousand responses by 
unemployed persons regarding their level of happiness and their perceived chances of 
finding a job within a month have been collected. Since the data set includes up to nine 
responses per unemployed, it allows using panel data regression methods and thereby 
cancelling out any unobserved individual heterogeneity. The results show that the Happiness 
Score displays little negative or positive development over the duration of unemployment. 
The self-assessed chances to find a job on the other hand increase despite the fact that 
objective chances rapidly fall over time. The study further shows that the application success 
has not much influence on the happiness of an unemployed person but that it does boost the 
perceived chances. Finally, most Active Labour Market Programs have a negative influence 
on both happiness and perceived chances. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since economists started to be interested in happiness as a research topic, the effect of 
unemployment on happiness has attracted much attention. This interest has not just be 
fuelled by the fact that unemployment has traditionally been a study subject of economics, 
but also because studies have repeatedly found large non-monetary costs generated by 
unemployment, costs in fact far larger than the estimated monetary effects through lost 
income. The main body of research has been devoted to comparing the happiness of the 
unemployed to the happiness of the employed. However, a few studies have focused on the 
unemployment spell itself and on the happiness dynamics over its duration. Quantitative 
research on this topic has been limited through the fact that most datasets only contain one 
measurement per person during the spell. Qualitative research on the other hand was able to 
observe the developments more closely, but couldn’t quantify the impacts and therefore was 
not able to use more complex modelling. 
 
Through the extensive data collected in one unemployment agency in Switzerland, it is now 
possible to look beyond the grainy analysis on duration effects conducted so far. This 
purpose-built database contains 3331 responses in total, with up to nine responses per 
unemployed persons. The responses were given by the unemployed once a month, either 
until the end of their unemployment spell or the end of the observational period. The panel 
structure of the dataset allows using panel data regression methods and thereby cancelling 
out any unobserved individual heterogeneity which might confound the estimation. As these 
observations stem from short and long term unemployed, it is possible to estimate the 
development over the whole duration of the unemployment spell.  
 
Additionally, the database contains a new indicator: chances to find a job within the next 30 
days, as predicted by the unemployed person him or herself. Apart from being an interesting 
indicator itself, data on the perceived chances allows observing how much the happiness 
level of the unemployed is determined through the self-assessed chances on the labour 
market. The dataset also contains data on the actual application success, on participations in 
ALMPs (Active Labour Market Programs) and sanctions in case of non-compliance with the 
rules of the unemployment insurance. Through this, several interesting determinants of 
happiness during unemployment can be tested. 
 
The results show that there is a slight negative trend for the Happiness Score (which is 
measured on a scale from 0, not at all satisfied, to 10, very satisfied) over the duration of 
unemployment. Between the early stages of unemployment (i.e. the first two month) and late 
stages (i.e. after the twelfth month), the average unemployed experiences a -0.088 point 
drop in her or his Happiness Score. This drop is much smaller than the initial drop of 
happiness when a person becomes unemployed in Switzerland, which is - 1.6 points. This 
finding is similar to the one found in the two main studies conducted on the subject so far 
which have also not found any influence of duration, neither in a positive (a habituation effect) 
or negative way (rising frustration). Perceived chances to find a job within a month, also 
measured on a scale from 0 (no chance) to 10 (very good chances), gains an immense 
1.382 points between early and late stages of unemployment. This is paradox as the actual 
chances fall heavily over time. A possible explanation could be that the increase is driven 
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through a sense of deserving and impatience: After waiting for a long time, the unemployed 
person might increasingly feel that it is now her or his turn to get the job.  
 
Being successful in the application process increases happiness, but just a little: The larger 
the number of interviews in the period before the measurement of the Happiness Score, the 
higher the score reported. The coefficients in these estimations are very small however and 
mostly not statistically significant. The level of search intensity (as measured through the 
number of applications written per week) has a negative effect on the level of happiness. On 
perceived chances on the other hand, the level of success has quite a large positive impact. 
The search intensity has almost no effect at all on the Perceived Chances Score. 
  
ALMPs have in average a negative impact on both happiness and perceived chances. This 
negative impact takes place as soon as the ALMP is announced which indicates that the fact 
that they’re invited to participate in an ALMP is taken as a negative signal by the unemployed 
on their own employability. While the ALMP lasts, that impact on perceived chances is 
reversed. This could mean that the unemployed believes that the ALMP is going to have a 
positive impact on his or her chances. Once the ALMP has finished and the unemployed still 
doesn’t find a job however, the scores falls to levels lower than before the ALMP. In terms of 
sanctions, the influence on happiness and perceived chances is small and statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Why is it important to study the level and development of happiness and perceived chances 
during unemployment? The findings of such research can give more insight on the non-
monetary costs of unemployment and on the changes of mental health over the duration of 
unemployment. They might identify possible problematic periods during unemployment. This 
information can then be used by the public labour market administrations (and other 
interested organizations) to improve their consultation and placement services. Research on 
the dynamics of happiness and self-assessed chances over the duration of unemployment 
also promises new insights into why search intensity and success fluctuate over time, and 
thereby adds to the theoretical body of determinants of unemployment duration. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way: In section 2, an overview over the previous 
literature and theory is given. Section 3 describes the two variables of interest, happiness 
and perceived chances, and the data used. In section 4, the development of the two 
variables over time is observed. Section 5 assesses how the application success affects 
happiness and perceived chances, and section 6 analyses how ALMPs and sanctions 
influence the two variables. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Theory and related literature 
In recent years, happiness economics has received a lot of attention, and the influence of 
unemployment on happiness has been one of the key topics. A good overview over this 
branch of literature is given by Clark (2006) and Carroll (2007). Studies have consistently 
found large non-monetary costs generated by unemployment, costs in fact far larger than the 
estimated monetary effects through lost income. The costs are not only large when 
expressed in monetary terms, but also when compared with other important blows of fate like 
divorce and widowhood (Clark and Oswald 2002a). For Switzerland, Frey and Stutzer (2002a) 
report that unemployed persons rate their happiness at an average score of 6.6 on a 10 point 
scale (10 representing complete satisfaction). Their employed compatriots showed a much 
higher average score of 8.2. Frey and Stutzer estimate that only a very small proportion of 
that effect is due to income loss. They show that the probability that a person reports a level 
of “complete satisfaction” drops by 21.5% when the labour market status is changed from 
employed to unemployed. If the monetary effects are held constant, that drop is still 20.6%, a 
mere 0.9 percentage point lower. This finding is very similar to estimations of the monetary 
and non-monetary costs of unemployment in other countries - apart from Italy and Spain, 
where there is a large loss of happiness through lower income (Frey and Stutzer 2002a). 
One would expect the monetary effect to depend primarily on the rules of the unemployment 
insurance. In Switzerland, these rules are comparatively generous: Unemployed received 
70% to 80% of their former income for the duration of 18 months. 
   
In terms of the simplest form of a labour supply model, the large non-monetary costs of 
unemployment are surprising: one would expect a positive impact of unemployment through 
more leisure time, once income is held constant. In explaining the costs of unemployment, 
the model is obviously too simple (Carroll 2007). Akerlof (1980) proposed a utility model 
which contains a reputation component. If unemployment is breaking social norms and leads 
to lower reputation, it results in a drop in utility. Indeed, Stutzer and Lalive (2004) showed 
that in Switzerland the reduction in life satisfaction through unemployment is larger if the 
norm to live off one’s own income in the region is strong. Research on unemployment in 
Australia (Shields et al. 2008), Germany (Clarke et al. 2008), South Africa (Powdthavee 2006) 
and the United Kingdom (Shields and Wheatley Price 2005 and Clarke 2003) lends further 
support: The higher unemployment in an area, the smaller the effect on happiness when a 
person becomes unemployed (despite the fact that high unemployment actual decreases the 
chances to regain employment). In psychological studies too, much has been written about 
the negative link between unemployment and happiness. According to these studies, 
joblessness reduces an individual’s perceptions of self-worth and nurtures feelings of lack of 
control and helplessness. As a result, unemployed persons are in worse mental and physical 
health condition than employed persons, and are more prone to depression and suicide 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002b). Unemployed also miss everything people like about their jobs 
apart from income; a provider of social relationships, identity in society and individual self-
esteem (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1997). 
 
Because of the limited data on the subject, there has been only limited economic research on 
the dynamics of happiness over the unemployment spell. One of the two main studies stems 
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from Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997). These authors found on basis of German Socio-
Economic Panel data that happiness is unrelated to unemployment duration: An unemployed 
person doesn’t seem to be more or less affected by unemployment as time passes on. The 
authors conclude that there is no habituation effect over time. Clark (2006), using British 
Household Panel Survey, German Socio-Economic Panel and the European Community 
Household Panel, didn’t find any effect of duration on happiness either. Both studies had to 
rely on datasets measuring happiness data once a year and therefore not able to observe 
how happiness levels changed between those intervals.  
 
The main literature and theory on the effect of unemployment duration stems from 
psychological studies (see McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) and Paul (2005) for an overview). Two 
main models proposed in this literature are the cumulative stress model and the stage model. 
The cumulative stress model argues for a linear deterioration of mental health over the 
unemployment spell. Once unemployed, the stress level increases with time as frustration 
and despair set in with the continuous failure to get a job. Also, financial pressure increases 
as savings are used up (Jackson and Warr 1984). The more complex stage models on the 
other hand drop the assumption of a simple linear development over duration. They presume 
that there is a more complex development which can be described in stages which are 
roughly identical for all unemployed. Although the models differ in details, usually it is 
assumed that the mental health and happiness level are in relatively good shape at the 
beginning of unemployment, while there is still hope to find a job quickly. If the search for a 
job has failed in this initial stage, there is a large drop in the happiness level due to despair 
and frustration over the months that follow. After the crises, there is a final stage of 
adaptation at a happiness level which is higher than the low mark but lower than the level at 
the beginning of unemployment. Warr and Jackson (1987) distinguish between a 
constructive adaptation which is due to the creation of activities and relationships outside the 
job environment through which a regained control and sense of competence is developed, 
and the resigned adaptation which is based on lower aspirations. In contrast to the 
cumulative stress model, the stage models assume therefore a curvilinear relationship 
between unemployment duration and mental health (Paul 2005).  
 
In a recent study by Knabe et al. (2009), the authors apply a new technique which measures 
the utility created by different activities. The authors find that generally, unemployed continue 
to long for employment and do not adapt their overall aspirations. Their joblessness 
continues to make them unhappy. However, hedonic adaptation takes place as the 
unemployed adjust their time-use: The unemployed are able to spend more time on activities 
they like to do (even though per time unit, they might experience less enjoyment for the same 
activity than an employed person). According to this study, the unemployed thereby 
experience overall a similar life satisfaction than employed persons. 
 
Satisfaction and self-esteem were often treated as similar or at least closely related topics in 
the literature and have been looked at with the same models. Studies using an explicit self-
esteem indicator like the Self-Esteem Inventory proposed by Rosenberg have shown results 
on the initial passage from employment to unemployed similar to the ones regarding the 
effect on life satisfaction: Unemployed have a lower level of self-esteem than employed 
persons (Waters and Moore 2002). As time progresses, one would expect the same 
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downward trend for self-esteem as for happiness as theory predicts a deterioration of 
confidence when a job is not found over the initial period of unemployment. A study by 
Goldsmith et al. (1996) however found that unemployment duration has a positive effect on 
self-esteem. The authors describe this as “puzzling”, and think that one possible explanation 
is that as time progresses, the unemployed use more of their time for self-enrichment.  
 
Perceived chances to find a job within a month, the indicator used in this study, are not the 
same as self-esteem. Rather, it is a combination of self-esteem, objective chances and the 
ability to assess these objective chances correctly. There is very little research on the 
development of these perceived chances over the duration of the unemployment spell. 
However, it has been shown that the objective chances to be invited to a job interview drop 
rapidly over time (see the first essay of the thesis). If self-esteem is diminished over time as 
well, one would expect a large drop of the perceived chances over the unemployment spell. 
If self-esteem increases as shown by Goldsmith, it could offset some of the downward trend 
of the objective chances, or could even reverse the trend. It’s further possible that the quality 
of the assessment of ones chances to find a job is quite low and that perceived and objective 
chances diverge. This could be a random deviation, but Kahneman and Lovallo (2000) show 
that the forecast of future outcomes are often anchored on scenarios of success rather than 
on past results. Many people are therefore overly optimistic. This could shift the reported 
perceived chances upward. 
 
In the past, data on what people say rather than what people do has often been received 
with scepticism (Kahneman and Krueger 2006). Over time, such data has been more 
frequently used however, and lately, evidence has been gathered which shows that happy 
people don’t just report that they are happy but that the statement of happiness is 
accompanied by observables actions: Happy people smile more, and are described by family 
and friends as happy (Clark and Oswald 2002a). 
 
One further objection against happiness research has been that different people understand 
the question used to measure happiness differently or attribute different ratings to the same 
level of happiness (as Clark and Oswald (2002b) put it, “your 5 is my 4”). Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann (1997) point out that these different ratings are closely related to the problem of 
unobserved individual specific effects. An estimation bias exists if the person has a different 
rating system (the authors call it anchoring) and that rating system is correlated with other 
observables which enter the model as independent variables. While this problem is difficult to 
solve with cross section data, it is relatively easy to fix using panel data: A dummy variable is 
entered for each individual (fixed effect) through which all unobserved individual differences 
can be excluded, as long as they are time-invariant over the course of the panel observation. 
Through these individual dummies, different individual anchoring can therefore be eliminated 
in the estimation (Clark and Oswald 2002b).  
 
On the question of ordinal versus cardinal quality of the happiness variable, another 
discussed topic in literature, Frey and Stutzer (2000) write that the results are very similar, 
whether ordinal or cardinal treatments of satisfaction scores are used in microeconometric 
happiness functions. In this study, the score will be treated as a cardinal variable in order to 
use the more widely understood class of OLS regression methods.  
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3. Data 
As in other countries, data on Swiss happiness is collected through the annual Swiss 
Household Panel. This panel includes unemployed persons, but is only surveyed once a year. 
There is no data on the perceived chances to find a job collected in a systematic way. 
Therefore the necessary data for this study had to be collected. This was done in one agency 
of the Swiss Unemployment Insurance in the city of Zurich, between 1st of July 2007 and 
31st of March 2008. All unemployed persons registered at this agency during that time were 
asked to participate and to answer the question during their monthly counselling session, 
either until the end of their unemployment spell or until the end of the observational period, 
whichever came first. According to the case workers, most unemployed were happy to do so. 
Only 7.9 % refused to participate or were not able to answer because of language barriers. 
This led to a database containing data of 1247 unemployed persons, who filled out between 
1 and 9 questionnaires. A total of 3331 responses to both questions were collected; the 
average number of responses per person is 2.7.  
 
The two questions were asked at the beginning of the monthly counselling session of the 
unemployed person with his or her case worker. The interval of these sessions is not strictly 
on a monthly basis but instead depends on the need and urgency, as assessed by the case 
worker. A priori, one would expect that unemployed with good chances and good application 
behaviour (many applications and many job interviews) would be invited less often. If this 
expectation were to be true, it could have an impact on the balance in the sample and 
thereby distort the results. Fortunately, the data allows this to be tested: The dataset includes 
a duration forecast for each unemployed person. The forecast is an individual duration 
prediction recorded by the case worker at the start of the unemployment spell. The sample 
average (median value) is 38 days between measurements, with two modes at 28 days 
(local) and 35 days (global). For the group of the unemployed with a long term 
unemployment (LTU, i.e. a duration of more than 12 months) forecast, the median lies at 41 
days. The group of unemployed with a Non-LTU forecast has a slightly lower median 
duration of 35 days between sessions (see Annex 1 for the distribution of the intervals). This 
means that the balance in the sample regarding observations from unemployed with low and 
high chances is kept to a large extent. 
 
Much data stems from the beginning of the unemployment spells, as the unemployed get 
fewer as the duration of the spell progresses (Figure 1). The number of observations is 
relatively low after the 18th month, when most unemployed in Switzerland have used up their 
benefits. Some unemployed however can continue their spell for another few months (older 
unemployed and persons who participate in a work subsidy scheme). Of any month of the 
unemployment spell, the highest number of observations (i.e. an answer to one or both of the 
two questions) is achieved in the first month of unemployment, in which the number of 
observations reaches almost 700). None of the months of the unemployment spell reaches 
the maximum of 1247 observations (an observation for each of the 1247 unemployed), 
because the data is censored to the left and right through the start and end of the data 
collection period (e.g. for many unemployed the first month of unemployment was not 
observed because at the beginning of the observational period, they were already 
unemployed for more than a month). Further, not all members have the same number of 
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observations as members leave the sample when they find a job (i.e. sample attrition). This 
“unbalancedness” of the panel could create a bias in the estimations, if the selection criterion 
is correlated to the error term. There is no reason however to believe that the fact that some 
people find a job earlier is correlated to the error term in the estimations on happiness and 
perceived chances, after controlling for the fixed effects (see Wooldridge 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of observations recorded in the dataset, per month of the spell 
Note: The figure shows the number of observation covered in each month. The duration is plotted until the 24th month, after 
which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 1247 unemployed are observed. Because the data is left and right 
censored through the beginning and end of the observation period, in no month a total of 1247 (i.e. one observation per person) 
is reached.  
 
 
For most of the analysis, data of 1247 persons and their 3331 responses can be used. 
However, the sample size is decreased when analysing the influence of search intensity and 
search success on happiness and perceived chances. This is because the database only 
contains application information for 638 persons of the sample. Further, this sub-sample is a 
stratified sub-sample from the overall sample: It contains all unemployed with at least one 
participation in an Active Labour Market Program (ALMP), which make up a quarter of all 
unemployed registered. The sub-sample further contains a random selection of a third of the 
spells in which the unemployed did not attend such a program. The reason that the sample 
was taken with this stratification is that the data was also used to evaluate ALMPs (see the 
first essay of the thesis). Because of the stratification, data will be weighted in order to 
represent the proportions in the overall population, when (and only when) assessing the 
influence of the application behaviour and success (section 5). 
 
In accordance to the standard happiness question used in surveys which contain such a 
question (such as the World Value Survey and different national Household Panels), the 
following question was used: In general, how satisfied are you with your life? The answers 
were given on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10 means “very 
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
Nu
m
be
r 
o
f r
e
sp
o
n
se
s 
pe
r 
m
o
n
th
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Duration of the unemployment spell in months
Essay 2: The Effect of Unemployment Duration on Happiness and the Perceived Chances to Find a Job 65 
 
satisfied”. The terms happiness and life satisfaction are used as synonyms in this paper. A 
second question was then asked; According to your opinion, how good are your chances to 
find a job during the next month? One would expect that these self-assessed chances, or 
perceived chances as they are called in the reminder of this paper, are a combination of the 
objective chances, the ability to assess these objective chances correctly and a subjective 
component which could be interpreted as confidence or self-esteem. The answers were also 
given on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “no chance” and 10 means “very good 
chances”. 
 
To get an overview, the distributions of the two variables of interest are shown in Figure 2 
and 3. The average Happiness Score is 6.8 on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mode of 8. This is 
very similar to the value Frey and Stutzer (2002a) report for the whole of Switzerland, 6.6. 
There is a surprising amount of variation: The mode, 8, is only chosen by just over 20 % of 
all unemployed. Using the German Household Panel, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997) 
also found a global mode of 8 and a local mode at the middle response 5, reflecting a choice 
for unemployed who perceive themselves as neither particularly satisfied nor particularly 
dissatisfied. This local mode can also be found in the data from the Swiss agency.   
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the Happiness Score 
Note: The figure shows the relative frequency with which the eleven possible answers were chosen. 0 means “not at all 
satisfied”, 10 means “very satisfied”. A total number of 3331 responses of 1247 unemployed are observed. 
 
 
The self assessed chances to find a job within a month show an average of 6.2 measured on 
the same scale of 0 to 10. The distribution is even broader than the one of the happiness 
variable. The global mode lies at 5, which probably indicates an uncertainty how to judge 
one’s own chances. The second largest (local) mode lies at 8 which indicates a large amount 
of optimism of finding a job soon.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Perceived Chances Score 
Note: The figure shows the relative frequency with which the eleven possible answers were chosen. 0 means “no chance”, 10 
means “very good chances”. A total number of 3331 responses of 1245 unemployed are observed. 
 
 
One potential problem for the analysis could be a lack of ‘within’-variation in the data. If the 
overall variation would stem mainly from the variation between individuals, and hardly any 
variation from different answers from the same person (within variation), the estimation with 
fixed effects could not be performed in a reliable way. Table 1 shows however that although 
the between-variation is larger, there remains enough within-variation to work with (see 
Annex 2 for the summary statistics of the other variables). Further, one would expect that 
there is quite a large amount of random influences on the responses of the unemployed, 
determined through the many influences on how the person feels on the day or moment the 
questions are asked. While this makes the estimation less efficient, it does not bias it. 
 
 
    Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
          
Happiness Score overall 6.8188 2.2753 N = 3331 
  between  2.0785 n = 1247 
  within  1.1263 T-bar = 2.6712 
          
Perceived 
Chances Score overall 6.2085 2.5507 N = 3331 
  between  2.2542 n = 1245 
  within  1.3374 T-bar = 2.6755 
          
Table 1: Decomposition of the variance into between and within variation 
Note: N is the number of responses, n the number of unemployed and T-bar the average number of responses per unemployed. 
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4. Effect of duration on happiness and perceived chances to 
find a job 
To get an intuition of how the two variables of interest change over duration, the average per 
month is plotted from the beginning of the spell till the 24th month, after which the entitlement 
time frame in Switzerland expires (Figure 4). The figure shows that over the duration of the 
unemployment spell, there is a slow decline in both variables. The Happiness Score is 
relatively constant for most of the spell and only drops noticeably after the 15th month. 
Afterwards, the development of the Happiness Score is subject to higher fluctuation. This can 
be explained through the much lower number of observations at the end of the spell.  
 
The Perceived Chances Score on the other hand starts on a lower level and then looses 
almost one point in the score till the 8th month. It then stabilises and even regains ground 
between the 15th and the 16th month. Over the rest of the spell, the Perceived Chances Score 
drops more than one point in the score. Again, there is high fluctuation in the score at the 
end of the spell due to few observations. 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of happiness and perceived chances over the unemployment 
spell 
Note: The figure shows the average score in a certain month. The duration is plotted until the 24th month, after which the 
entitlement time frame expires. For happiness, a total number of 3331 responses of 1245 unemployed are observed, for 
perceived chances 3331 responses of 1245 unemployed. 
 
 
The descriptive analysis in Figure 4 shows the development of the sample average over the 
duration of the unemployment spell. The negative trend could stem either from changes in 
the values that are reported by the individual (the unemployed becomes unhappier and less 
confident over time) or from changes in the sample (unemployed with high levels of 
happiness and confidence leave the sample). Figure 5 shows that indeed, some of the 
changes stem from changes in the sample. The figure tracks the development of the sample 
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average of the scores in month 1. In the first month, the sample is complete. Each month 
after the announcement, the sample looses members. The sample average of the month 1 
values is mostly stable for life satisfaction. For perceived chances, the score falls steeply in 
the first few months but stabilises after month 4. The development can only be observed till 
the 6th month, because it’s limited to unemployed who started their spell after the beginning 
of the observational period so that their score value in month 1 could be calculated. The 
observational number decreases quickly over time and for the subsample of persons who 
started their unemployment spell within the observational period, the number gets too low 
after the sixth month of the unemployment spell. 
 
 
Figure 5: Sample attrition till the sixth month (development of sample mean of month 1 
values)  
Note: The figure shows the average value of the month 1 scores, and the development of the mean value as the sample 
decreases over time. The duration is plotted until the sixth month (the score in month 1 can only be calculated for unemployed 
who started their spell after the beginning of the observational period, July 2007, and the observational number decreases 
quickly over time – after month 6 it is low. For happiness, a total number of 1319 responses of 612 unemployed are observed, 
for perceived chances 1322 responses of 612 unemployed. 
 
 
To measure the individual development, a simple regression model will be applied. The unit 
is a single response to a question of the survey. Because the number of responses to the 
happiness question is different to the responses regarding perceived chances, the 
observation numbers differ slightly between the estimations. As dependent variable, the 
model contains the Happiness Score of the person (or, in a separate model, the Perceived 
Chances Score), measured on a scale from 0 to 10. On the right side of the equation, four 
dummies are entered which indicate how much time, at the time of the score measurement, 
has passed since the start of the spell. The coefficient of a certain duration dummy indicates 
the impact of this period on the score as compared to the omitted dummy variable, the first 
two month. These dummies allow a flexible modelling of the effect of time. Overall, this is a 
very parsimonious model. However, this is desirable; by not adding further variables to the 
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model, these variables are effectively allowed to vary over the month and all differences over 
time are captured by the duration dummies. 
 
The first estimation is pooled (1st and 3rd column in Table 2). Because there are no other 
variables in the model, the values of the dummies correspond exactly to the development 
plotted in Figure 4 (apart from the fact that the periods in the model are aggregated into 
periods of two or more months). For the Happiness Score, there’s a tendency of the 
coefficients to get larger (i.e. more negative) the later in the spell. This indicates a drop in the 
variables over time. Only the last of these coefficients is statistically significant on the 10 %-
level. The Perceived Chances Score has less of a clear direction as time passes on: it first 
falls, then rises, then falls again. The coefficients are relatively small and statistically not 
significant. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean 6.819 6.819 6.209 6.209 
    Std. Dev. 2.275 2.275 2.551 2.551 
      
Month 3 and 4 -0.122 -0.144 -0.133 0.357* 
 (0.119) (0.125) (0.130) (0.154) 
Month 5 and 6 -0.043 0.059 -0.235 0.570* 
 (0.162) (0.193) (0.167) (0.230) 
Month 7 to 12 -0.197 -0.055 -0.644** 0.942** 
 (0.153) (0.202) (0.171) (0.296) 
Month 12 and later -0.280+ -0.088 -0.850** 1.382** 
 (0.158) (0.300) (0.185) (0.380) 
      
Fixed effects no yes no yes 
      
Constant 6.945** 6.866** 6.575** 5.595** 
 (0.080) (0.118) (0.084) (0.160) 
      
Sample 
     
Number of 
measurements 3331 3331 3331 3331 
Number of unemployed 1247 1247 1245 1245 
      
Estimation 
     
R-squared 0.0024 0.7554 0.0189 0.7302 
F-value 1.0568 0.7276 6.6479 4.0344 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level.  
Table 2: The influence of duration on happiness and perceived chances 
 
 
Clark (2003) presents some evidence that individuals who suffer most from unemployment 
might be the first ones to exit the unemployment insurance. If this happens, the calculated 
average happiness level would – other things being equal - be lower for short-term 
unemployed than for long-term unemployed, and the pooled results will be distorted (the 
issue is picked up in Figure 5, but due to the limited number of observations is only observed 
until the sixth month). Also, one often discussed issue in the happiness research literature is 
the anchoring issue: Different persons will report their score differently. Both issues can be 
addressed through estimation with fixed effects. The fixed effect models add a dummy for 
each unemployed, therefore excluding all time-invariant influences on the happiness or 
chances score. This estimation solely calculates the intra-person effect of duration and is not 
prone to changes in the composition of the sample or the individual anchoring.  
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The results in Table 2 (2nd column) show that the Happiness Score falls less if calculated with 
fixed effects. The difference between the first two months (early stages unemployment) and 
the period after the twelfth month (long term unemployment) is now only – 0.088 points, and 
is not statistically significant anymore. Although this result is highly surprising when 
compared to the theoretical body developed in psychology which predicts a much larger drop 
(see the theory section), it reflects what has been found using Household Panel data from 
Britain, Germany and Europe as a whole (Clarke 2006 and Winkelmann and Winkelmann 
1997). Happiness seems to drop steeply when a person becomes unemployed (in 
Switzerland, the change is -1.6 points on the 10 point scale (as reported by Frey and Stutzer 
2002a)), but the score is then relatively stable over the course of the unemployment spell. 
 
For perceived chances, the results diverge even more, depending on whether one uses a 
pooled estimation or panel estimation with fixed effects (Table 2, 4th column). The results 
from the fixed effect estimation show a clear upward trend. This upward trend is very large; 
between the first two month of unemployment and the period after the twelfth month 1.382 
points in the Perceived Chances Score are gained (this coefficient is significant on the 1 %-
level). How can this large difference to the pooled results be interpreted? It seems that 
changes in the group composition are responsible for the downward trend as estimated by 
the pooled estimates: Unemployed who perceive their chances as low chances remain 
unemployed for longer (no causality implied). Once the group composition is held constant 
(through the inclusion of fixed effects), unemployed seem to get much more positive 
regarding their chances over time. 
 
This finding is interesting as the perceived chances do not correspond with the actual 
probability of getting a job. The actual probability drops steeply over time, as employers get 
more wary as time progresses, taking the long unemployment duration as a signal for low 
employability (see the first essay of the thesis). Why do the unemployed believe that there 
chances are rising when they’re actually falling? This might be due to a sense of deserving to 
get a job soon and patience running out: At the beginning, unemployed know that the search 
might take a while and that they have to be patient. With many applications written and 
duration progressing, many might start to think that their time has come to have a job offer 
and that this offer is going to happen soon or at least that it should happen soon. Another 
possible explanation is that an unemployed person has to explain to him or herself, and to 
the case worker of the unemployment insurance, that one is trying hard to find a job. The 
(perceived) possibility of finding soon a job provides the motivation to continue searching and 
the justification to keep receiving unemployment compensation payments. 
 
Furthermore, it is quite difficult to track one’s personal interview probability or even the 
average chances of success in the occupation or industry of the unemployed person. The 
upward trend of the score might therefore be explained partly by a lack of information (at 
least it explains why objective and perceived chances are not closely related). How do these 
results relate to the theories of the cumulative stress model and the stage model? At first 
glance the results do not seem to be supportive of either one, as the changes in the 
Happiness Score fluctuate around zero. However, it is not possible to discard the stage 
model as it is quite likely that the stages happen for each unemployed at different times down 
the track of the unemployment spell. The regression model calculates the average over 
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these stages. What the data shows is that if there are stages, they are not happening at the 
same time for each unemployed. 
 
As described in the theory section, there has been little research on perceived chances. It 
has been shown that the objective chances drop heavily over the spell (see the first essay). 
In regards to self esteem, it is less clear what to expect. Theory would lean towards a 
downward trend but Goldsmith et al. (1996) have found an upward trend over time. The 
prediction for perceived chances ranges therefore from negative duration impacts on 
perceived chances to positive ones if self-esteem would more than off-set the negative trend 
of the objective chances. Surprisingly, it seems to do exactly that. One likely explanation is a 
the perceived chances are not much shaped by the objective chances sense at all, and are 
instead influenced by a sense of deserving and an increasing lack of patience as the job 
search goes on. 
 
Because the regression results are surprising, it’s natural to question the validity of the model. 
In order to obtain further evidence, the results are replicated in an even simpler way. For 
each unemployed, the drop over time is calculated in a descriptive manner: First, the 
difference between the second period (month 3 and 4) and the first period (month 1 and 2) is 
calculated for both Happiness and Perceived Chances Score, for each individual. Then the 
average over these differences is calculated. This average difference should be similar to the 
coefficient obtained in the regression with fixed effects, because the individual component 
should be eliminated by calculating the difference for each individual. Similar differences can 
be calculated between later periods (month 5 and 6 and month 7 to 12) and the first period. It 
can not be calculated for the last period (month 12 and later), because there is no 
unemployed which has both data for this last period and the first period as the observational 
period only lasted for nine month: an unemployed in his or her second month at the 
beginning of the observational period would only have reached month 11 at the end of the 
observational period.  
 
 
Difference to Month 1 and 2 
 
Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
     
Month 3 and 4 Mean -0.17 0.34 
 Std. Dev. 1.63 2.10 
 N (unemployed) 257 258 
 
    
Month 5 and 6 Mean -0.04 0.49 
 Std. Dev. 2.23 2.32 
 N (unemployed) 115 115 
 
    
Month 7 to 12 Mean -0.20 1.08 
 Std. Dev. 1.70 2.99 
 N (unemployed) 60 60 
 
    
Month 12 and later Mean N/A N/A 
 Std. Dev. N/A N/A 
  N (unemployed) N/A N/A 
Notes: The difference to the first period (month 1 and 2) cannot be calculated for the last period (month 12 and later) as the observational period 
only lasted for nine month: an unemployed in his or her second month at the beginning of the observational period would have only reached month 
11 at the end of the observational period.  
Table 3: Development over time – descriptive differences 
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The results in Table 3 show that the calculated differences are very similar to the estimated 
coefficients in Table 2. This supports the finding that the Happiness Score indeed only shows 
little variation over the duration of the unemployment spell, while the Perceived Chances 
Score increases strongly over time. 
 
Table 4 and 5 replicate the estimation shown in Table 2 for six different groups: women, men, 
Swiss, foreigners, unemployed under the age of 30 and unemployed over the age of 50. The 
mean values of the Happiness Score and the Perceived Chances Score per group are also 
displayed in the tables. One notices that women report a slightly higher Happiness Score 
then men and Swiss a higher one than foreigners. The largest deviation from the mean is 
found among unemployed over the age of 50, who report a mean score which is a third of a 
point lower than the average. In terms of perceived chances however, both men and 
foreigners report higher scores than women and Swiss respectively. While young people 
have the highest score of any of the six groups, people above the age of 50 have by far the 
lowest, more than a point below the mean. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score 
 All Women Men Swiss Foreigners Age < 30 Age > 50 
    Mean 6.819 6.902 6.742 6.868 6.761 6.996 6.495 
    Std. Dev. 2.275 2.264 2.284 2.187 2.376 2.335 2.424 
        
Month 3 and 4 -0.144 -0.119 -0.166 -0.156 -0.126 -0.168 -0.530* 
 (0.125) (0.193) (0.159) (0.181) (0.169) (0.302) (0.264) 
Month 5 and 6 0.059 -0.017 0.142 0.195 -0.114 -0.037 -0.186 
 (0.193) (0.290) (0.255) (0.274) (0.271) (0.524) (0.460) 
Month 7 to 12 -0.055 -0.086 -0.020 -0.039 -0.080 -0.034 -0.383 
 (0.202) (0.295) (0.277) (0.252) (0.335) (0.685) (0.381) 
Month 12 and later -0.088 -0.246 0.052 0.100 -0.365 1.104 -0.083 
 (0.300) (0.443) (0.409) (0.335) (0.550) (1.335) (0.546) 
        
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Constant 6.866** 6.993** 6.745** 6.860** 6.900** 6.925** 6.689** 
 (0.118) (0.172) (0.163) (0.145) (0.206) (0.226) (0.311) 
        
Sample 
       
Number of measurements 3331 1600 1731 1808 1523 609 747 
Number of unemployed 1247 598 649 709 538 292 233 
        
Estimation 
       
R-squared 0.7554 0.7273 0.7807 0.7655 0.7460 0.7950 0.7420 
F-value 0.7276 0.2297 0.6972 0.8474 0.1925 0.3306 1.5359 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level.  
Table 4: The influence of duration on happiness, group-wise estimation  
 
 
In terms of the development over time, foreigners and women show the largest loss of 
happiness, at least if one compares the difference between early stages (month 1 and 2) and 
late stages (large term unemployment) as indicated by the coefficient for “Month 12 and 
later”. None of the coefficients are statistically significant however, apart from large 
coefficient for month 3 and 4 in the regression for the group above age 50). One notices a 
stark positive development for the unemployed below the age of 30, with a coefficient for 
“Month 12 and later” of over one point. This either indicates that this group has adapted their 
expectations and accepted the situation – or it could be due to a random change in a very 
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small sample (note that the overall size of the group is 292, but only a small proportion of 
them become long term unemployed). The coefficient is not statistically significant. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Perceived Chances Score 
 All Women Men Swiss Foreigners Age < 30 Age > 50 
    Mean 6.209 6.127 6.283 5.980 6.480 6.758 4.985 
    Std. Dev. 2.551 2.622 2.482 2.568 2.503 2.358 2.755 
        
Month 3 and 4 0.357* 0.481* 0.237 0.354+ 0.360 0.413 -0.265 
 (0.154) (0.243) (0.193) (0.212) (0.223) (0.423) (0.364) 
Month 5 and 6 0.570* 0.648* 0.492 0.572+ 0.567 0.696 0.287 
 (0.230) (0.324) (0.324) (0.300) (0.357) (0.629) (0.438) 
Month 7 to 12 0.942** 1.247** 0.648+ 0.980* 0.889* 1.388 -0.012 
 (0.296) (0.467) (0.360) (0.391) (0.450) (1.080) (0.533) 
Month 12 and later 1.382** 1.457* 1.280** 1.586** 1.087+ 1.471 0.935 
 (0.380) (0.608) (0.464) (0.506) (0.572) (1.305) (0.661) 
        
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Constant 5.595** 5.424** 5.765** 5.344** 5.921** 6.301** 4.637** 
 (0.160) (0.241) (0.207) (0.199) (0.261) (0.321) (0.396) 
        
Sample 
       
Number of measurements 3331 1595 1736 1810 1521 607 747 
Number of unemployed 1245 596 649 710 535 292 233 
        
Estimation 
       
R-squared 0.7302 0.6990 0.7630 0.7458 0.7052 0.7175 0.7646 
F-value 4.0344 3.1264 1.2012 2.5918 1.5209 0.6527 0.6233 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level.  
Table 5: The influence of duration on perceived chances, group-wise estimation  
 
 
In terms of the development of the Perceived Chances Score, the largest gains are found 
among the Swiss (1.586 points between the first two month and month 12 and later), while 
the smallest gain is made by the group of the unemployed aged 50 and above (0.935). All 
groups therefore show very strong positive gains. 
 
 
 
 
5. Happiness, perceived chances and application performance 
This section analysis the influence of a determinant one would expect to wield a very strong 
power over the happiness and perceived chances of the unemployed: the application 
success. Before looking at objective measures of success however, first the influence of the 
perceived chances on happiness will be analysed.  
  
Figure 6 shows the scatter plot of the individual means of the Happiness and Perceived 
Chances Score. Each dot represents an unemployed person in the sample. While the cloud 
is widely dispersed over the whole field – practically all combinations exist – there seems to 
be a loose positive relation between the two scores: A happier person reports a higher 
Perceived Chances Score, and the other way round. 
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Figure 6: Interaction between happiness and self-perceived chances 
Note: Each dot represents one unemployed with his or her mean value of Happiness Score and Perceived Chances Score. 
Some observations are overlapping. To make the number of observations and their distribution better visible, a small amount of 
jitter of the data points was introduced: Each dot is placed at a random location near its actual value. A total number of 1243 
unemployed are observed. 
 
 
This relationship is confirmed in the regression analysis (Table 6). The Perceived Chances 
Score has a strong influence on the Happiness Score. For each additional point on the 
Perceived Chances Score, the Happiness Score raises by 0.275 (significant on the 1 %-
level). An additional point on the Happiness Score on the other hand increases the Perceived 
Chances Score by 0.387 (significant on the 1 %-level).  
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean 6.822 6.208 
    Std. Dev. 2.272 2.547 
    
Perceived Chances Score 
 
 0.275**  
 (0.035)  
    
Happiness Score 
  0.387** 
   (0.043) 
    
Duration (4 dummies, omitted: Month 1 and 2) yes yes 
    
Fixed effects yes yes 
 
  
Constant 5.302** 2.943** 
 (0.234) (0.310) 
    
Sample 
   
Number of measurements 3321 3321 
Number of unemployed 1243 1243 
    
Estimation 
   
R-squared 0.7841 0.7583 
F-value 1.4796 4.9062 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level.  
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later 
Table 6: Interaction between happiness and self-perceived chances 
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Annex 3 shows the results, when the estimation is run with the same variables, but a 1st 
difference approach is used rather than a fixed effects model. The general rule is that when 
the error term is serially uncorrelated, it is more efficient to use the fixed effect model. 
However, this assumption can be wrong. It is possible that the unobserved factors that 
change over the duration of the unemployment spell are actually serially correlated. If the 
error term follows a random walk (substantial positive serial correlation), then first 
differencing is the better approach as the difference of the error terms between periods are 
serially uncorrelated (Wooldridge 2009). Wooldridge suggests using both approaches and 
comparing the results. The table in Annex 3 shows that the results using the first differencing 
approach are very similar to the results with fixed effects. 
 
One would assume that not just the self-assessed chances have a major influence on the 
happiness of an unemployed person, but that the actual application success might have an 
even stronger, more positive influence. To measure this influence, the number of applications 
written by the unemployed person and the number of job interview invitations received are 
entered as further determinants into the model. Three variations of both these two variables 
are tested: The number of job interviews (and applications) during the last month, the 
number of interviews (applications) during the month before last, and the cumulative number 
of interviews (applications) since the start of the unemployment spell up to the date of the 
Happiness and Perceived Chances Score measurement. Note that the dataset does not 
contain the actual date of the interview, it only contains the date of the application and a 
dummy variable indicating if the application led to an interview or not. One would expect the 
job interview to take place within the next 30 days and therefore the indicator “number of 
interviews last month” would be the most relevant one to measure the influence of 
application success. However, in case it might take longer for the average interview to take 
place or at least to leave its mark on the happiness and perceived chances of an 
unemployed, the variables will also be entered with a lag.  
 
Generally for all three variations of the number of interviews, one would expect a positive 
relationship between application success and happiness and perceived chances to find a job 
within a month. For the number of applications (as a proxy for search intensity), the sign of 
the coefficient is less clear: The search intensity is directly influenced by the unemployed 
itself and one would expect an effect on the two scores, if any at all, mainly through lower 
utility through the search effort (negative influence on happiness) and a gratification or 
remorse effect for high or low search intensity over the previous month (positive influence on 
happiness). One would expect a positive influence of the search intensity on perceived 
chances as more applications should lead to more interviews. Finally, both interviews and 
applications are entered to see how what the influence of the interviews success is once 
search intensity is hold constant. 
 
As discussed in the data section, only a random sub-sample of 638 unemployed (out of the 
total sample of 1247) can be used. Because this sample is stratified, weights will be used in 
the descriptive and analytical estimations of this section. In order to make sure that this sub-
sample has similar characteristics and behaves the same way as the whole sample, the main 
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results (from Table 2) are replicated for the sub-sample (see Annex 4). The results show that 
the sample and the sub-sample indeed behave in a very similar way. 
  
Figure 7 shows the scatter plot of the relation of the number of interviews in the last month 
and the Happiness Score. Again, the point cloud is quite widely dispersed, but one could 
imagine traces of a weak positive relationship, as the cloud has an upward direction. 
However, this potential positive relationship is not confirmed in the regression analysis (Table 
7). The results show that regarding the Happiness Score, the number of interviews in the last 
month has no influence whatsoever. The number of interviews in the month before last has a 
very small positive influence, and so does the cumulative number of interviews. The 
influence is very small indeed: In order to gain one point in the Happiness Score, one would 
have to add almost 100 interviews to the cumulative number of interviews since the start of 
unemployment. While the influence of search intensity is of a similar minuscule proportion, it 
seems more stable, resulting in high statistical significance levels (for number of applications 
last month and number of applications since the start of unemployment). Interestingly, the 
coefficients are negative: The higher the search intensity, the unhappier the unemployed. It 
seems that the negative influence of the search effort overrules any gratitude effect the 
average unemployed experiences through more applications. Of course, the number of 
applications is not completely exogenous; the unemployed person might write more 
applications because he or she realizes his or her difficulties in finding a job, which would 
both result in a higher number of applications and in unhappiness.  
 
 
Figure 7: Happiness and application success  
Note: Each dot represents one unemployed with his or her mean number of interviews in the month before measuring the 
Happiness Score, and the mean Happiness Score. Some observations are overlapping. To make the number of observations 
and their distribution better visible, a small amount of jitter of the data points was introduced: Each dot is placed at a random 
location near its actual value. A total number of 665 unemployed are observed. 
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Dependent variable: Happiness Score 
    Mean 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 6.798 
    Std. Dev. 2.281 2.281 2.281 2.281 2.281 2.281 2.281 2.281 2.281 
          
Number of interviews 
         
last month -0.003      0.046   
 (0.043)      (0.046)   
the month before last  0.030      0.046  
  (0.045)      (0.048)  
since start unemployment   0.012      0.043* 
 
  (0.019)      (0.019) 
          
Number of applications 
        
last month    -0.030*   -0.034*   
    (0.012)   (0.013)   
the month before last     -0.008   -0.010  
     (0.012)   (0.013)  
since start unemployment      -0.011**   -0.013** 
      (0.003)   (0.004) 
          
Duration (4 dummies, 
omitted: Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
         
Constant 6.885** 6.888** 6.894** 7.024** 6.871** 6.728** 7.019** 6.872** 6.737** 
 (0.150) (0.147) (0.150) (0.149) (0.147) (0.150) (0.150) (0.147) (0.151) 
          
Sample 
         
Number of measurements 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 
Number of unemployed 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 
          
Estimation 
         
R-squared 0.7455 0.7456 0.7455 0.7480 0.7456 0.7489 0.7482 0.7458 0.7499 
F-value 1.0660 1.1357 1.1419 0.7014 0.7971 1.7770 0.7699 0.8347 2.4345 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level.  
The four duration dummies are: Month 1 and 2 (omitted), month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later 
Table 7: The influence of search intensity and success on happiness 
 
 
The coefficients for search intensity hardly change when both the number of applications and 
interviews are entered into the regression. The influence of application success however 
increases quite steeply once the search intensity is hold constant: It seems that success is 
appreciated once the disutility of the search effort is subtracted. Note however that the 
coefficients are still very small, i.e. the influence of both search intensity and success on 
happiness is marginal.  
 
How about the influence of search intensity and success on the perceived chances to find a 
job within a month? The scatter plot (Figure 8) seems to reveal a positive influence of the 
number of interviews on the Perceived Chances Score. The regression analysis (Table 8) 
shows that while the number of interviews in the last month has only a minor influence, the 
number of interviews stemming from applications the month before last show a strong and 
statistically significant (on a 5 %-level) influence: Each additional interview increases the 
Perceived Chances Score by 0.223. The influence of the cumulative number of job interviews 
since the start of unemployment is a bit weaker but still strong: Each additional interview in 
the cumulative number of interviews increases the score by 0.130. It seems that the 
relationship is strongest when the interviews are still quite recent.  
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High search intensity also increases the Perceived Chances Score, but its relationship is a 
bit weaker than the one between the score and the number of interviews. The coefficient of 
the number of applications the month before last is 0.023 and statistically significant (on a 10 
%-level). It means that by writing an extra 10 applications in that month, one get the same 
boost in self-esteem as one would receive by being invited to a single job interview (0.223). If 
one uses both the number of application and interviews in the regression, the influence of the 
search intensity decreases immensely however, while the influence of the number of 
interviews is quite stable. This indicates that the positive effect through writing more 
applications is mainly due to the fact that it increases the number of interviews, and not an 
intrinsic good feeling about one’s own chances just by having a high search intensity. 
 
 
Figure 8: Perceived Chances and application success  
Note: Each dot represents one unemployed with his or her mean number of interviews in the month before measuring the 
Perceived Chances Score, and the mean Perceived Chances Score. Some observations are overlapping. To make the number 
of observations and their distribution better visible, a small amount of jitter of the data points was introduced: Each dot is placed 
at a random location near its actual value. A total number of 664 unemployed are observed. 
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Dependent variable: Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean 6.228 6.228 6.228 6.228 6.228 6.228 6.228 6.228 6.228 
    Std. Dev. 2.540 2.540 2.540 2.540 2.540 2.540 2.540 2.540 2.540 
          
Number of interviews 
         
last month 0.015      0.008   
 (0.058)      (0.063)   
the month before last  0.223*      0.208*  
  (0.094)      (0.097)  
since start unemployment   0.130**      0.131** 
 
  (0.032)      (0.035) 
          
Number of applications 
        
last month    0.005   0.004   
    (0.014)   (0.015)   
the month before last     0.023+   0.010  
     (0.014)   (0.014)  
since start unemployment      0.006   -0.001 
      (0.004)   (0.004) 
          
Duration (4 dummies, 
omitted: Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
         
Constant 5.659** 5.697** 5.783** 5.643** 5.706** 5.748** 5.642** 5.713** 5.776** 
 (0.175) (0.181) (0.177) (0.179) (0.185) (0.194) (0.177) (0.185) (0.185) 
          
Sample 
         
Number of measurements 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 
Number of unemployed 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 664 
          
Estimation 
         
R-squared 0.7185 0.7222 0.7263 0.7185 0.7194 0.7193 0.7185 0.7224 0.7263 
F-value 2.5359 1.8501 0.9454 2.1384 1.3296 0.6644 1.8599 2.2567 3.2109 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment (which are subject to different rules by the 
unemployment insurance) are used. The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and 
later. Weights are used to compensate for stratified sample. 
Table 8: The influence of search intensity and success on perceived chances 
 
 
Using first differencing instead of a fixed effects model results in very similar results to the 
ones displayed in Table 7 and 8 (see Annex 5 and 6). The influence of the application 
success on happiness is even further weakened however. For the Perceived Chances Score, 
the only major difference is that the coefficient for the number of applications since the start 
of unemployment increases in size and becomes statistically significant (both when entered 
alone and when entered with the number of interviews). 
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6. Effect of ALMP participation and sanctions 
In this model, events can now be entered to see what influence they wield over life 
satisfaction and perceived chances to find a job within a month. Two clearly identifiable 
events are the participation in an Active Labour Market Program (ALMP) and a sanction 
because an unemployed person has not fulfilled the requirements by the unemployment 
insurance. In the next section, it will be further analysed how the application success impacts 
on happiness and perceived chances.  
 
ALMP are courses and programmes which aim to make reintegration of unemployed persons 
quicker and longer lasting. Sanctions are carried out if the unemployed doesn’t fulfil the 
application requirements of the Swiss unemployment insurance. The sanctions are financial 
in nature as unemployed benefits are not paid out if a person is sanctioned (for a more in-
depth description, see Lalive et al. 2005). In order to analyse the third research question, the 
effect of ALMP (Active Labour Market Program) participation and sanctions on happiness 
and self-esteem, the original regression model will be used, this time adding a dummy 
variable which will switch from 0 to 1 once an ALMP has been announced and a dummy 
variable which switches from 0 to 1 once a sanction has been carried out.  
 
Of the 1247 unemployed used in the regressions on Happiness Score, 371 have participated 
in an ALMP, and 55 have been informed about a sanctioned (52 actually sanctioned). In the 
estimation of the Perceived Chances Score (1245 unemployed altogether), 370 have 
participated in an ALMP, 55 were informed about a sanction and 52 were sanctioned. Table 
9 shows that the ALMP has a negative effect on the Happiness Score. However, this effect of 
-0.206 is not statistically significant from zero. The ALMP effect on perceived chances is also 
negative, but much larger at -0.407. This value is statistically significant on the 10 %-level 
and surprisingly large. In order to understand this effect, it helps to split the effect further up.  
 
The next column splits the effect into three partial ALMP effects often discussed in literature; 
the threat effect, the lock-in effect and the skill-enhancement/signal effect (see the first essay 
of the thesis). The threat effect predicts that the search intensity rises after the 
announcement, as the unemployed is not keen on joining the ALMP. After the ALMP has 
started, theory predicts the occurrence of a second effect, the lock-in-effect. This effect 
happens if the ALMP is demanding and doesn’t leave the unemployed enough time to write 
as many applications as they did before the ALMP started. Increasingly with the 
advancement of the ALMP, and especially once the ALMP has finished, the desired effects 
should set in, i.e. the skill enhancement and signal effect. All three partial effects discussed 
in literature are effects on the application behaviour. Nevertheless it is likely that these partial 
effects also leave traces on both happiness and perceived chances. 
 
To check for these partial effects, a dummy is introduced which switches to 1 once the ALMP 
has been announced and then turns back to 0 once the ALMP has started. Additionally, a 
dummy switching to 1 while the unemployed participates in the ALMP, and a dummy 
switching to 1 after the ALMP has finished, are added to the model.  
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Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean 6.819 6.819 6.819 6.209 6.209 6.209 
    Std. Dev. 2.275 2.275 2.275 2.551 2.551 2.551 
   
  
   Overall ALMP effect -0.206    -0.407+   
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.212)    (0.235)   
   
    
  
Partial effects 
        
Threat Effect  
 
-0.184   
  
-0.314  
    (Dummy is 1 between announcement and start) 
 
(0.233)   
  
(0.250)  
Lock-in Effect  
 
-0.013   
  
0.043  
    (Dummy is 1 between start and end) 
 
(0.251)   
  
(0.282)  
Skill enhancement and signal effect  
 
-0.380   
  
-0.549+  
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP ends) 
 
(0.247)   
  
(0.311)  
   
    
  
ALMP Type 
  
  
   
 
Basic course (167 participants) 
 
 
-0.490 
 
 
-0.637 
  
 
(0.320) 
 
 
(0.412) 
Personality oriented course (50 participants)   -0.019    -0.183 
   (0.534)    (0.395) 
Basic qualifications course (20 participants)   -0.011    -0.088 
   (0.672)    (1.511) 
Language course (23 participants)   0.637    0.522 
   (0.594)    (0.376) 
Other course (36 participants) 
 
 
0.341 
   
0.054 
 
 
 
(0.565) 
   
(0.465) 
Employment programme (78 participants)   -0.387    -0.704 
   (0.450)    (0.468) 
   
    
  
Duration (4 dummies, omitted: Month 1 and 2) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
   
    
  
Constant 6.882** 6.866** 6.883** 5.625** 5.599** 5.626** 
 (0.120) (0.123) (0.118) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159) 
         
Sample 
        
Number of measurements 3331 3331 3331 3331 3331 3331 
Number of unemployed 1247 1247 1247 1245 1245 1245 
 
        
Estimation 
        
R-squared 0.7556 0.7560 0.7564 0.7309 0.7312 0.7316 
F-value 0.7586 0.9203 0.7839 4.0313 2.8761 2.6933 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
Table 9: The influence of Active Labour Market Programs on happiness and perceived 
chances  
 
 
The results in Table 9 show that all three effects are negative when regressing on Happiness 
Score, with the largest one being after the ALMP and the smallest one during the ALMP. All 
partial effects are insignificant. Similarly, for perceived chances the largest negative effect 
happens after the ALMP has finished (at -0.549, this coefficient is large and significant on a 
10 %-level). During the ALMP however, the effect is practically zero. A possible explanation 
is that the unemployed believe that the skill-enhancing nature of the course is effective and 
that the ALMP increases their chances; and that the unemployed therefore readapt their 
chances to the initial level before the ALMP announcement. They are later disillusioned (as 
indicated through the negative coefficient after the ALMP) if they don’t find a job soon after it 
has finished. Alternatively, the positive effect might be explained by the effect of seeing 
unemployed with even worse chances (lower language skills or the like) in the course. 
Through this, the unemployed might judge their employability relative to other unemployed 
instead of comparing it to the employability of the employed. Interestingly, the announcement 
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of the ALMP has a strong negative effect itself. The announcement by the case worker might 
be taken as a signal by the unemployed that her or his chances on the labour market are 
quite low, and maybe lower than anticipated.  
 
It is important to note that a negative effect is not necessarily a bad characteristic for an 
ALMP as it could entail adjusting unrealistic expectations. Indeed, some support for this 
thesis can be gathered from the third column in Table 9, which shows the effect by different 
types of ALMP (each type has its own dummy variable which switches to 1 after that 
particular type of ALMP has been announced). There seems to be a large negative effect of 
the Basic Course, which is – besides other goals - intended to address unrealistic 
expectations, on the Perceived Chances Score. The Basic Course also has quite a strong 
negative impact on the Happiness Score of its participants. Two more courses are worth 
mentioning: Language courses have a strong and positive impact on the happiness level and 
the Perceived Chances Score of its participants (both effects are insignificant however, due 
to the small number of observations). Employment programmes have a large negative effect 
on the perceived chances. These programmes are often used by the case workers quite late 
in the unemployment spell as an ALMP of last resort. This might be observed by the 
unemployed who interpret their participation as a negative signal on their own employability. 
 
Summing up, ALMPs have a negative impact on both happiness and perceived chances in 
average. This effect is particularly strong for the Basic Course and the employment 
programmes, while language courses show a positive effect. These estimates do not give 
away the reasons for the negative impact, but possible interpretations are that the ALMP are 
taken as a negative signal by the unemployed on their own employability. While the ALMP 
lasts, there is a positive impact on perceived chances, which can be interpreted that the 
unemployed trust the positive impact of the ALMP. Once the ALMP has finished and the 
unemployed still didn’t find a job however, the scores are lower than before the ALMP. 
 
Next, the influence of sanctions on happiness and perceived chances is examined. The first 
column of Table 10 shows the effect of the sanction carried out (the dummy switches to one 
once the person was sanctioned). It is very small on both the Happiness Score and the 
perceived chances, and statistically insignificant. A possible explanation could be that the 
effect does not happen when the financial sanction is carried out but instead when the 
unemployed is informed that a sanction has been filed for by the case worker (the sanction is 
not carried out by the case worker but instead by another department of the Office of Labour 
and Economy). This effect, shown in the second column, results in similarly small coefficients. 
Looking at the signs, one can conclude that sanctions has not influence on the happiness of 
the sanctioned unemployed, but that the sanctioned unemployed correct their perceived 
chances upwards (why that might be is unclear). However, the coefficients should not be 
over-interpreted: the coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. A potential 
explanation for this small influence might be that the unemployed already expected to be 
sanctioned (even before they were informed) and that they therefore already incorporated 
the change in their Happiness and Perceived Chances Score. 
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Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean -0.039 -0.039 0.025 0.025 
    Std. Dev. 2.024 2.024 2.411 2.411 
     Sanction effect -0.041   0.136  
    (Dummy is 1 after sanction has been carried out) (0.199)   (0.235)  
  
    
 
Sanction filed effect 
 0.051   0.113 
    (Dummy is 1 after sanction has been filed) 
 
(0.197) 
  
(0.229) 
 
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
Duration (4 dummies, omitted: Month 1 and 2) yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
  
    
 
Constant 6.864** 6.868** 5.602** 5.600** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.160) (0.160) 
       
Sample 
      
Number of measurements 3331 3331 3331 3331 
Number of unemployed 1247 1247 1245 1245 
 
      
Estimation 
      
R-squared 0.7554 0.7554 0.7303 0.7302 
F-value 0.5634 0.5535 3.0377 3.0224 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
Table 10: The influence of sanctions on happiness and perceived chances 
 
 
When recalculating the models in Table 9 and 10 with a first differencing estimation, one 
notices that the ALMP effect on happiness and perceived chances grow in size (see Annex 7 
and 8). The effect on happiness increases from -0.206 to -0.307 and the effect on perceived 
chances from -0.407 to -0.448. Latter is now statistically significant on a 1 %-level. Similarly, 
the partial effects and the effects of the different types of ALMP grow stronger and some 
become statistically significant. In terms of sanctions, the coefficients change their size a bit 
but stay small and statistically insignificant.   
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7. Conclusion 
To conduct this study, 3331 responses from the unemployed on their happiness level and 
perceived chances to find a job during the next month have been collected. This customized 
data set allows calculating the influences of unemployment duration on happiness and 
perceived chances during the unemployment spell in a more detailed way that other studies 
have been able to do. Insights into the dynamics over the unemployment spell are important 
in order to maximize the effectiveness of the interventions by the case workers and the 
instruments used by the unemployment insurance.  
 
The analysis of the collected data shows that the Happiness Score does not change 
considerably over the duration of unemployment. Perceived chances on the other hand grow 
strongly as time passes. This interesting finding might be explained by a sense of deserving 
and impatience: After waiting for such a long time, an unemployed person might feel 
increasingly that it is now her or his turn to get the job. This is a phenomenon which should 
be analysed further. This feeling of overconfidence (relative to the actual objective chances) 
might have a negative impact on the search intensity and create a too narrow search field. 
On the other hand, it might be a positive occurrence if it motivates unemployed persons who 
were unmotivated through the awareness of their low chances. It might be a case of some 
people gaining from a (unrealistic) boost of their self confidence, and others loosing. 
 
The Happiness Score is only influenced in a very small way by the search intensity 
(measured as the number of applications per month). The relation is negative: the more 
applications she or he writes, the unhappier the unemployed person. The search success 
(measured as the number of interviews per month) has a small positive influence on 
happiness. The Perceived Chances Score on the other hand is influenced strongly and 
positively by the number of interviews. Finally, two major institutional events during an 
unemployment spell, a participation in an Active Labour Market Program (ALMP) and 
sanctions being carried out due to non-compliance, were analysed. The results show that on 
average, ALMP have a negative impact on both happiness and perceived chances, while 
sanctions only show a minor positive effect on the Perceived Chances Score.  
 
The results show that happiness and perceived chances are a complex topic. While this 
study has exposed some of the influences on happiness and perceived chances, there is 
much to be learned. While there is a large literature body on qualitative research on 
happiness and self-esteem during unemployment, the volume of quantitative data and 
therefore studies is still slim. One interesting development is the gathering of quantitative 
data on a very detailed level, for example through the Day Reconstruction Method proposed 
by Kahneman and Krueger (2006) which allows the measurement of the satisfaction of 
different types of single activities. Because the gathering of this kind of data is very resource 
intensive and therefore does not allow covering many persons, it will also be necessary to 
continue to gather more simple data on as many persons as possible. The gap in quantitative 
research on the dynamics over the unemployment spell should be filled. This would allow 
researchers, government agencies and organizations in the unemployment sector to learn 
more about unemployment and improving their services. 
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: Distribution of the intervals between measurements 
 
All unemployed 
 
Note: Only observations with more than one measurement are taken into account. 847 unemployed with 2981 responses are 
observed. The median value of “days between measurements” is 38 days. 
 
 
 
Unemployed with LTU forecast (left) and with Non-LTU forecast (right) 
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Note: Only observations with more than one measurement and a duration forecast by the case worker are taken into account. 
The sample is split according to the duration forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 309 
unemployed with LTU forecast are observed, with 983 responses. 281 unemployed with Non-LTU forecast are observed, with 
960 responses. The median value of “days between measurements” is 41 days for unemployed with a LTU forecast, and 35 
days for unemployed with a Non-LTU forecast. The number of observations from unemployed with a LTU and a Non-LTU 
forecast is smaller than the total number of observations as the unemployment duration forecast is only available for the sub-
sample of unemployed who have data on the application behaviour (see section 3). 
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Annex 2: Summary statistics of main variables 
   
 
  
  
Mean Std. Dev. 
  
  
Happiness 6.819 2.275 
Self-assessed chances 6.209 2.551 
  
  
Applications per month 8.024 5.418 
Interviews per month 0.477 1.197 
 
   
  
Number of 
unemployed 
Proportion of  
total number 
    
Total 1247  
   
Women 598 0.480 
Foreigners 538 0.431 
Age < 30 292 0.234 
Age > 50 233 0.187 
  
  
Unemployed with a  
  
   - ALMP participation 371 0.298 
   - Sanction (informed) 55 0.044 
   - Sanction (carried out) 52 0.042 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Interaction between happiness and self-perceived chances  
(first difference estimation) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean -0.039 0.025 
    Std. Dev. 2.024 2.411 
    
Perceived Chances Score 
 
 0.285**  
 (0.304)  
    
Happiness Score 
  0.405** 
   (0.037) 
    
Duration (4 dummies, omitted: 
Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes 
    
Constant -0.054* 0.044 
 (0.026) (0.032) 
    
Sample 
   
Number of measurements 2072 2072 
Number of unemployed 836 836 
    
Estimation 
   
R-squared 0.1160 0.1283 
F-value 19.1188 29.1458 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
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Annex 4: The influence of duration on happiness and perceived chances  
(Replicated results for the sub-sample with application data) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean 6.819 6.798 6.209 6.228 
    Std. Dev. 2.275 2.281 2.551 2.540 
      
Month 3 and 4 -0.144 -0.283+ 0.357* 0.235 
 (0.125) (0.164) (0.154) (0.193) 
Month 5 and 6 0.059 -0.097 0.570* 0.294 
 (0.193) (0.253) (0.230) (0.243) 
Month 7 to 12 -0.055 0.030 0.942** 0.856* 
 (0.202) (0.280) (0.296) (0.343) 
Month 12 and later -0.088 -0.175 1.382** 1.625** 
 (0.300) (0.390) (0.380) (0.520) 
      
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
      
Constant 6.866** 6.884** 5.595** 5.665** 
 (0.118) (0.147) (0.160) (0.181) 
      
Sample 
     
Number of 
measurements 3331 1987 3331 1988 
Number of unemployed 1247 665 1245 664 
      
Estimation 
     
OLS yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.7554 0.7455 0.7302 0.7185 
F-value 0.7276 0.7455 4.0344 3.3259 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
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Annex 5: Regression of application performance on happiness  
(first difference estimation) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score 
  
  
    
    Mean 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 
    Std. Dev. 2.087 2.087 2.087 2.087 2.087 2.087 2.087 2.087 2.087 
          
Number of interviews 
         
last month -0.004      0.051   
 (0.043)      (0.046)   
the month before last  -0.004      0.010  
  (0.052)      (0.055)  
since start unemployment   -0.002      0.030 
 
  (0.023)      (0.025) 
          
Number of applications 
        
last month    -0.036**   -0.040**   
    (0.013)   (0.014)   
the month before last     -0.009   -0.010  
     (0.014)   (0.014)  
since start unemployment      -0.011**   -0.012** 
      (0.004)   (0.004) 
          
Duration (4 dummies,  
omitted: Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
         
Constant 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.017 0.019 0.016 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
          
Sample 
         
Number of measurements 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 
Number of unemployed 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 
          
Estimation 
         
R-squared 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 0.0239 0.0113 0.0231 0.0251 0.0114 0.0246 
F-value 1.8360 1.8369 1.8374 3.1347 1.8216 3.2288 2.7213 1.5176 2.7488 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
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Annex 6: Regression of application performance on perceived chances  
(first difference estimation) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Perceived Chances Score 
 
  
    
    Mean 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 
    Std. Dev. 2.437 2.437 2.437 2.437 2.437 2.437 2.437 2.437 2.437 
          
Number of interviews 
         
last month 0.001      -0.008   
 (0.058)      (0.061)   
the month before last  0.209*      0.188*  
  (0.090)      (0.094)  
since start unemployment   0.119**      0.102** 
 
  (0.031)      (0.033) 
          
Number of applications 
        
last month    0.006   0.007   
    (0.015)   (0.015)   
the month before last     0.026+   0.014  
     (0.014)   (0.015)  
since start unemployment      0.011**   0.006+ 
      (0.003)   (0.004) 
          
Duration (4 dummies,  
omitted: Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
         
Constant 0.071 0.073 0.088+ 0.072 0.074 0.078+ 0.072 0.074 0.090+ 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
          
Sample 
         
Number of measurements 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 
Number of unemployed 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
          
Estimation 
         
R-squared 0.0158 0.0281 0.0349 0.0161 0.0202 0.0253 0.0161 0.0293 0.0376 
F-value 2.4119 3.6187 4.8237 2.7716 3.3391 4.3657 2.3067 3.3717 4.5053 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
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Annex 7: Regression of ALMP participation on happiness and perceived chances (first 
difference estimation) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 0.025 0.025 0.025 
    Std. Dev. 2.024 2.024 2.024 2.411 2.411 2.411 
   
  
   Overall ALMP effect -0.307    -0.448*   
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.194)    (0.209)   
   
    
  
Partial effects 
        
Threat Effect  
 
-0.227   
  
-0.263  
    (Dummy is 1 between announcement and start) 
 
(0.215)   
  
(0.220)  
Lock-in Effect  
 
0.069   
  
0.184  
    (Dummy is 1 between start and end) 
 
(0.250)   
  
(0.220)  
Skill enhancement and signal effect  
 
-0.620*   
  
-0.789**  
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP ends) 
 
(0.243)   
  
(0.265)  
   
    
  
ALMP Type 
  
  
   
 
Basic course (167 participants) 
 
 
-0.574* 
 
 
-0.777* 
  
 
(0.265) 
 
 
(0.375) 
Personality oriented course (50 participants)   -0.124    0.020 
   (0.382)    (0.449) 
Basic qualifications course (20 participants)   -0.109    0.375 
   (0.697)    (1.088) 
Language course (23 participants)   0.552    0.569+ 
   (0.619)    (0.342) 
Other course (36 participants) 
 
 
0.234 
   
-0.108 
 
 
 
(0.386) 
   
(0.322) 
Employment programme (78 participants)   -0.486    -0.789* 
   (0.505)    (0.363) 
   
    
  
Duration (4 dummies,  
omitted: Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
   
    
  
Constant -0.021 -0.021 -0.024 0.051 0.050 0.046 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 
         
Sample 
        
Number of measurements 2080 2080 2080 2082 2082 2082 
Number of unemployed 838 838 838 840 840 840 
 
        
Estimation 
        
R-squared 0.0052 0.0094 0.0083 0.0225 0.0264 0.0268 
F-value 1.3358 1.9769 1.1776 5.4753 4.9031 4.0246 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
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Annex 8: Regression of sanctions on happiness and perceived chances  
(first difference estimation) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Happiness Score Perceived Chances Score 
    Mean -0.039 -0.039 0.025 0.025 
    Std. Dev. 2.024 2.024 2.411 2.411 
  
  
  Sanction effect 0.052   0.109  
    (Dummy is 1 after sanction has been carried out) (0.181)   (0.208)  
  
    
 
Sanction filed effect 
 0.175   0.054 
    (Dummy is 1 after sanction has been filed) 
 
(0.176) 
  
(0.210) 
 
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
Duration (4 dummies,  
omitted: Month 1 and 2) 
yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
  
    
 
Constant -0.023 -0.022 0.048 0.048 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) 
       
Sample 
      
Number of measurements 2080 2080 2082 2082 
Number of unemployed 838 838 840 840 
 
      
Estimation 
      
R-squared 0.0032 0.0038 0.0194 0.0193 
F-value 0.8107 0.9926 4.3336 4.3055 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The four duration dummies are: Month 3 and 4, month 5 and 6, month 7 to 12 and month 12 and later. 
 
Essay 3: An Opening Door?  94 
 
 
 
Essay 3 
An Opening Door?  
 
Surprising Evidence that Foreigners Have Above-Average Chances to 
Find a Job When Controlling for the Quality of the Match Between the 
Job-seeker and the Requirements of the Job advertisement 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In order to identify the discriminatory component of divergent labour market outcomes it is 
necessary to determine how much of the divergence can be explained through different 
productivity, job choices and other influences. Because of usually high levels of unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data, this is often a difficult challenge for discrimination research. A new 
dataset on unemployed job seekers allows considerably reducing this unobserved 
heterogeneity by including data on the quality of the match between the job seeker and the 
requirements of the job advertisement, the application behaviour and the occupational 
distribution. Especially the match to the language requirements (as part of the matching 
quality) has a large influence on the estimation. The results show that foreigners have above 
average chances to be invited to a job interview, once one includes controls for the matching 
quality, the application behaviour and the occupational distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
Discrimination has not just been a hotly debated topic in political discussions, but ever since 
Gary Becker sparked their interest in the 1950’s it has also been an important theoretical and 
empirical issue for economists. In the economic literature on discrimination, one of the most 
important issues has always been the question why discrimination can persist in a 
competitive market. Wouldn’t non-discriminating employers make a premium by employing 
members of the underpaid discriminated group and eventually drive discriminating employers 
out of the market? One strain of literature has argued that the differences in labour market 
outcomes like wages are not signs of discrimination but instead can be explained through 
differences in productivity (lower education or a different job choice for example). This 
argument has made unobserved heterogeneity a core topic of the debate on discrimination: If 
the relevant differences between groups and their members are not captured in the data, the 
estimations might over- or underestimate the part of the difference in the labour market 
outcome between the two groups which can be interpreted as discrimination. 
 
This study is able to reduce the extent of unobserved heterogeneity by approaching the 
ultimately unobservable productivity from another angle; through the matching of the 
characteristics of the job seeker with the requirements mentioned in the job advertisement to 
which he or she applied. While this indicator might not be all-encompassing (important 
aspects like personality or social skills are not covered), it captures the early stages of a job 
application quite well: a prospective employer is also often limited in his or her assessment of 
productivity to the signals he or she picks up through the written application of an applicant. 
To collect data on the matching quality, an extensive data collection was carried out in one 
unemployment agency in Switzerland. Data on almost 500 unemployed were collected, along 
with data on their over 6,000 applications to advertised job positions. The unemployed were 
asked to collect the job advertisements to which they applied. These advertisements were 
then coded in terms of occupation, education, language, age and gender requirements, and 
data on the unemployed was matched against these requirements. Additionally, the work 
certificates of the unemployed were coded and added to the dataset, was general 
information on their education and former function. In additional estimations, measurements 
of application behaviour and occupational distribution were introduced, thereby holding these 
factors constant. Altogether, group differences could be stripped of several potentially 
important factors influencing the differences in the labour market outcome. 
  
This study does not focus on the difference in wages between job seekers of local and 
foreign origin, but in the tradition of correspondence testing on another labour market 
outcome: the probability to be invited to a job interview. In contrast to experimental 
correspondence testing (as famously used by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for example), 
the design used in this study is purely observational and no fictional applications are sent out 
to employers. This has the advantage that applications are as real as possible and that the 
number of observations can be increased. Because the used data set is very rich, many 
variables can be held constant despite the non-experimental design. 
 
The results of the estimations are surprising. Comparing the group averages in a simple 
regression without controlling for the matching quality, application behaviour and 
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occupational distribution, foreigners do slightly better than Swiss job seekers: The interview 
probability for foreigners is 0.0014 higher than the one for Swiss. This small effect (it’s the 
equivalent of 3.2 % of the average interview probability in the sample, 0.0431) is not 
statistically significant. The positive coefficient is still highly surprising as one might have 
expected a negative coefficient, reflecting an advantage of the local job seekers. Further 
estimations show that this advantage is confined to foreigners from a neighbouring country 
which experience a very large advantage compared to the Swiss unemployed (+ 0.0436) 
while other foreigners have a slight to a large disadvantage, depending on their region of 
origin. In some very broad interpretations of the concept discrimination it is argued that the 
pure group differences are the best measure of discrimination as pre-labour market 
determinants of productivity or job choices are themselves nothing but the outcome of 
discrimination. This argument does not seem applicable to the discrimination of foreigners 
who might have been educated and trained in another county. To collect evidence on the 
existence of discrimination how the concept is commonly understood - direct discrimination 
by employers - productivity would ideally be hold constant. While this is not fully 
accomplishable – in many industries productivity is even for employers difficult to measure, 
and getting data on their measurements is usually not feasible – productivity has to be 
approximated as far as possible. 
  
To do so, a set of matching variables, the level of praise in work certificates and the highest 
attained education and former function of the unemployed person are included into the 
estimation. The inclusion of these variables has a strong impact on the coefficient which 
indicates the interview probability of foreigners compared to the one of Swiss job seekers. 
The coefficient jumps from a small 0.0014 to a much larger effect of 0.0148 (this coefficient is 
still not statistically significant however). The change in the size of the coefficient is driven 
through the inclusion of the matching variable and among these variables it is primarily the 
local language (German) requirement which plays a large role. It seems that job seekers with 
only basic local language knowledge get heavily punished. Unemployed with medium and 
high levels of German knowledge are not disadvantaged against native German speakers 
however.  
 
In a next step, the application behaviour is held constant (through adding variables on the 
method of applying, on public and private placements and on the search intensity). This 
changes the difference in favour of the Swiss (with controls for the application behaviour and 
duration, the difference is -0.0039). Foreign unemployed seem, in general, to use particularly 
effective ways to apply more frequently than Swiss unemployed do. Once this influence is 
held constant, the size of the coefficient decreases. In a third step, variables are entered to 
control for the occupational distribution. This increases the chances of foreigners, as they 
generally apply to job openings with more competition (that is to jobs categories 
characterized through a higher unemployment rate). Once this effect is held constant 
(through adding industry dummies to the model, occupational dummies or directly through 
adding the number of unemployed in the occupation) the chances of foreigners are increased. 
 
If the productivity related measures and the control variables for application behaviour and 
occupational distribution are added together, the foreign coefficient jumps from 0.0014 
(without controls) to 0.0257. This is a very large coefficient, statistically significant on the 5 
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%-level. The main force behind this change is the inclusion of the language dummies. This is 
a very interesting and to a certain degree puzzling result: Employers seem to favour 
foreigners over Swiss citizens once the language component is kept constant. A possible 
explanation – which can not be tested with the data at hand however – is that there is a 
selection process and that foreign unemployed with good job chances stay in the country 
while unemployed with lower chances might be more likely to consider returning to their 
country of origin. This would also explain why the interview probability is particularly high 
among job seekers from neighbouring countries as these unemployed might be more likely to 
return than foreigners from further away (of course, this is at least partly also due to the 
cultural familiarity of employers and such job seekers with each other). 
 
In a final estimation, interactions between the foreign origin and other characteristics are 
analysed. Additional dummy variables are included into the model which indicate if the 
person is a women, a person aged 30 years or less, 50 years or more, and if the person is a 
long term unemployed (the unemployment spell has already lasted for more than a year) or 
not. This estimation shows that the foreigner coefficient is very stable when those new group 
dummies are added: It is not just a spurious correlation (at least not one with one of the 
tested group dummies as the confounding factor). The results also show a large 
heterogeneity behind the average effect for foreigners. While male foreigners have a strong 
advantage over male Swiss, female foreigners have an even larger one. There are even 
larger differences to be found between the different age groups. It seems that the advantage 
of foreign job seekers is purely determined through the middle age category (31 to 49 year 
olds). Among the unemployed younger and older than this middle age group, Swiss have a 
higher interview probability than foreign job seekers. In terms of the long term unemployed, 
the overall positive result for foreigners is robust: both short term and long term unemployed 
of foreign origin have an advantage over the short and long term unemployed Swiss 
respectively. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way: In section 2, an overview over the previous 
literature and theory is given. The data used is described in section 3. Section 4 assesses 
the simple group difference uncontrolled for other influences, while section 5 introduces step-
wise groups of control variables to hold productivity related measures, application behaviour 
and occupational distribution constant. Section 6 analyses the interaction between foreign 
origin and other characteristics (gender, age and duration of unemployment). Section 7 
concludes.  
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2. Theory and related literature 
According to the simplest definition, discrimination is an act of treating “equals” unequally (for 
a discussion of the definition, see Pager and Shepherd 2008). As Amartya Sen (1992) wrote, 
a central question in the assessment of (in)equality is, “equality of what?”. On the labour 
market, which has received most attention of economic discrimination studies, the most often 
used measurements are productivity and salary: Discrimination is systematically 
remunerating equally productive individuals differently because of the group they belong to. 
In his pioneering work, Gary Becker (1957) argued that some employers have a “taste” for 
discrimination and are willing to pay respectively forego part of their profit to maintain 
distance from members of a particular group. In competitive labour and product markets, 
rational employers would hire groups of workers which are currently paid less than their 
productivity is worth. Discriminating employers would thereby suffer a loss of 
competitiveness which would eventually drive them out of the market. This has not happened 
(although there are signs that discrimination has diminished over the past decades). Several 
theories have been put forward to why discrimination persists in the labour market (Darity 
and Mason 1998 and Figart 2009). 
 
One explanation for this persistence, put forward by supply-side human capital theory, is that 
the salary differences actually reflect differences in the productivity and are not real 
discrimination after all. Women for example might invest less in their education in anticipation 
of spending less time in the labour market through child-birth and possibly a stronger 
preference towards family life. That decision would also explain why women earn less. The 
wage difference would not be generated through the labour market and therefore the gap 
could not be considered discriminatory behaviour by employers (Figart 2009). Other 
theoretical approaches acknowledge discrimination, and make amendments to the theory 
why discrimination continues to exist. One approach is simply that markets are imperfectly 
competitive and that this permits discrimination to persist (Darity and Mason 1998). A second 
approach, the theory of statistical discrimination, suggests that potential employers cannot 
observe the true productivity of a job candidate. They use characteristics associated with 
groups to compensate for the lack of information on the candidate Kennelly (2003). While 
this might explain why individuals get over- or underpaid, it does not explain why the group 
average should deviate from its legitimate value. Darity and Mason (1998) criticize the model 
of statistical discrimination as the authors think that employers should learn if their 
assessment is erroneous (that is, a group’s productivity is misjudged) and adapt their 
judgement. However, this adaptation might not happen if it is more expensive to 
communicate with a minority group (Lang 1986), or assess that group (Cornell and Welch 
1996). Dickinson and Oaxaca (2006) show that statistical discrimination can also happen if 
the estimation is less accurate and therefore more variable. Risk-averse employers would 
prefer a group which they can judge in a more exact way, generally local workers (even if the 
estimated group means are the same). Rooth (2009) shows that attitudes and stereotypes 
are often operated in an automatic, less conscious mode and that discriminatory behaviour 
against foreigners might be driven through automatically activated associations. 
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In terms of the interview probability, which will be assessed in this study, an interesting 
hypothesis stems from Bergman (1974). Her overcrowding hypothesis states that women 
“crowd” in a subset of occupations, due to societal pressure. This might also be applicable to 
foreigners if society allows them explicitly (through regulation) or implicitly to work only in 
certain occupation. The oversupply of labour in these occupations brings the salaries down 
(see also Usui 2009 and Bergmann 2007). As Kalleberg (2003) noted, this segmentation can 
also take on new forms like “insiders” having traditional employment relations while 
“outsiders” having non-standard work arrangements, like temporary work.  
 
When empirically measuring the discrimination, a direct comparison between groups in terms 
of salary, employment prospects etc. can be interesting because it captures the overall 
difference to the average, no matter how these differences came about. However, in order to 
understand the causalities behind a certain pattern, and to assess if direct employer 
discrimination exists, a direct comparison is not very illuminating, since the differences might 
be productivity related. An often used approach to estimate the direct discrimination is 
running a regression, using salary or occupational status as the dependent variable. On the 
right side of the equation different variables are entered to hold productivity related measures 
constant (like education, experience and job tenure) and a dummy variable for the group of 
interest (foreigners for example) is added. If that dummy variable is statistically significant 
after holding all other productivity related variables constant, the so estimated group 
difference can be cautiously interpreted as (positive or negative) discrimination (Darity and 
Mason 1998).  
 
A second often used method is the Blinder-Oaxaca technique, developed by Oaxaca (1973) 
and Binder (1973). Two separate wage regressions are run, one each for the discriminated 
group and the non-discriminated group (say foreigners and locals). The difference between 
the two group averages in the labour market outcome is then divided into two parts. One part 
is due to the differences in the values of the determinants between the two groups and is 
called the explained part. The second unexplained part is due to different wage regression 
coefficients and could be considered as discrimination (Darity and Mason 1998). In a meta-
study, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) assessed 457 of such (gender wage gap) 
studies and came to the conclusion that even a very extensive specification of the model 
cannot explain the whole wage difference – there is always an unobserved part. However, 
the unexplained part might just simply be due to unobserved characteristics not included in 
the model and might not be evidence of discrimination (Oreopoulos 2009). The regression 
approach with group dummy variables and the Blinder-Oaxaca method should generally 
arrive at a similar conclusion regarding the discrimination. The Blinder-Oaxaca estimation 
has the advantage that it allows for a more flexible estimation: While the regression approach 
assumes that the wage equation is the same for both groups, the Blinder Oaxaca does 
explicitly not (Darity and Mason 1998).  
 
Because of the availability of data, salaries have been the focus of the economic 
discrimination literature. However, a new branch of literature has focused on the probability 
to be invited to a job interview, after one has written an application. This so called 
“correspondence testing” method is usually conducted in the following way: Two fictional 
applications are sent out which differ only in the gender or nationality of the applicant (without 
Essay 3: An Opening Door?  100 
 
changing any productivity relevant information), and the researcher compares the success of 
both applications. A good overview over correspondence testing is given by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2004) who used the approach utilizing African-American and white American-
sounding names to test for discrimination. They have found that white names have a 50 
percent higher probability to be invited to a job interview, and that this gap applies across 
occupation, industry, and employer size. The same authors (together with two other 
researchers) have recently used the approach again to measure labour market discrimination 
of job seekers of different casts in India (Banerjee et al. 2009), where they generally did not 
find signs of discrimination. The method has further been used by Oberholzer-Gee 2008 with 
applications from unemployed and employed to test for an unemployment stigma. In other 
recent papers, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) measured the effect of different ethnic 
backgrounds and Drydakis (2009) the effect of the sexual orientation of the applicant on the 
application success. 
 
A strength and a weakness of correspondence testing is the fact that it only observes the 
application process up to the job interview, and does not take into account what happens 
after it. It’s a weakness because ultimately, one would be interested in the overall differences 
in the probability to get a job. However, the job interview itself contains so many 
unobservable processes and characteristics (for example the appearance of the applicant, 
see Rooth 2009), that it is very difficult to control for them. In so called “audit studies” actors 
are used to measure the difference in outcome of the job interview. However, with this 
method it is difficult to provide proof that the matched testers are really identical in every 
aspect, including their social and communication skills. The experiment is not double-blind 
and an actor might consciously or unconsciously influence the outcome. Since these studies 
are expensive, the number of observation is much smaller (Bassanini and Saint-Martin 2008). 
Bassanini and Saint-Martin 2008 also argue that there is usually no reverse discrimination 
found in such audit studies (negative discrimination in the written application process and 
then positive discrimination during the job interview process - or the other way round). 
Therefore, discrimination in the first stage of the application process does provide at least 
evidence of the presence and direction of the overall hiring discrimination.  
 
In this study, in contrast to the way correspondence testing is usually used, no fictional 
applications were created. Instead, information was collected on the real applications sent 
out by unemployed job seekers. This has the advantage that applications are as real as 
possible. Forging applications can be difficult for researchers if applications from a whole 
range of educational and occupational backgrounds have to be mimicked. Through the 
observational approach, a larger number of applications can be assessed as the method is 
less time-consuming. Although fewer variables can be held constant than in the experimental 
design (like the quality of the cover letter for example), the compiled data set is very rich and 
contains many variables describing the unemployed. It also includes data on the quality of 
his or her reference letters (in Switzerland, it is standard to attach them directly to the written 
application).  
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3. Data 
Data on the application process is systematically gathered in all Swiss unemployment 
insurance agencies, using a self-reporting sheet filled out by the unemployed person. The 
unemployed track all their applications over the course of a month and hand the sheet over 
to the case worker at the end of the month. Most of these forms are filled out by hand, and 
while they are archived for quality checks and lawsuits, the information isn’t stored 
electronically. The data has not been used for research so far. In order to make this data 
source accessible, the data on the application sheets have to be stored electronically. This 
has been done in one agency of the Swiss Unemployment Insurance, the Zurich-
Staffelstrasse agency. Being a medium sized agency with both clients from city and rural 
areas and with a wide variety of occupations, this agency seemed well suited. Obviously, the 
data cannot be considered representative for the canton of Zurich or Switzerland as a whole, 
but it gives important insights. The data was gathered between 1st of July 2007 and 31st of 
March 2008. 
 
Of all the unemployed registered during this time, a stratified sample was taken: This sample 
contains all unemployed with at least one participation in an Active Labour Market Program 
(a quarter of all unemployed registered at Zurich-Staffelstrasse) and a random selection of a 
third of the spells in which the unemployed did not attend such a program. The reason that 
the sample was taken with this stratification is that the data was also used to evaluate Active 
Labour Market Programs (see the first essay of the thesis). From this sample, all applications 
within the lay-off period (the person wasn’t unemployed at any point of the spell) and 
applications during the last month of unemployment were dropped, as these periods are 
subject to different rules by the unemployment insurance. Including them would distort the 
analysis. The sample was then further restricted to applications to advertised job openings as 
the estimations use data from the job advertisements (to identify to quality of the match 
between the job opening and the applicant).  
 
The unemployed were asked to collect the advertisements of job openings they applied to (if 
the open positions were advertised). Altogether, 6637 job advertised of 467 were collected 
and then coded by the research team. This very time-intensive process was crucial to this 
study, because the data on requirements could then be compared to the skills and 
characteristics of the unemployed person. Thereby, an individual matching between the 
unemployed and the job opening could be calculated. While 6637 job advertisements is a 
very large number, please note that this is only 43.7 % of all job advertisements which could 
have been brought in if the advertisements would have been collected for every single 
application to an advertised job opening (altogether 15,198). 117 unemployed didn’t bring in 
a single cut-out job advertisement. Among the ones who did, the average unemployed 
brought in every second advertisement (49.6 %) to the next counselling session. This raises 
questions how representative the sub-sample is. 
 
Table 1 shows that the sub-sample “applications with a recorded job advertisement” is 
surprisingly balanced when compared to the total sample of “applications to advertised job 
openings”. Applications from women, younger and older unemployed and long term 
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unemployed are very similarly distributed in both groups. However, the unemployed who 
collected the advertisements were more often Swiss unemployed than in the overall sample 
of applications to advertised job openings. The reason for this is most likely language 
barriers: Some unemployed did not understand what was asked of them. However, even 
between Swiss and foreigners, the balance is kept quite well. The table also shows the 
balance for an indicator which captures the overall chances of an unemployed to find a job, 
as assessed by the case worker. This indicator is a forecast by the case worker at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell, and the table shows the proportion of unemployed with 
a forecast of 12 months and more (a long term unemployment forecast). The average 
unemployed in the sub-sample of those who handed the job advertisement in is slightly less 
likely to become long term unemployed in the eyes of the case workers, but the difference is 
small. A final comparison assesses the search intensity, measured as the average number of 
applications written in the week the application was sent off. As one would expect, this 
number is slightly higher in the sub-sample of unemployed who brought the job 
advertisements with them (because both, high search intensity and following the request to 
bring the advertisements along, might be a sign for motivation during the job search). Again, 
the difference is small and the sub-sample is largely representative also in this aspect. 
 
 
  
Applications to advertised  
job openings  
Applications with a recorded  
job advertisement 
     
Foreign origin 0.5207 0.5841 
     
Women 0.4809 0.4759 
Age <= 30 0.1871 0.1938 
Age >= 50 0.2346 0.2210 
Long term unemployed 0.2557 0.2547 
  
   
Unemployed has a long term unemployment forecast 0.5048 0.4655 
 
  
Search intensity (number of applications in the week  
the application was sent off) 
 
3.7201 3.7915 
     
N (applications) 15,198 6637 
N (unemployed) 584 467 
Table 1: Balance of sub-sample with recorded job advertisement compared with 
overall sample 
Note: Weights are used to compensate for stratified sample. 
 
 
Altogether, the data collection led to a database containing data of 6637 applications of 467 
unemployed persons. The number of observations decreases steeply as the duration of the 
spell increases; more and more unemployed leave as they find a job. The case number can 
be low when looking at the later stages of the unemployment spell (see Figure 1). Because 
of the stratification, data will be weighted in order to represent the proportions in the overall 
population. 
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Figure 1: Development of the number of applications in the sample 
Note: The graph shows the number of observation covered in each week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after 
which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 467 unemployment spells are observed. Because of left and right 
censoring this total number is not reached in any of the weeks. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the development of the proportion of applications which stem from foreigners. 
The ratio changes over time: There are more applications from foreigners as time passes by. 
The changing proportion is interesting for one part because this is an indicator of application 
success: an unemployed with a higher interview probability will also leave unemployment 
quicker than others. The shifting proportions might also pose a problem for the estimation 
however, because if there are fewer applications from Swiss citizens at a later stage of the 
spell, this might lead to a higher overall average interview probability of that group (as 
applications later in the spell have a generally lower chance than applications early in the 
spell). To further assess if the results are robust towards these changes in the sample, two 
separate estimations will be conducted for applications from an early and a late period in the 
spell.  
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Figure 2: Development of the relative frequency of applications by foreigners 
Note: The graph shows the proportion of applications in the sample which were written by foreigners, per week. The duration is 
plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 467 unemployment spells are 
observed. Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used. 
 
 
Two general objections to the data quality could be raised, both in connection to the self-
reporting nature of the application sheets. The first possible objection could be that not all 
records are truthful and that some unemployed record applications they have never written. 
While wrongly recorded data (on purpose or by mistake) cannot be ruled out, the amount of 
purposeful cheating should be rather small, as case workers regularly check back with 
employers if the unemployed have indeed applied to the job indicated on their self-reporting 
sheet. The second objection could be that because of the requirement to write at least 8 to 
12 applications, many unemployed don’t bother writing all their applications down and 
instead stop once the minimum has been reached, therefore depriving the dataset of all their 
other applications. Again, this doesn’t seem to be the case, neither according to statements 
by the case workers, nor showing up in the data. The applications are more or less evenly 
distributed over the stretch of a month, both the ones from Swiss and foreign unemployed 
(see Annex 1). If only the first 10 or so applications would be recorded, one would expect an 
accumulation at the beginning of the month.  
 
There is one more issue which has to be addressed in connection to the reporting sheet: 
Among other entries, the unemployed record the outcome of the application, whether they 
had an interview, a job offer or a rejection. The case workers at the trial agency reported that 
there was some confusion about the meaning of “job interview” when unemployed were 
carrying out personal applications (showing up at a company’s door step and asking for a 
job). A few unemployed recorded such a personal application as an interview. The avoid any 
bias, the data from unemployed who declared all their personal applications as a success 
were left away (this is already incorporated in the above mentioned observational numbers). 
 
Apart from the self-reporting application sheets, data sources used include the database of 
the Swiss unemployment insurance on registered unemployed persons, and a survey 
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conducted among case workers (to gather data on the unemployment duration forecast and 
the quality of the work references). 
 
 
 
 
4. Differences in the probability to be invited to a job interview  
Traditionally readily available data like the unemployment duration shows large differences 
between Swiss unemployed and unemployed with another nationality: While the average 
unemployment spell lasted 181 days (median value of the unemployed covered in the 
dataset), it was 169 days for Swiss and 203 days for foreigners. Among those who left the 
unemployment insurance during the observational period, 75.6 % reported that they 
deregister because they have found a job. Among Swiss (78.7 %) this proportion is higher 
while for foreigners (71.0 %) it is lower. This simple comparison shows that there are indeed 
large differences between the two groups, to the disadvantage of foreigners. The question 
this study seeks to answer is, what differences between the two groups can be found in the 
probability to be invited to a job interview once an unemployed person has sent his or her 
application off? This probability will be first estimated in a very simple regression where only 
a minimum of influences are held constant (the duration of the spell at the time) and later in 
successively more complex models through which many influencing factors are held constant 
(productivity related measures, application behaviour and occupational distribution). 
  
The following regressions are all conducted in a similar fashion. As the dependent variable, 
the model contains a dummy variable indicating if the application was a success. The dummy 
takes the value 1 if the application results in a job interview and 0 if it doesn’t. The mean 
value for this variable is 0.0431 which means roughly every 20th application is successful 
(see Annex 2 for the summary statistics per group). On the right side, a dummy variable 
which switches to one if the applicant is of foreign origin is entered into the estimation. The 
coefficient of this dummy measures the difference in the application success between Swiss 
and foreigners. Additional estimations are conducted where the simple dummy variable for 
foreigners is further split into dummies for foreigners from different regions (most of these 
estimations can be found in the Annex). Additionally, duration dummies are entered which 
indicate in which month the application was sent off. This is important because the interview 
probability falls quickly over time (see the first essay of the thesis). By including these 
dummies, one can also counteract the misbalance in the sample which stems from the fact 
that the majority of applications late in the unemployment spell are sent of by foreigners while 
the majority of early applications are written by Swiss citizens (see Figure 2).  
 
Then (in the next section) further variables are entered to control for influences which might 
distort the identification of a potential discrimination. The estimations are conducted by the 
OLS method, and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported (the errors take into 
account that some of the applications are clustered, i.e. from the same person). 
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In a first step, simple OLS regressions are run to estimate the difference between Swiss and 
foreign job seekers in their job interview probability (Table 1). The results show that on 
average, foreign unemployed have practically the same chance to be invited to a job 
interview. The probability is actually slightly higher for foreigners (+ 0.0014) but the difference 
is very small (it’s the equivalent of 3.2 % of the average interview probability in the sample, 
0.0431). This small difference is not statistically significant. There does not seem no be any 
overall difference which manifests itself directly on the nationality (at least none which shows 
up on the interview probability). This finding is very surprising; from literature, similar 
correspondence studies and descriptive statistics on other labour market outcomes (like 
wages) one would have expected foreigners to have a much lower interview probability for 
foreigners. It’s also surprising if one compares this result with the above mentioned average 
duration of an unemployment spell which shows that on average, foreign unemployed are 
unemployed for a longer period of time. Possibly Swiss unemployed fare better in the job 
interview situation and counteract this initial advantage of foreigners. Another explanation 
could be that foreigners apply on average to jobs where more applicants are screened in the 
interview process. This would allow them to enjoy a high probability to be invited to a job 
interview but it would not increase their overall chance to receive a job offer. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability  
 
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 
   
Foreigner 0.0014  
 (0.0082)  
 
  
From a neighbouring country 
 0.0436** 
(Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein)  (0.0166) 
   
From an EU or EFTA country 
 -0.0072 
(other than the neighbouring countries)  (0.0177) 
   
From an non-EU / non-EFTA country 
 -0.0114 
  (0.0085) 
   
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes 
  
 
Constant 0.0768** 0.0728** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) 
   
Sample 
  
Number of measurements 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 
   
Estimation 
  
R-squared 0.0092 0.0141 
F-value 2.5938 3.0891 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Table 2: Interview probability of unemployed of different origins 
 
 
It is possible that very heterogenous interview probabilities hide behind this aggregated 
dummy for foreigners, depending on the region the foreigner comes from. Because of the 
limited number of unemployed covered in the study, it is not possible to estimate the effects 
for the unemployed of single nations. Therefore, broad regional dummies are entered: 
foreigners from a neighbouring country, foreigners from another EU-27/EFTA country (from 
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one of the 27 member states of the European Union or from one of the four member states of 
the European Free Trade Association), and foreigners from outside the EU-27/EFTA area. 
The first of these three groups could have an advantage because of the cultural familiarity (of 
both the job seeker and the employer with each other) and because the neighbouring 
countries share the national languages of Switzerland. Both other groups might not share the 
above mentioned advantages but they still have access to the Swiss labour market 
(otherwise they would not be able to obtain unemployment compensation).  
 
The second column in Table 2 shows the results of the estimation with the differentiated 
foreigner variable. The results indicate that there is a very large positive effect for foreigners 
migrating from one of Switzerland’s neighbouring countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy 
and Liechtenstein). That group of unemployed has an interview probability which is 0.0436 
higher than the one for Swiss unemployed. This very large difference (it’s as high as the 
average interview probability in the sample, 0.0431) is statistically significant on a 1 %-level.  
 
The coefficient for the group of foreigners from an EU-27/EFTA countries is slightly negative 
(-0.0072) and the coefficient for foreigners from a non-EU-27/EFTA country (this is 
geographically a very diverse group obviously) is strongly negative at -0.0114. Both 
coefficients are not statistically significant. It seems that the positive foreigner effect is limited 
to the neighbouring countries. While these differences between Swiss and foreigners as 
captured in Table 2 and 3 are interesting themselves, they are not proof that discrimination 
does or does not exist, as productivity related measures for example are not held constant.  
 
 
 
 
5. Holding productivity related measures, application behaviour 
and the occupational distribution constant 
In order to reject the interpretation of simple group comparisons of labour market outcomes 
as a sign for discrimination, two arguments are usually used. One is that groups vary in 
productivity and that this has to be taken into account. Foreigners might experience worse 
(or better) labour market outcomes because they have higher (or lower) education or lack of 
local language knowledge. The other one is that it might be a matter of choice where people 
like to work and that some jobs might be remunerated less because they are more enjoyable 
in other ways (Figart 2009). Foreigners could have a better labour market outcome because 
they work in more dangerous jobs for example. In order to show that differences in labour 
market outcomes might indeed be due to some form of discrimination, one has to show that 
these differences still exist, even with productivity related measures and the occupational 
distribution being held constant. As a third possible explanation for differences in the 
interview probability, the application behaviour of the unemployed will also be examined.  
 
The first group of variables tries to approximate the unobservable productivity of an 
unemployed person. Note that the productivity is also not directly observable to the employer, 
especially not that early in the application process. Ideally therefore, in trying to find a 
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discriminatory component, one should choose the same or similar measurements of 
productivity the employer would use when receiving an application. The most important 
indicators of productivity for an employer are probably the quality of the match between the 
job requirements and the skills, education and experience of the job seeker. This match is 
usually hard to include in studies because of the lack of data on it. However, for this study 
over 6,000 job advertisements were collected, coded and recorded which made it possibly to 
match the requirements against the data available on the unemployed in the database of the 
unemployment insurance. Through this, several variables showing the matching quality could 
be calculated: The occupational match (previous occupation of the unemployed versus 
occupation mentioned in the job advertisement), educational level, knowledge of the German 
language, age and gender. In case of occupation, German knowledge and gender the 
matching variable is a dummy variable switching to 1 if the requirement is fulfilled. In case of 
education and age, where the unemployed can have a value too low or too high, a set of 
dummies is used (education is split into “requirement fulfilled, “overqualified” and 
“underqualified”, and age is split into “requirement fulfilled”, “too old” and “too young”). For 
each set, there is also a dummy variable indicating if there was no requirement mentioned in 
the job advertisement. 
 
Next, the level of praise in the last three work certificates is introduced. In Switzerland, it is 
common to attach a copy of the last few work certificates to the application and they seem to 
be treated with importance (as public debates over them regularly show). As good or very 
good work certificates are common (see the summary statistics in Annex 2), one would 
expect that mainly sub-standard work certificates leave their mark on the chances of a job-
seeker. Therefore, not the average level over the last certificates is added the model, but 
instead the lowest level of praise found in any of the last three certificates. Three dummies 
are included, one dummy for a unsatisfactory minimum level of the certificates, a dummy for 
a satisfactory level and one dummy for a good to very good level.  
 
A third estimation assesses if the results change if the highest education (5 groups are 
distinguished) and the former function level (three groups are distinguished: management, 
professional and low-skilled level) of the unemployed are added as further explanatory 
variables. The educational match has already been included as part of the matching 
variables, but it’s possible that education has an influence beyond the pure match with the 
requirements: It might (or might not) signal to employers a quick grasp of things, willingness 
to learn and persistence. Experience in the occupation could also be included among these 
general productivity related variables, but the database of the unemployment insurance lacks 
data on it.  
 
The results in Table 4 show that compared with the original result (Table 2) indeed a large 
change to the group coefficient is noticeable once the matching quality is held constant. 
When the matching variables are added, the coefficient for foreigners experiences a huge 
increase, from a coefficient close to zero (0.0014) to a strong positive one (0.0211) which is 
significant on a 5 %-level. The relative size cannot easily be compared to the constant as the 
constant now represents a Swiss unemployed who does not fulfil one single requirement 
mentioned in the job advertisement. The coefficient is best compared to the overall average 
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interview probability for all unemployed (at any stage of the spell), 0.0431. The difference is 
49.0 % of that average.  
 
The fact that the foreigner coefficient rises once the matching variables are introduced shows 
that the match with the requirements is often quite bad for foreigners. The summary statistics 
in Annex 2 point to the local language knowledge requirement which is most often not fulfilled. 
Indeed, only 10.2 % of all applications written by foreigners fulfil the German requirement, 
while 58.5 % of the applications don’t fulfil the requirement and 31.3 % of the applications are 
directed to advertisements which did not mention a German requirement. For Swiss, the 
respective proportions are 34.6 % (fulfilled), 12.4 % (not fulfilled) and 53.1 % (no 
requirement). The relatively high number of applications by Swiss unemployed who do not 
fulfil the German requirement probably stem from Swiss unemployed who are originally from 
another region of Switzerland (where one of the other three national languages is spoken; 
French, Italian or Rhaeto-Romanic), or from persons who migrated from another country and 
have acquired Swiss citizenship in the mean time. As the language requirements mentioned 
in the job advertisement and the skills recorded in the database do not have the same coding, 
a conversion rule had to be applied. Possibly, the language matching criteria was chosen too 
hard – after all, a large proportion of the unemployed fails to fulfil it, both of foreign and Swiss 
origin. However, test haven shown that loosening the criteria does not change any of the 
results. Employers seem to favour foreigners over Swiss citizens if the language component 
is kept constant – this result is both surprising and puzzling in as far what could be the root 
cause for this. 
 
Next the minimum level of praise in the last three work certificates is introduced. If this level 
of praise is held constant, the foreigner coefficient is slightly increased compared to its 
original size. The new dummy variables seem to compensate for the fact that foreigners have 
more often insufficient work certificates (an insufficient work certificate is attached to 15.8 % 
of the applications by foreign unemployed compared to 9.0 % applications from the Swiss 
unemployed). Also, 22.8 % of applications from foreigners do not have a work certificate 
attached at all (compared to 10.9 % of the Swiss applications). This might also have a 
negative impact. The reason for the lack might be that the foreigner comes from a country 
where written work certificates are not common practice. A Swiss employer however might 
interpret the fact that an applicant does not attach such work certificates as a signal that the 
job seeker has not worked at all before, that she or he had temporary jobs for which no job 
reference was received, that he or she had a bad relationship to the previous employers or 
that the certificate was so bad that the job seeker prefers not too reveal it.  
 
The fourth and last column enters the highest education and the former function level of the 
unemployed as independent variables. Adding these variables does also increase the 
coefficient of foreigners. Foreigners (at least the unemployed ones) possess more often than 
Swiss job seekers either a weak or strong formal education, while Swiss job seekers are 
more equally distributed over the different educational categories: 62.4 % of foreign 
unemployed have no further education beyond compulsory schooling. Among Swiss, this 
proportion is 16.5 %. However, 10.6 % of foreign job seekers have a university degree, while 
among Swiss this is slightly less at 10.4 %. The regression results show (coefficients are not 
displayed in the tables) that education has a strong influence on the interview probability; the 
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higher the education, the better the chances. In the case of foreigners, the high number of 
job seekers without further schooling or vocational training reduces the overall interview 
probability of the group. Once this influence is held constant, the foreigner coefficient rises to 
a higher level. 
 
The coefficient for foreigners is much higher than the original coefficient from the estimation 
without those variables when all the productivity related measures are added together. While 
adding any of the controls variables had a positive influence on the foreigner coefficient, it 
was clearly the matching variables which raised it to its highest level. Adding all control 
variables together, the coefficient for foreigners is actually slightly lower than in the 
estimation with just the matching variables. It seems that the impacts of the control variables 
cancel each other out to a certain degree. However, the coefficient in this final estimation is 
still of a very large size (but remains not statistically significant).  
 
Differentiating the one dummy variable for foreigners further into dummy variables for the 
different regions (foreigners from neighbouring countries, foreigners from EU-27/EFTA 
countries or foreigners from a non-EU-27/EFTA country) continues to result in a very large 
positive coefficient for foreigners from a neighbouring country and smaller but also positive 
coefficients for foreigners from the other two regions. These results are shown in Annex 3 (all 
other tables in the main text are replicated using the three region dummies, and displayed in 
Annex 3 to 7).  
 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability     
 
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
      
Foreigner 0.0014 0.0211* 0.0037 0.0057 0.0148 
 (0.0082) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0091) 
 
     
Match between unemployed person and open position  
(occupation, education, German, age and gender match) 
no yes no no yes 
Level of praise in work certificates  
(the lowest level in one of the last 3 certificates determines the value) 
no no yes no yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person no no no yes yes 
 
     
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes 
  
    
Constant 0.0768** -0.0015 0.0548** 0.0520** -0.0286 
 (0.0124) (0.0230) (0.0141) (0.0181) (0.0260) 
      
Sample 
     
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 467 
      
Estimation 
     
R-squared 0.0092 0.0206 0.0113 0.0185 0.0280 
F-value 2.5938 2.8700 2.3118 2.6490 2.6595 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). The 13 
duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Table 4: Group specific interview probabilities – controlled for productivity related 
measures 
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It remains surprising that foreigners do not have a disadvantage – wether one does or does 
not include productivity related indicators. Once these variables are introduced, foreigners 
have a distinct advantage over Swiss unemployed. These positive gains through the control 
variables are mainly due to introducing a variable which holds the match to the German 
language requirement of the job, on which many foreigners fare badly, constant. Below, 
some more estimations will be performed to analyse this finding further.  
 
In Table 5, the first column assesses the impact of the matching variables if all the matching 
variables but the variables describing the match to the German language requirement are 
added. The second column shows the estimation if all the variables are included (including 
the German language match). The results show that the foreigner coefficient is much weaker 
if the German language match is missing, although the other matching variables also have a 
strong positive effect on the size of the coefficient. In a next estimation (third column) 
additional dummies are entered to control for the German language abilities of an 
unemployed person (the direct match to the German requirement is again removed). The 
results show that once these dummies are included, the foreigner coefficient becomes highly 
positive (+ 0.0227) and the difference to Swiss unemployed becomes statistically significant 
on a 5 %-level. The results also show that the interview probability is very low for foreign 
unemployed who only speak basic German (this is the lowest level assigned in the 
assessment): This group has an interview probability which is 0.0565 lower than the one for 
native German speakers. Equally bad off are persons which have not been tested yet (this 
might be because there is a high proportion of persons with very low levels of German in this 
group). Foreigners with a medium or high knowledge of the German language however have 
no disadvantage over persons with native German knowledge. In fact, medium German 
knowledge results in an advantage over both native speakers and unemployed with high 
German knowledge – this is hard to explain, but it might just be due to a random occurrence 
(the coefficient is not statistically significant). 
 
Adding both language and language matching dummies, the foreigner coefficient is 
practically the same as the one in the estimation with just the language dummies. In this 
combined estimation the coefficients of the language matching dummies are only a bit 
smaller while the German matching dummies fare quite a lot weaker. However, fulfilling the 
language requirement still has a strong positive impact, despite holding language knowledge 
constant – it seems that both matching the requirement and general language knowledge 
matter.  
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Dependent variable: Interview Probability  
   
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
    
 
Foreigner 0.0079 0.0148 0.0227* 0.0228* 
 (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
     
Match with German language requirement mentioned in job advertisement 
    
Requirement fulfilled  0.0379**  0.0094 
  (0.0106)  (0.0125) 
No requirement mentioned  0.0174*  -0.0017 
 
 (0.0084)  (0.0092) 
 
    
Knowledge of the German language (omitted category: native German) 
    
Basic   -0.0565** -0.0522** 
   (0.0139) (0.0143) 
Medium   0.0260 0.0298 
   (0.0569) (0.0585) 
High   0.0071 0.0064 
   (0.0204) (0.0208) 
Not tested   -0.0509** -0.0467** 
 
  (0.0123) (0.0130) 
 
    
Match between unemployed person and open position  
(occupation, education, age and gender match - without German language match) 
yes yes yes yes 
Level of praise in work certificates  
(the lowest level in one of the last 3 certificates determines the value) 
yes yes yes yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person yes yes yes yes 
 
 
   
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes 
  
   
Constant -0.0116 -0.0286 0.0309 0.0226 
 (0.0254) (0.0260) (0.0254) (0.0261) 
     
Sample 
    
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 
     
Estimation 
    
R-squared 0.0250 0.0280 0.0337 0.0341 
F-value 2.5413 2.6595 3.2999 3.1165 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). The 13 
duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Table 5: The influence of German language knowledge 
 
 
Next several variables are introduced to examine if the differences in group specific interview 
probabilities might be explained through different application behaviour of Swiss and foreign 
unemployed (Table 6). Two dummy variables are introduced first which indicate if the 
application was a phone or personal application (the omitted category are the written 
applications). Both phone and personal applications have a considerably higher interview 
probability than written ones, and it’s therefore possible that a group using one of these 
methods more frequently achieves a higher overall probability. Indeed, the foreigner 
coefficient turns from slightly positive (with no control variables apart from the duration 
dummies, first column) to slightly negative (additionally controlled for application method, 
second column). Foreigners seem to use these productive methods more often then Swiss 
(see Annex 2) – holding their influence constant, the foreigner coefficient is decreasing. 
However, the foreigner coefficient remains close to zero and is statistically not significant. 
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In the third column, two dummy variables are introduced which indicate if the application has 
been linked to a public placement (by the case worker of the unemployment insurance) or a 
private placement (by one of the private recruitment agencies). Including data on placements 
does not change the foreign group coefficient at all. This is perhaps not surprising as 
placements are quite uncommon (only 7.4 of all applications are linked to a placement). 
Similarly, adding the search intensity of the unemployed person, measured as the number of 
applications written in the week the application was sent off, to the model does not change 
the interview probability of foreigners relative to one of Swiss unemployed by much. While a 
higher search intensity can decrease the average interview probability (if the unemployed 
first applies to the position with the highest interview probability, then to the position with the 
second-highest etc.), it probably also correlates with motivation and the effort put into the 
applications (and therefore could correlate positively with the interview probability of an 
unemployed). In either case, this does not seem to affect the foreigner coefficient.  
 
Adding all the variables describing the application behaviour together in the last estimation of 
this set, the foreigner coefficient reaches its lowest level yet. However, it is still close to zero 
and not statistically significant. One can summarize that different application behaviour does 
not seem to explain much of the difference between the application performance of 
foreigners and Swiss job seekers. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability         
  
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
      
Foreigner 0.0014 -0.0034 0.0010 0.0012 -0.0039 
 (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0083) 
 
     
Method of applying (written, phone or personal application) no yes no no yes 
Placement (public or private) no no yes no yes 
Search intensity (number of applications written) no no no yes yes 
      
 
     
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes 
  
    
Constant 0.0768** 0.0701** 0.0769** 0.0756** 0.0687** 
 (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
      
Sample 
     
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 467 
      
Estimation 
     
R-squared 0.0092 0.0242 0.0093 0.0093 0.0244 
F-value 2.5938 3.5781 2.7961 2.5221 3.6568 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
For control for the method of applying and placements two dummies each are entered. The 13 duration dummies are:  
1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Table 6: Group specific interview probabilities – controlled for application behaviour 
 
 
A final group of control variables relate to the occupational distribution. It could be argued 
that by comparing the job interview probability across all occupations and industries, one is 
comparing oranges with apples if the assessed groups apply in different industries or 
different occupations (Darity and Mason 1998). These industries / occupations might be 
feature different levels of competition. The estimations in Table 7 check the validity of that 
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argument and assess if any of the group differences might be explained through the 
occupational distribution. The battery of tests consists of first adding dummies for each of 
twelve industries, then refining this broad classification further by adding 119 dummies for 
the occupations. Note that the estimation is thereby restricted to the intra-industry and intra-
occupation variation respectively. In the case of the occupational dummies, one thereby also 
effectively discards all the information from unemployed who are the only sample member in 
their occupation (54 unemployed). 
 
There are also arguments against holding the occupational distribution constant in an 
estimation of group differences. As Darity and Mason (1998) state, the occupational 
distribution might be a type of discrimination itself (rather than an exogenous factor) if society 
pushes a group into particular jobs. Bergman 1974 and 2007 has argued in her crowding 
hypothesis that the occupations which are over-frequented by discriminated groups tend to 
be over-crowded. The high supply of workers pushes the wages down. Workers of 
discriminated groups nevertheless don’t leave the occupation because societal pressure or 
government regulations only allow them to work in certain occupations or industries.  
 
One would indeed expect the level of competition around an open position to have a direct 
and major influence on the interview probability. Unfortunately, the number of applicants is 
not known. It can be approximated however through the number of unemployed in the 
occupation to which the advertised position belongs, in the region (the canton of Zurich). On 
a purely descriptive level, there is some evidence of a possible “over-crowding” in 
occupations where foreigners apply. The summary statistics show that the average 
application is sent to a position which belongs to an occupational group with 742 unemployed 
in the region. Because the region is rather small and accessible, one might be compete with 
up to 742 other applicants for that job opening (not to forget all the applicants which still have 
a job, or applications which are willing to commute or to relocate from another region. While 
for Swiss unemployed this number is 670, foreigners compete with up to 840 potential 
competitors. In a third estimation, the number of unemployed in the occupation is added to 
the model (note that it is not the occupation of the unemployed but the occupation of the job 
opening which is included – of course they might often be the same one). 
 
The results in Table 7 show that after adding the industry dummies, foreigners fare much 
better. The coefficient grows from 0.0014 to 0.0064. Adding occupational dummies results in 
changes in the same direction, but the foreigner coefficient grows even more, to 0.0085. 
Adding the number of unemployed has also the effect in increasing the coefficients, however, 
the change is quite a weak one, from 0.0014 to 0.0019. The foreigner coefficient remains 
statistically not significant in all estimation, even when the new control variables are added. 
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Dependent variable: Interview Probability     
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
     
Foreigner 0.0014 0.0064 0.0085 0.0019 
 (0.0082) (0.0091) (0.0108) (0.0083) 
 
    
Industry (12 dummies) no yes no no 
Occupation (119 dummies) no no yes no 
Number of unemployed in the occupation no no no yes 
 
    
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes 
  
   
Constant 0.0768** 0.0739** 0.0706** 0.0789** 
 (0.0124) (0.0167) (0.0117) (0.0131) 
     
Sample 
    
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 
     
Estimation 
    
R-squared 0.0092 0.0125 0.0619 0.0094 
F-value 2.5938 1.7212 1.8177 2.3389 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The number of unemployed in the occupation (119 categories are differentiated) is measured as the total number in the region (the 
canton of Zurich). The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more 
months. 
Table 7: Group specific interview probabilities – controlled for occupational 
distribution 
 
 
In fact, these changes behave just as expected. Foreigners apply in industries with high 
competition and therefore below average interview probability. This decreases their chances. 
Once this effect is held constant (through the industry dummies, occupational dummies or 
directly through the number of unemployed in the occupation) the chances are increased for 
foreigners.  
 
After separately holding productivity related measures, application behaviour and 
occupational distribution constant with their respective sets of variables, it is now interesting 
to see what happens if they’re all included simultaneously in the estimation. Table 8 shows 
two estimations. The first one contains simply the group dummy for foreigners and the set of 
duration dummies. The second one contains the group dummy and all discussed control 
variables, apart from the occupation dummies. Latter are excluded because they might result 
in an over-specification of the model with their high number of estimated dummies – the 
effect of an “over-crowding” can also be captured through the industry dummies and the 
number of unemployed in the occupation. 
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Dependent variable: Interview Probability   
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 
   
Foreigner 0.0014 0.0257* 
 (0.0082) (0.0111) 
 
  
Productivity related measures 
  
Match between unemployed person and open position no yes 
Level of praise in work certificates no yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person no yes 
Knowledge of the German language no yes 
 
  
Measurements of application behaviour 
  
Method of applying  no yes 
Placement no yes 
Search intensity no yes 
 
  
Measurements of occupational distribution 
  
Industry no yes 
Number of unemployed in the occupation no yes 
 
  
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes 
  
 
Constant 0.0768** 0.0136 
 (0.0124) (0.0281) 
   
Sample 
  
Number of measurements 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 
   
Estimation 
  
R-squared 0.0092 0.0533 
F-value 2.5938 3.4068 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). For both 
method of applying and placements two dummies are entered. The number of unemployed in the occupation (119 categories are 
differentiated) is measured as the total number in the region (the canton of Zurich). The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 
7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Table 8: Group specific interview probabilities – controlled simultaneously for 
productivity related measures, application behaviour and occupational distribution 
 
 
The results show that overall, the foreigner coefficient is greatly increased, from 0.0014 to 
0.0257, when all controls are added. The latter coefficient is statistically significant on a 5 %-
level. These results confirm what has already been found in the previous estimations: Once 
productivity related measures, application behaviour and occupational distribution are held 
constant, foreigners have a distinctive advantage over Swiss. The previous estimations have 
also shown that holding the application behaviour constant does not change a great deal. 
However, holding productivity related measures (among it, most importantly, language 
knowledge and the match with the language requirement) and the occupational distribution 
(and thereby the distribution into jobs with a high or low competition) constant, increases the 
chances of foreigners, as they have both a generally bad match with the language 
requirement and are distributed into jobs with a high competition. 
 
As discussed in the data section, the proportions of applications stemming from foreigners 
changes over time. This fact can have an influence on the estimation. For example, if there 
are more applications from foreigners later in the unemployment spell (Figure 2), this might 
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lead to a lower overall average interview probability, as applications early in the spell have 
generally a higher chance than applications later in the spell. In order to test for this affect, 
Annex 8 replicates the estimations shown in Table 8, but this time the estimation is 
conducted separately for the two following duration groups: Applications in month 1 to 6 and 
applications in month 7 and later. This split was chosen because it divides the sample 
roughly in half. The estimation results show that the foreigner coefficient has the same sign 
no matter if one uses all applications, only applications during the first six month or only 
applications from month 7 onwards. However, the coefficient is much larger in the first period 
(+ 0.0330). In the second period the coefficient is decreased (0.0107) and not statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, 0.0107 is also a large difference between the two groups. 
 
 
 
 
6. Interaction with gender, age and unemployment duration 
So far, foreigners have been studied as one large homogenous group. However, in 
calculating the average effect, one might miss important differences within the group itself. In 
order to unveil more of this in-group heterogeneity, the interaction of the dummy variable for 
foreigners with other group dummy variables is assessed. Especially other groups which 
might potentially experience discrimination themselves are of interest. Four groups of 
unemployed are analysed in this way: women, younger unemployed (30 years of age and 
younger), older unemployed (aged 50 and older) and the long term unemployed 
(unemployed with a spell duration of more than a year). Gender specific differences in labour 
market outcomes have been – together with differences between foreigners and locals - a 
main focus of the discrimination literature. It seems interesting to broaden the spectrum of 
potentially discriminated groups and also include age groups, on which a lot of political 
discourse has been initiated in many countries. In Switzerland, the debate has been sparked 
through very high youth unemployment (very high for the generally low Swiss unemployment 
rates at least) during the last peak of unemployment. Older job seekers also experience a 
high unemployment rate which is characterized through fewer unemployed experiencing very 
long unemployment spells. Finally, there also seems a high level of suspicion of employers 
towards unemployed with a spell of more than twelve months (the so called “long term 
unemployed”). Employers seem to take the long spell as a signal for low employability and 
are not willing to take the risk (AMOSA 2006). 
 
In a first estimation, additional group dummies are added to the model; one for each group. 
Because the group dummies are included simultaneously, each group coefficient shows the 
influence of that particular group membership while holding the other included memberships 
constant. To predict the effect of a multiple group membership in this estimation one would 
simple add the coefficients of the relevant groups (for woman and foreigner for example, to 
predict the overall effect for female foreigners). This simple approach does not allow for more 
complex interactions between the groups but restrains the estimation of the effect of the 
group memberships to simple linear additions. It does however give a good indication if the 
foreigner coefficient is truly driven through the fact that a person is foreign, rather than being 
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young or male (foreigner unemployed are on average younger than Swiss unemployed and 
more often male). In a second step, interaction terms between the group of foreigners and 
the other group memberships are added. These are dummy variables which switch to 1 if 
both group memberships are given. The coefficient indicates how much the interview 
probability is increased or decreased if one is member of both groups (additional to the effect 
both group memberships have separately).  
 
The results in Table 9 show that the foreigner coefficient is extremely stable when the other 
group variables are added. This shows that the high positive foreigner coefficient is not due 
to a correlation to another group variable (at least not to one which has been tested here). In 
terms of the other group coefficients, it’s interesting to see that women show a much higher 
interview probability than men (the coefficient is large at +0.0094, however not statistically 
significant) when productivity related measures, application behaviour and occupational 
distribution are controlled for. In fact this finding is just as surprising as the overall positive 
coefficient for foreigners. This shows that the fact that women experience lower salaries 
(2008 men earned 24 % more (BFS 2008)) does not translate directly into a worse 
performance as an unemployed job seeker. Both younger and older job seekers have lower 
chances than the middle age category (unemployed 31 to 49 years old); older job seekers 
have a large negative coefficient (-0.0214) which is statistically significant on a 5 %-level. 
Finally, as expected, the long term unemployed show a much lower interview probability as 
the unemployed with a duration less than a year (-0.0283, statistically significant on a 10 %-
level).  
 
The third column shows the large changes which take place when the interaction terms are 
introduced. From the simple group coefficients, only the foreigner coefficient stays stable. All 
other group coefficients have been largely affected by the inclusion of the new interaction 
terms. The coefficient for women has turned from positive (0.0094) to negative (-0.0046). 
This shows that it really matters for the gender specific differences if the woman is Swiss or 
of foreign origin. While Swiss women have a lower interview probability than Swiss men (as 
can be seen by the negative coefficient for women), foreign women have an advantage over 
foreign men (as can be seen by adding the coefficient for women and the strongly positive 
coefficient of the interaction term for foreign women). When the focus is put on foreigners, 
the results show that while male foreigners have a strong advantage over male Swiss (as 
can be seen by the coefficient for foreigners, 0.0239), female foreigners have an even larger 
advantage over female Swiss (as can be seen by adding the coefficient for foreigners and 
the interaction term for foreign women, 0.0239 + 0.0300 = 0.0539). Why this large difference 
exists between the genders regarding their foreigner coefficient is not clear. Maybe there is a 
larger demand in the jobs female foreigners do. This could theoretically be tested, by adding 
occupational dummies to the estimations - one thereby estimates the difference purely on 
intra-occupational grounds. However, the model with the occupational dummies is very 
highly specified (as it adds another 119 dummies to an already large model) and therefore 
not reliable with this number of unemployed. 
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Dependent variable: Interview Probability    
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
    
Foreigner 0.0257* 0.0258* 0.0239 
 (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0146) 
 
   
Woman 
 0.0094 -0.0046 
 
 (0.0081) (0.0092) 
30 years old and younger 
 -0.0058 0.0127 
 
 (0.0100) (0.0145) 
50 years old and older 
 -0.0214* -0.0099 
  (0.0099) (0.0116) 
Long term unemployed 
 -0.0283+ -0.0346* 
 
 (0.0157) (0.0159) 
 
   
Foreign woman 
  0.0300+ 
 
  (0.0179) 
Foreign 30 years old and younger 
  -0.0349+ 
 
  (0.0208) 
Foreign 50 years old and older 
  -0.0317+ 
   (0.0190) 
Foreign long term unemployed 
  0.0083 
 
  (0.0155) 
 
   
Productivity related measures 
   
Match between unemployed person and open position yes yes yes 
Level of praise in work certificates yes yes yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person yes yes yes 
Knowledge of the German language yes yes yes 
 
   
Measurements of application behaviour 
   
Method of applying  yes yes yes 
Placement yes yes yes 
Search intensity yes yes yes 
 
   
Measurements of occupational distribution 
   
Industry yes yes yes 
Number of unemployed in the occupation yes yes yes 
 
   
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes 
  
  
Constant 0.0136 0.0134 0.0076 
 (0.0281) (0.0278) (0.0284) 
    
Sample 
   
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 
    
Estimation 
   
R-squared 0.0533 0.0550 0.0571 
F-value 3.4068 3.3637 3.3380 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). For both 
method of applying and placements two dummies are entered. The number of unemployed in the occupation (119 categories are 
differentiated) is measured as the total number in the region (the canton of Zurich). The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 
7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Table 9: Interaction between origin, gender, age and unemployment spell duration 
   
 
The coefficient for young people has also changed sign (from -0.0058 to 0.0127). Again, this 
means that the effect is very different for foreign and Swiss unemployed aged 30 years or 
less. While it’s Swiss young people have an advantage over the middle age category 
(+0.0127), foreign young people have a disadvantage (-0.0222). Among Swiss, the 
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unemployed aged 50 years or more has a moderate disadvantage (-0.0099), while among 
foreigners, the group has a large disadvantage (-0.0416). 
 
Focussing on foreigners, it seems that the positive foreigner effect is purely determined 
through the middle age category (31 to 49 year olds). For this group, the overall positive 
foreigner coefficient is relevant: Foreigners of the middle age group have an interview 
probability which is 0.0239 higher than the one of Swiss unemployed in the same age group. 
Both younger and older foreigners however have a slight disadvantage against the Swiss 
unemployed (-0.011 for the younger and -0.0078 for the older group). Because these 
coefficients are not statistically significant the thesis that these differences are actually zero 
cannot be rejected. 
  
Finally, the inclusion of the interaction terms made the coefficient for the group of the long 
term unemployed even larger. Swiss long term unemployed have therefore a very large 
disadvantage over their compatriots which are not (yet) long term unemployed (-0.0346). 
Among unemployed foreigners, the drop in the interview probability over time is not quite as 
large. The difference between foreign long term unemployed and foreign short term 
unemployed (that is, less than twelve months unemployed) is – 0.0263. Assessing the group 
of foreigners, both short term and long term unemployed have an advantage over the short 
and long term unemployed Swiss respectively. Among the short term unemployed, the 
difference is 0.0239. Among the long term unemployed, it is even larger at 0.0322. However, 
this last result is not fully conclusive when compared to the split results from Annex 8. These 
results, which stem from separate estimations for applications written between month 1 and 
6 and applications written from month 7 onwards, show that the foreigner coefficient 
becomes smaller later on in the spell. All estimations however show that foreigners have a 
higher interview probability than Swiss.  
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Levels and measures of productivity often lie at the heart of the discrimination debate, but 
they are difficult to measure. A new dataset on unemployed job seekers and their 6,637 
applications includes the quality of the match between the job seeker and the requirements 
mentioned in the job advertisement he or she is applying to. This allows approaching 
productivity from another angle which is very similar to the one employers have to use in 
their assessment if they want to invite an applicant to a job interview or not. First separately 
and later simultaneously, measures of application behaviour and the occupational distribution 
were also added to the estimations, to assess if these might explain some of the group 
differences.  
 
Adding these control variables greatly increased the coefficient for the group of the foreign 
job seekers from a small coefficient (0.0014) to a much larger one (0.0257) which is 
statistically significant on a 5 %-level. It is really quite surprising that foreigners do not have a 
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disadvantage over Swiss – without even adding productivity related measures or other 
control variables. It is even more surprising that by holding productivity related variables, 
application behaviour and occupational distribution constant foreigners have an advantage 
over Swiss job seekers. Why that is cannot be explained through the data. One possible 
reason for these above-average chances might be that a selection process takes place. If 
unemployed foreigners who perceive their own chances to find a job soon as low leave 
Switzerland and return to their country of origin (first generation immigrants), the average 
interview probability in the pool of foreign unemployed which stay in Switzerland would 
increase (the higher probability would have to be due to some characteristic or skill not 
included in the models used in this study, otherwise these would have been held constant). 
This would also explain why job seekers from neighbouring countries have a particularly 
large positive coefficient (of course, this is at least partly also due to the cultural familiarity of 
employers and such job seekers with each other). Another (part) explanation could be that 
on average, foreigners apply to jobs where more applicants are screened in the interview 
process. They would enjoy a high probability to be invited to a job interview but their overall 
chance to receive a job offer would not have been increased. This would explain why foreign 
unemployed have a higher interview probability than Swiss unemployed but that this does 
not actually translate into a shorter unemployment spell or a lower unemployment rate. When 
looking at the interview probability, there certainly seems to be different rules at play than 
those for other labour market outcomes like wages. Foreigners earn less than Swiss citizens, 
at least in low skilled jobs – and that’s where most of the unemployed foreigners search for 
employment (in high skilled jobs, foreigners actually earn more than Swiss citizens, see BFS 
2009).  
   
This study has set out to estimate the discriminatory component of a particular labour market 
outcome, the probability to be invited to a job interview once the unemployed has sent an 
application off. It has been found that the advantage is actually reversed from the one would 
expect based on studies in other countries or from other labour market outcomes in 
Switzerland. It is certainly too early on basis of these preliminary results to speak of a 
discrimination of Swiss citizens - after all, the results only stem from one unemployment 
agency, and despite the very large number of job advertisements collected, the observational 
number is still quite low in some groups. Also, there are several other labour market 
outcomes on which foreigners fare far worse (wages, unemployment duration, 
unemployment rate). However, the size of the coefficient – and its statistical significance – 
are quite a clear indication that at least on this outcome, the dynamics around discrimination 
might be more complex than previously thought. 
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: Applications recorded in a typical month at Zurich-Staffelstrasse 
 
 
 
Note: Averages over the nine month of data collection are shown. Day 30 and day 31 were reweighed because their lower number of appearance. 
December was not taken into account. Weights are used to compensate for stratified sample. 
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Annex 2: Summary statistics 
 
  
All Swiss Foreigners 
 
  
 
Interview Probability 0.0431 0.0455 0.0399 
  
    
  
Matching quality 
      
Occupation match       
Occupation (5-Code) fulfilled 0.30 0.27 0.35 
Occupation (3-Code) fulfilled 0.09 0.11 0.07 
Occupation (1-Code) fulfilled 0.14 0.12 0.16 
Requirement not fulfilled 0.46 0.49 0.42 
No requirement mentioned 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        
Education match       
Requirement (exactly) fulfilled 0.14 0.19 0.09 
Underqualified 0.19 0.14 0.25 
Overqualified 0.23 0.29 0.15 
No requirement mentioned 0.44 0.38 0.51 
        
German knowledge match       
Requirement fulfilled 0.24 0.35 0.10 
Requirement not fulfilled 0.32 0.12 0.59 
No requirement mentioned 0.44 0.53 0.31 
        
Age match       
Requirement fulfilled 0.24 0.14 0.37 
Too young 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Too old 0.09 0.06 0.12 
No requirement mentioned 0.66 0.78 0.49 
        
Gender match       
Requirement fulfilled 0.16 0.15 0.17 
Requirement not fulfilled 0.02 0.02 0.03 
No requirement mentioned 0.82 0.84 0.79 
        
Work Certificates (worst level out of the last three certificates) 
      
Below sufficient (3.9 and less out of 6 possible points) 0.12 0.09 0.16 
Sufficient to good (4 to 4.9 out of 6 possible points) 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Good to very good (5 to 6 out of 6 possible points) 0.53 0.61 0.43 
No work certificate 0.16 0.11 0.23 
        
Education 
      
No further education 0.36 0.17 0.62 
Apprenticeship 0.28 0.37 0.16 
Gymnasium 0.06 0.09 0.02 
Technical college 0.10 0.15 0.04 
University 0.10 0.10 0.11 
Education not known 0.09 0.13 0.05 
        
Former function 
      
Management 0.10 0.12 0.09 
Professional 0.49 0.66 0.27 
Low skilled 0.48 0.32 0.68 
        
Knowledge of the German language 
      
Native German 0.55 0.82 0.18 
High 0.02 0.00 0.04 
Medium 0.03 0.01 0.04 
Basic 0.15 0.04 0.29 
Not tested 0.26 0.13 0.45 
        
Application behaviour 0.72 0.78 0.64 
Written application 0.24 0.20 0.30 
Phone application 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Personal application    
        
Public Placement (public employment service) 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Private Placement (private recruiter) 0.05 0.05 0.05 
        
Search intensity (number of application in the week  
the application was sent off) 4.12 4.08 4.19 
        
Essay 3: An Opening Door?  126 
 
Annex 2: Group characteristics (continued) 
  
All Swiss Foreigners 
Industry 
      
No answer, first sector or “private household” 0.14 0.18 0.09 
Industry 0.11 0.06 0.17 
Building and Constructing 0.12 0.14 0.10 
Trade and Commerce 0.18 0.09 0.31 
Hospitality industry 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Transport and Communication 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Financial services 0.16 0.14 0.19 
Business services (incl. IT) 0.04 0.07 0.01 
Public administration 0.05 0.09 0.01 
Health and social services 0.06 0.08 0.03 
Other services 0.04 0.05 0.02 
        
Number of unemployed in occupation in  
which the open position is placed 742.44 669.79 839.76 
        
N (unemployed) 467 244 223 
N (applications) 6637 3781 2,856 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Interview probabilities controlled for productivity related measures (regional 
estimation) 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability     
 
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
      
From a neighbouring country (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein) 0.0436** 0.0425* 0.0421* 0.0310+ 0.0288+ 
 (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0167) 
From an EU or EFTA country (other than the neighbouring countries) -0.0072 0.0120 -0.0079 0.0005 0.0118 
 (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0190) (0.0171) (0.0184) 
From an non-EU / non-EFTA country -0.0114 0.0094 -0.0082 -0.0089 0.0049 
 (0.0085) (0.0108) (0.0089) (0.0105) (0.0117) 
 
     
Match between unemployed person and open position  
(occupation, education, German, age and gender match) 
no yes yes yes yes 
Level of praise in work certificates  
(the lowest level in one of the last 3 certificates determines the value) 
no no yes yes yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person no no no yes yes 
 
     
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes 
  
    
Constant 0.0728** 0.0021 0.0540** 0.0573** -0.0217 
 (0.0124) (0.0234) (0.0141) (0.0179) (0.0271) 
      
Sample 
     
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 467 
      
Estimation 
     
R-squared 0.0141 0.0221 0.0154 0.0205 0.0287 
F-value 3.0891 3.1613 2.7307 3.5115 3.1375 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). The 13 
duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
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Annex 4: Interview probabilities controlled for language knowledge (regional 
estimation) 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability  
   
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
    
 
From a neighbouring country (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein) 0.0288+ 0.0288+ 0.0297+ 0.0297+ 
 (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) 
From an EU or EFTA country (other than the neighbouring countries) 0.0026 0.0118 0.0278 0.0278 
 (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0189) 
From an non-EU / non-EFTA country -0.0045 0.0049 0.0144 0.0147 
 (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
     
Match with German requirement mentioned in job advertisement 
    
Requirement fulfilled  0.0337**  0.0090 
  (0.0112)  (0.0126) 
No requirement mentioned  0.0146  -0.0019 
 
 (0.0089)  (0.0092) 
 
    
Knowledge of the German language (omitted category: native German) 
    
Basic   -0.0526** -0.0486** 
   (0.0162) (0.0165) 
Medium   0.0310 0.0344 
   (0.0568) (0.0584) 
High   0.0113 0.0105 
   (0.0198) (0.0201) 
Not tested   -0.0476** -0.0437** 
 
  (0.0136) (0.0140) 
 
    
Match between unemployed person and open position  
(occupation, education, age and gender - without German match) 
yes yes yes yes 
Level of praise in work certificates  
(the lowest level in one of the last 3 certificates determines the value) 
yes yes yes yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person yes yes yes yes 
  
   
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes 
  
   
Constant -0.0046 -0.0217 0.0330 0.0250 
 (0.0262) (0.0271) (0.0259) (0.0266) 
     
Sample 
    
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 
     
Estimation 
    
R-squared 0.0264 0.0287 0.0341 0.0344 
F-value 3.2032 3.1375 3.7165 3.5314 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). The 13 
duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
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Annex 5: Interview probabilities controlled for application behaviour (regional 
estimation) 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability         
  
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
      
From a neighbouring country (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein) 0.0436** 0.0396* 0.0433** 0.0433** 0.0391* 
 (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0178) 
From an EU or EFTA country (other than the neighbouring countries) -0.0072 -0.0070 -0.0080 -0.0074 -0.0077 
 (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0169) 
From an non-EU / non-EFTA country -0.0114 -0.0175* -0.0120 -0.0116 -0.0181* 
 (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
 
     
 
     
 
     
Method of applying (written, phone or personal application) no yes no no yes 
Placement (public or private) no no yes no yes 
Search intensity (number of applications written) no no no yes yes 
      
 
     
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes 
  
    
Constant 0.0728** 0.0654** 0.0727** 0.0718** 0.0639** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0121) 
      
Sample 
     
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 467 
      
Estimation 
     
R-squared 0.0141 0.0294 0.0143 0.0142 0.0297 
F-value 3.0891 3.5741 3.2468 3.0576 3.6350 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
For control for the method of applying and placements two dummies each are entered. The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 
5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
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Annex 6: Interview probabilities controlled for occupational distribution (regional 
estimation) 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability     
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 0.2031 
     
From a neighbouring country (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein) 0.0436** 0.0519** 0.0499* 0.0438** 
 (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0198) (0.0167) 
From an EU or EFTA country (other than the neighbouring countries) -0.0072 -0.0043 -0.0000 -0.0071 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0271) (0.0177) 
From an non-EU / non-EFTA country -0.0114 -0.0089 -0.0037 -0.0117 
 
    
Industry (12 dummies) no yes no no 
Occupation (119 dummies) no no yes no 
Number of unemployed in the occupation no no no yes 
 
    
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes 
  
   
Constant 0.0728** 0.0800** 0.0700** 0.0723** 
 (0.0124) (0.0169) (0.0118) (0.0132) 
     
Sample 
    
Number of measurements 6637 6637 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 467 467 
     
Estimation 
    
R-squared 0.0141 0.0180 0.0643 0.0141 
F-value 3.0891 2.3717 2.1931 2.9185 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The number of unemployed in the occupation (119 categories are differentiated) is measured as the total number in the region (the 
canton of Zurich). The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more 
months. 
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Annex 7: Interview probabilities controlled simultaneously for productivity related 
measures, application behaviour and occupational distribution (regional estimation) 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability   
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 
   
From a neighbouring country (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein) 0.0436** 0.0350+ 
 (0.0166) (0.0188) 
From an EU or EFTA country (other than the neighbouring countries) -0.0072 0.0257 
 (0.0177) (0.0175) 
From an non-EU / non-EFTA country -0.0114 0.0166 
 (0.0085) (0.0138) 
 
  
Productivity related measures 
  
Match between unemployed person and open position no yes 
Level of praise in work certificates no yes 
Highest attained education and former function of unemployed person no yes 
Knowledge of the German language no yes 
 
  
Measurements of application behaviour 
  
Method of applying  no yes 
Placement no yes 
Search intensity no yes 
 
  
Measurements of occupational distribution 
  
Industry no yes 
Number of unemployed in the occupation no yes 
 
  
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes 
  
 
Constant 0.0728** 0.0157 
 (0.0124) (0.0288) 
   
Sample 
  
Number of measurements 6637 6637 
Number of unemployed 467 467 
   
Estimation 
  
R-squared 0.0141 0.0537 
F-value 3.0891 3.6507 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). For both 
method of applying and placements two dummies are entered. The number of unemployed in the occupation (119 categories are 
differentiated) is measured as the total number in the region (the canton of Zurich). The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 
7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
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Annex 8: Estimation split according to duration period 
 
Dependent variable: Interview Probability All applications First 6 months of unemployment Month 7 and later 
Mean 0.0431 0.0431 0.0549 0.0549 0.0302 0.0302 
Std. Dev. 0.2031 0.2031 0.2278 0.2278 0.1712 0.1712 
       
Foreigner 0.0014 0.0257* -0.0012 0.0330+ 0.0048 0.0107 
 (0.0082) (0.0111) (0.0129) (0.0171) (0.0093) (0.0106) 
 
      
Productivity related measures 
      
Match between unemployed person and open position) no yes no yes no yes 
Level of praise in work certificates no yes no yes no yes 
Highest attained education and former function  
    of unemployed person 
no yes no yes no yes 
Knowledge of the German language no yes no yes no yes 
 
      
Measurements of application behaviour 
      
Method of applying (written, phone or personal application,  no yes no yes no yes 
Placement (public or private) no yes no yes no yes 
Search intensity (number of applications written) no yes no yes no yes 
 
      
Measurements of occupational distribution 
      
Industry (12 dummies) no yes no yes no yes 
Number of unemployed in the occupation no yes no yes no yes 
 
      
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  
     
Constant 0.0768** 0.0136 0.0777** -0.0100 0.0136 -0.0169 
 (0.0124) (0.0281) (0.0124) (0.0452) (0.0130) (0.0337) 
       
Sample 
      
Number of measurements 6637 6637 3460 3460 3177 3177 
Number of unemployed 467 467 323 323 219 219 
       
Estimation 
      
R-squared 0.0092 0.0533 0.0038 0.052 0.0079 0.083 
F-value 2.5938 3.4068 1.0343 3.4415 1.1238 5.3192 
  
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The match between the unemployed person and open position is measured in five dimensions (occupation, education, knowledge of the 
German language, age and gender). Each dimension is measured through a set of dummies (usually requirement fulfilled; requirement 
not fulfilled; no requirement mentioned in the job advertisement). The level of praise in the work certificate is measured as a set of 
dummies representing the lowest level of praise in the last three work certificates. The highest attained education is measured through 
five dummies and the former function of the unemployed through three dummies (low skilled, professional, management). For both 
method of applying and placements two dummies are entered. The number of unemployed in the occupation (119 categories are 
differentiated) is measured as the total number in the region (the canton of Zurich). The 13 duration dummies are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 
7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
